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Preface
The four earlier technical studies in this series were devoted to
analytical techniques appropriate in a variety of problems that a busi
ness manager must face in running his business. This study covers
another important decision—the decision to sell a business or to buy
someone else’s.
As with all other management services technical studies, this one
focuses on the role of the CPA as an analyst and advisor to his client.
While the types of business problems covered thus far constitute only
a part of the management services activities of most CPAs, they do
represent a significant portion of the management services practice.
This is particularly true for the small and medium-sized businesses
typically served by local and regional CPA firms; the CPA serving such
clients needs a large kit of analytical tools. The purpose of this study
is to describe and illustrate some of the analytical techniques that are
appropriate in purchase and sale decisions. Many of the analytical
techniques described in the earlier studies are also relevant in a pur
chase or sale analysis. To avoid repetition, however, these techniques
are not described in detail here. This study is based on the assumption
that the reader already has a thorough knowledge of those techniques
described earlier.
Scope of This Bulletin

Because of the importance of this topic, a large and excellent body
of literature already exists; several recent books concerned with
mergers and acquisitions are listed in a bibliography at the end of this
chapter. Three of those works were written from the point of view of
a corporate financial executive, a lawyer, and a CPA, and were the
subject of a comparative review in a recent magazine article.1 Most
1 Wakefield, B. R., “Keeping In fo rm ed : M ergers and Acquisitions,” Har
vard Business Review , Septem ber-O ctober 1965.
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practitioners will wish to have all three volumes in their library be
cause they cover many important aspects of the topic not dealt with
in this study. This bulletin seeks to fill a gap in the existing literature
by devoting itself exclusively to the analytical role of the CPA advisor
to small businesses. This emphasis results in two important limitations
on the scope of this study:
1. Small business. The “purchase and sale” title is intended to imply
that this bulletin is dealing with a somewhat different phenomenon
than the widely discussed “merger and acquisition” activities of large
corporations. Although there are many similarities in terms of the
problems to be faced by both large and small businesses, there are also
significant differences other than in the dollar magnitude of the transac
tion. For example, organizational planning and the administrative
integration of two corporations into a new efficient economic unit is
an important aspect of large mergers. For small businesses, however,
this problem is frequently one of little consequence; only a limited
number of people are involved and during the negotiations they will
have ample opportunity to “size up” each other and decide whether
or not they will be able to work together after the transaction is con
summated. Personality conflicts may cause a breakdown in negotia
tions, but this occurs as an almost automatic byproduct of the nego
tiating process rather than as a separate problem to be explicitly dealt
with. The net effect is that the purchase or sale of a small business
is frequently a much cleaner problem, from an administrative point of
view, than the merger or acquisition of a large business.
Another important characteristic of small business transactions is
that they usually do not require involvement with or approval of fed
eral regulatory agencies. The relatively small size of these transactions
usually precludes any consideration of the anti-trust laws, particularly
in cases where one small business is buying another. Nevertheless, the
CPA should have sufficient familiarity with anti-trust legislation in
order to be able to advise his client concerning the need for expert
legal opinion on the subject. If a small business is being sold to a
larger enterprise, the buyer may be exposed to anti-trust involvement,
and the CPA advisor to the small business seller should raise a question
early in the negotiations. Usually, however, the seller can rely on the
advice of counsel for the buyer who is experienced in these matters
and who will seek to protect his client from potential anti-trust liti
gation.
In a similar manner, most small business transactions do not require
SEC registration or compliance with other regulations of that agency.
viii

Most small businesses are owned by one individual or by a very small
group of stockholders. Usually, the owners are intimately familiar with
the operations of the business, thus eliminating the need for careful
and complete disclosure to investor-stockholders who must approve a
purchase or sale transaction. Both anti-trust and SEC considerations
are important factors in large mergers or acquisitions, but they are not
dealt with in this study.
2. Analytical role of the CPA. There are at least three phases to a
purchase or sale engagement, and the CPA’s role will depend upon
how many of these the client wishes him to undertake and to what
extent he is to go.
The first phase is concerned with conducting a limited audit of the
financial statements prior to an acquisition. The second phase is de
voted to the income tax consequences of the alternative ways in which
an acquisition might be consummated.
Finally, there is a third phase which is concerned with preparing an
analysis of the economic consequences of the transaction in order to
assist the client in arriving at a reasonable price, and to provide the
client with summaries of quantitative data for his use in the negotiating
process.
The latter phase is the subject of this study.
This is the fifth in a series of five technical studies prepared under
the general supervision of Professor Richard F. Vancil, D.B.A., CPA,
Harvard Business School and Henry DeVos, CPA, manager, manage
ment services. Assistance in field research and case writing was pro
vided by Dr. James S. Hekimian, Dr. Charles J. Christenson, Dr. David
Hawkins, Dr. Robert C. Deming, Dr. Robert C. Hill, and L. Paul
Berman.
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Analysis for Purchase or
Sale of a Business
This chapter is devoted to a general discussion of the analytical role
played by a CPA in the purchase or sale of a small business. First,
consideration is given to the motivating factors which lead the buyer
and the seller to consider the transaction in the first place; the CPA
can perform his job competently only if he thoroughly understands
what the parties to the transaction are trying to achieve. Then, through
the use of illustrative examples, the remainder of the chapter is devoted
to the analysis that the CPA might perform for the seller, his role in
the initial negotiating session, the analysis that he might perform for
the buyer, and finally, the part he might play in the resolution of con
flicts in the final negotiations. The study then presents four actual case
studies in which a CPA and his client were involved in the purchase
or sale of a small business.
MOTIVATIONS FOR THE TRANSACTIONS

Considering all the problems that must be resolved and the inherent
conflict of interest between buyer and seller, it is amazing that so
many purchase and sale transactions are consummated every day. The
starting point for any understanding of the mystical process by which
buyer and seller reach agreement is the realization that there will be
no transaction unless both parties believe that it serves their own best
interests. In almost all cases, the financial aspect of the transaction is
only one of a host of considerations which motivate both the buyer and
the seller to arrive at some mutually agreeable arrangement. One of
the greatest contributions the CPA can make to a client entering
negotiations as either buyer or seller is to prepare a concise, dispassion
1

ate and objective statement of the motivations of both parties. In
particular, a clear understanding of the other party’s nonmonetary
motivations will permit the CPA’s client to emphasize the advantages
that would accrue to the other party through achieving these goals,
thus helping to steer negotiations toward the more favorable end of the
range of possible prices.
There are probably dozens of factors that motivate the purchase or
sale of a small business, but some of the more common ones are listed
in Exhibit 1, below. Most transactions involve varying combinations
of several of these factors, a point that will be illustrated in the case
studies that follow. Here it is sufficient to comment briefly on some
of the more important motivations.
Seller’s Motives

Most small businesses are not for sale. This simple, rather obvious
fact is all too frequently ignored by an aggressive buyer. It is also
true, and obvious, that almost any small business can be purchased at
a sufficiently high price, but if price is the only factor motivating the
seller, that price will frequently be too high to be attractive to the
buyer.
W hat motivates the small businessman to run his own business in
the first place? A composite answer from a cross section of such men
would include such things as the desire to be his own boss, the satis-

Exhibit 1

COM M ON M OTIVES
FO R PURCHASE OR SALE TRANSACTIONS

Factors Motivating the Seller
• Impending Retirement of Owner
• Resolution of Existing or Potential Estate Problems
• Source of Capital for Expansion
• Access to Better Management and Administration
• Desire to Be Part of a Larger Organization
Factors Motivating the Buyer
• Attractive Investment Opportunity
• Desire to Achieve Economies of Scale: Integration Cost Savings
• Alternative or Supplement to Internal Growth
• Source of Additional Management Talent
2
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faction of creating something, and an honest belief in the spirit of free
enterprise. Such a man rarely sells his business solely for money; the
personal dislocation is too great. In addition, as the owner grows older,
two nonmonetary factors become increasingly important. The first
is a natural desire to perpetuate the business rather than let it die ( as
most small businesses do) when the owner retires. Many small busi
nessmen, in effect, “sell” their business by bringing in a younger man
and training him to take over when the owner retires. The second
factor, related to the problems of estate valuation in the settlement
of estate taxes, occurs only if the business is sizable. In such a circum
stance, turning the business over to a younger man is less feasible and
may motivate the owner to seek an outside buyer.
Most small businessmen are not aggressively seeking to expand the
scope of their operations. The personable owner-operator of a single
unit in a distribution or service industry may earn a very good living
even though he lacks the capital, management talent, and personal
aspirations to expand into a multi-unit chain. Where he does have such
aspirations however, the other two requirements—capital and man
agement—may lead him to seek a buyer for part or even all of his
business. The price, in terms of dilution of the owner’s equity, to be
paid for new resources is a critical factor in such a transaction, but the
recognized need for the new resources may lead the owner to be more
realistic in terms of his selling price than he would be if he were not
motivated by the desire to expand.
Finally, some quite successful small businessmen find that their
personal goals and ambitions change over a period of time and they
conclude that they might be happier as part of a larger organization.
The motivation to sell in this instance is quite intangible, reflecting
some combination of a desire to share the responsibility for running
the business, a desire to reduce a demanding personal workload, and/or
a desire to reduce the financial risk of having a major portion of his
personal assets committed to one operation. Despite the personal nature
of these considerations, a buyer dealing with such a seller is well ad
vised to recognize the importance of these factors to the seller and to
stress them in the negotiations, thus de-emphasizing the importance of
the purchase price itself.

Buyer’s Motives

In contrast to the seller’s motives, the buyer’s motives are usually less
personal and emotional. He has more options. His business is usually
3

healthy and expanding. The possibility of purchasing a particular small
business must make sense, on a dollar and cents basis, when compared
with the alternatives of purchasing other similar businesses or starting
a competitive business from scratch. If he has had prior experience
with acquisitions, the buyer is usually well aware of the problems and
risks of purchasing someone else’s business, and he tries to insist on a
purchase price that will be low enough to compensate him for assum
ing those risks.
Nevertheless, just as in the case of the seller, there are frequently
some more subtle considerations that motivate the buyer, and the
seller who recognizes these factors will improve his own negotiating
position. For example, the amalgamation of two businesses that are in
related activities may produce a new economic unit which is more
profitable than the sum of the two independent units. This synergy
is the most common rationale for business combinations. Usually, it is
the buyer who is in a better position to estimate the advantages and
cost savings from integration, but the seller should not overlook these
advantages. It may, in fact, be true that the seller’s business is worth
more to the buyer than it is to the seller. The seller who recognizes
this fact may be able to negotiate a higher price.
If the buyer is committed to a program of expansion for his own
business, the purchase of a related enterprise that is compatible with
his objectives may be quite attractive. The advantages of such a
purchase—savings of both time and money—are powerful motivating
factors. Starting a new business, or another unit in a chain operation,
involves not only startup losses during the early months but also
carries a significant administrative cost. Acquiring an existing business
that has already incurred these costs and losses also avoids the two- or
three-year time lapse that is frequently required to bring the unit to an
efficient and profitable level. Unless the seller has a truly unique loca
tion, a franchise, or an unusual degree of management skill, he is not
really offering to sell the buyer anything that the buyer could not pur
chase piecemeal in the creation of a new unit of his own. But the
“goodwill” of an established operation does offer tangible values to the
buyer which the seller should attempt to recoup in the negotiations.
Finally, almost any business, and particularly an expanding one, can
use additional managerial talent. If the seller has demonstrated his
executive abilities through building a business which is attractive to
the buyer, one of the most important assets to be sold may be the seller
himself. The continued employment of the owner-manager and other
members of his organization is a matter to be discussed early in the
negotiations with a potential buyer. If the employment contracts for
4
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key executives are to be a part of the transaction, the salaries and other
terms of these agreements become an almost inseparable part of the
purchase price negotiations.
Summary

If the purchase or sale of a small business were simply a matter of the
transaction price, the most efficient means of arriving at that price
would be an auction. But price is only one aspect of the transaction, a
counterweight to be put on the scale by the buyer to balance off a host
of other considerations which are also involved in the transaction. The
CPA acting as an advisor to either a buyer or a seller must make a con
scious effort to explicitly identify these other factors and bring them
into the negotiations. When such an approach is followed, the net re
sult will usually be more fruitful discussions and a more satisfactory
mutual agreement between the parties.

ANALYSIS FOR THE SELLER

The CPA’s role as an advisor to the client who is selling a small busi
ness may take many forms. In order to make a discussion of this role
more tangible and to illustrate some of the analytical techniques in
volved, an actual case history will be used. While the case discussed
here will not touch on all of the CPA’s activities, the additional case
studies which follow this chapter will illustrate other variations of his
role. The Hastings-Robinson, Inc. case has been chosen for discussion
here because both the buyer and the seller engaged a CPA to assist
them in the transaction. The discussion will proceed chronologically,
covering a six-month period from March through September 1966, be
ginning with the seller’s decision to engage a management services
consultant and concluding with the sale of the business to a larger
company.
Hastings-Robinson, Inc.

In September 1954, Charles Hastings and James Robinson incorpo
rated a new enterprise under the name of Hastings-Robinson, Inc.
Both men, then in their mid-thirties, had grown up in the Cleveland,
Ohio area, and they believed that there was a substantial business
opportunity in renting equipment and small tools to construction con
tractors in that area. Many of the construction contractors operated as
5

sole proprietorships, bidding on jobs as prime or subcontractors and
hiring workmen as required. They frequently were undercapitalized,
and their ability to support a heavy investment in equipment was there
by limited. Their need for special types of equipment tended to be
sporadic. The two men thought that they could provide a real service
to those contractors by making expensive and special purpose equip
ment available for rental on an hourly, daily, weekly or monthly basis.
The economic feasibility of such a rental operation had already been
proven on the West Coast; several rental yards had been started during
the late forties in California. The inherent advantage of a rental yard
was that it reduced the amount of time that a piece of equipment
would remain idle. For example, a single contractor might require the
use of a heavy-duty air compressor for only five days per month and,
if he owned it, he would have to spread the full cost of ownership over
the time that the compressor was utilized. The same piece of equip
ment in a rental yard might be utilized 10 to 15 days per month, thus
permitting the ownership costs to be spread over a broader time span,
yet permitting a return for the operator of the rental yard. Contractors
found that the rental service was not only less costly for certain types of
equipment but also more convenient. The equipment cost behavior,
rather than being fixed, became variable and therefore easier to calcu
late in preparing a bid for a specific contract. Further, equipment cost
became an avoidable expense if the contract was not awarded.
Starting with an initial capitalization of only $50,000, and a limited
inventory of equipment, Hastings-Robinson opened their first rental
yard in Cleveland in early 1955: Over the next eleven years the busi
ness grew steadily and profitably. The first branch was opened in
Akron during 1957, followed by branches in Mansfield in 1959, Toledo
in 1961, and Pittsburgh in 1965. Because of the seasonal nature of the
construction business, Hastings-Robinson changed its fiscal date from
August 31 to January 31 in 1960; the two owners had decided that the
best time to open a new rental yard was in March or April, and a
January 31 closing date permitted them to absorb start-up costs of a
new yard in the same fiscal period as its first year of operation. Con
densed financial statements for the fiscal years 1963 through 1966 are
presented in Exhibits 2 and 3 (pages 7 and 8).
Because of the nature of the business, its expansion required sub
stantial amounts of new capital. In the fall of 1960, a package of sub
ordinated debentures and common stock was sold. Part of these se
curities were purchased by Messrs. Hastings and Robinson, and the
balance by five individual investors in the Cleveland area. The effect
of this transaction was to reduce the percentage of common stock held
6

ANALYSIS FOR PURCHASE OR SALE OF A BUSINESS

by the two men to just under 80 per cent. By 1964, the progress of the
company was sufficient to qualify it for a long-term loan from an in
surance company, and $400,000 was raised in this manner. While the
loan agreement contained restrictive covenants, it did not substantially
hamper the continued expansion of the company. By the spring of
1966, however, Hastings-Robinson was again beginning to feel the
pinch of funds to finance further expansion and Mr. Hastings, the
president, decided to seek outside assistance.
Beginning with its 1960 fiscal year, Hastings-Robinson, Inc. had re
quested a local CPA firm to prepare all of its financial statements. In
March 1966, Mr. Franklin, the partner in charge of the audit, was work
ing in Hastings-Robinson’s offices completing the working papers for

Exhibit 2

HASTINGS-ROBINSON, INC.
Com parative Income Statements
For the Years E nded January 31, 1963-1966
(All Amounts in Thousands)
Years E nded
January 31
1963

1964

1965

1966

Sales and rental income ............................
Cost of sales .............................................

$1,825
1,201

$2,109
1,356

$2,332
1,462

$3,099
1,912

Gross profit on sales ..........................

$ 624

$ 753

$ 870

$1,187

Expenses:
Selling and adm inistration
Interest ........................................................
O ther items (net) .....................................

$ 515
28
7

$ 594 $ 679 $ 868
59
47
24
(6)
(6)
(4)
$ 614 $ 720 $ 921

Total expenses

$ 550

O perating incom e before taxes
Provisions for taxes .................................

$

74
36

N et operating income
R etained earnings Feb. 1
Special item :
Gain on sale of undeveloped real estate
(net of taxes) .......................................

$

38
109

—

R etained earnings January 31

$ 147

N um ber of shares outstanding ..................
Earnings per share

$

221
.17

$ 139
62

$ 150
58

$ 266
84

$

$

92
224

$ 182
316

—

—

55

$ 224

$ 316

$ 553

$

77
147

221
.35

$

221
.42

$

221
.82
7
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HASTINGS-ROBINSON, INC.
C om parative Balance Sheets
January 31, 1963-1966
(All Amounts in Thousands)
1963

January 31
1964
1965

1966

ASSETS
C urrent Assets:
Cash ................................... ...........
Accounts receivable .......
Inventory ..........................
O ther current a s s e ts ........ ..........

$ 24
209
484
14

$

Total current assets ................

$731

Rental E quipm ent:
Heavy duty ...................................
Small tool .....................................

89
322
560
17

$ 299
429
388
27

$ 648

$ 988

$1,143

$242
—

$ 365
251

$ 376
299

$ 722
485

Total ...........................................
Less accum ulated depreciation

$242
124

$ 616
268

$ 675
284

$1,207
341

N et book value:
Heavy duty ...............................
Small tool .................................

$118
—

$ 225
123

$ 228
163

$ 545
321

$118

$ 348

$ 391

$ 866

O ther Assets .....................................

$ 76

$

71

$ 225

$ 118

Total assets ...................................

$925

$1,067

$1,604

$2,127

Total

26
169
435
18

$

LIA B ILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY
C urrent Liabilities:
Accounts payable and accruals
E quipm ent notes ........................

$ 186
241

$ 209
250

$ 277
201

$ 431
354

$427

$ 459

$ 478
400

$ 785
400

Total senior liabilities ...........

$427
$ 258

$ 878
$ 59
258

$1,185

D eferred Taxes ...............................
Subordinated D ebt ........................
Stockholders Equity:
Paid-in capital ............................
R etained earnings ......................

$ 459
$ 33
258

93
147

93
224

93
316

93
553

Total stockholders equity

$240

$ 317

$ 409

$ 646

Total liabilities and stockhold
ers equity ............................

$925

$1 ,067

$1 ,604

$2,127

Total current liabilities
Long Term Notes Payable

8

$

84
212
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Exhibit 3, continued

January 31
1963
Ratios:
Senior debt % of total capital .
Common stock: Shares at year
end ..............
Book value per
share ...........
R eturn on average equity

46%

1964
43%

1965
55%

1966
56%

221

221

221

221

$1.09
17%

$ 1.43
28%

$ 1.85
25%

$ 2.92
35%

the year end. While chatting with him one afternoon, Mr. Hastings
asked if Mr. Franklin could recommend anyone as an advisor to the
company on its financial problems. Mr. Franklin replied that many
CPA firms did “management services” work of that sort, but that his
own firm concentrated almost exclusively on audit and tax work. He
went on to say that he was well acquainted with another local CPA,
Mr. Richard Nelson, whose practice was concentrated mainly in the
fields of management services and income tax planning. He and Mr.
Nelson had frequently referred clients to each other and Franklin’s
clients appeared to have been satisfied with the work performed by the
other CPA. At Hastings’ request, Franklin agreed to notify Nelson that
he might expect a call; subsequently, Hastings telephoned Nelson and
invited him to visit Hastings-Robinson, Inc. so that the problem could
be explained to him.

Opportunities for Growth

A few days later, Hastings and Nelson met, and Hastings gave him
a brief history of the company. He then went on, “As I see it, the rental
of construction equipment is an industry that has just reached adoles
cence, but is going to mature very rapidly from this point on. Prac
tically anything can be rented these days, and we’ve got to define our
segm ent of the business quite carefully. If w e exclude th e ren ta l oper

ations that handle party furniture and sickroom equipment, and those
that deal primarily in small tools for the do-it-yourself market, there are
only a few dozen rental yards in the whole country that really con
centrate on construction equipment. More than half of those are
low-volume operators that will never be more than single-location
9

operations. We have no trouble competing against such yards because
we carry a much larger inventory, can afford sales promotions, and, in
general, run our yards in an efficient manner. At the other end of the
spectrum, we also compete with equipment distributors whose main
line of business is the sale of new and used equipment, but who also
offer short-term rentals on some of the used equipment that they have
in inventory. Rental of equipment and sale of equipment are comple
mentary lines of business. The real question is which side of the busi
ness gets the emphasis. We concentrate on the rental side, and there
fore carry a wider range of equipment for rental than most equipment
distributors even though they may be several times our size.
“So that really only leaves a couple dozen of us,” Mr. Hastings went
on, “that are large enough and ambitious enough to recognize the
growth potential in our business. We’ve had a virgin field these last
few years, and our growth has been most satisfying. But we won’t
have the field to ourselves forever. I’ve heard that several large com
panies are beginning to look hard at this type of business; just a few
weeks ago, Gotham Equipment Corporation, one of the most im
portant manufacturers of air compressors, back-hoes, and other equip
ment, purchased a small chain of rental yards on the West Coast.
Apparently, they see the potential in this business and they may be
planning to put together a nationwide chain.
“Well, I want to continue expanding too,” he continued, “but I
realize that we’ve got to move pretty fast if we are to establish our
selves in some of the cities that are not yet adequately served. I’d say
that the next three years are the critical ones; after that, the major
expansion phase of this industry will be over and it will be increasingly
difficult to find profitable new locations. On the other hand, it takes
from a quarter to a half million dollars to open a new branch with a
well-rounded inventory so an expansion program really takes a lot of
cash. Our company is already borrowing about as much money as the
banks are comfortable with, so we’re in the ‘box’ of having expansion
ideas that are much too big for our ‘financial britches.’ We’ve got the
know-how to run a chain of yards, a good young management team
coming along, and the desire to expand; the question is where and how
do we get the money?”
Nelson was interested in the problem posed by Hastings, and
thought that he could be helpful because he had had similar experi
ences with rapidly growing companies in other industries. The two
men spent a couple of hours discussing various aspects of the job to be
done, and as he left, Nelson said that he would get in touch with
10
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Hastings within a few days to present him with a specific proposal as
to how he might proceed.
Terms of the Engagement

When Nelson returned a few days later, he spoke from rough notes
on which he had jotted down the essential features of his proposal.
Subsequently, these notes provided the basis for an engagement letter
between Hastings-Robinson, Inc. and Mr. Nelson. The five steps in
the proposal are summarized briefly below:
1. Determination of the constraints, other than financial, that would
limit the amount of expansion possible during the next three years.
How many attractive new locations can be found and acquired? How
rapidly can managerial talent be developed within the organization?
2. Determination of the amount of new financing required to sup
port the maximum level of expansion possible in step 1. How much
cash will be available for reinvestment in the existing yards? What is
the pattern of cash outflows and subsequent inflows that may be ex
pected for each new yard that is started? W hat portion of these finan
cial requirements may be met with normal forms of senior debt such as
bank loans and equipment notes?
3. Calculation of the effect of dilution on the existing stockholders
for several alternative rates of growth. Money can usually be found to
finance profitable investments, but the existing stockholders may have
to give up too large a share of the equity if they attempt to finance the
maximum growth rate determined in step 1. From the point of view of
the existing stockholders, what would be the effect on their equity in
the business if a somewhat slower rate of growth were planned?
4. Selection of a growth rate and a financial plan to implement it.
This decision is to be made by management. However, management
will be in a much better position to make a rational selection after
having an opportunity to review the analyses prepared in the first
three steps.
5. Initiation of a search for new sources of funds. Once manage
ment has made the strategy decisions in step 4, Mr. Nelson will prepare
a final report which would describe the company’s expansion plans and
project its financial requirements. This report could then be used in
the opening negotiations with a variety of lenders and investors.
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The two men discussed this proposal at some length, clarifying what
was to be done. In particular, Nelson stressed that his role in step 5
was not to actually locate the necessary sources of funds for HastingsRobinson, Inc. He would offer some suggestions as to sources, when
that point was reached, but his main role was to help the owners to
find what their financial needs were and to select a reasonable program
for meeting those needs.
As a final point in their discussion, Hastings raised the question of
professional fees. Nelson explained that he worked on a per diem basis,
that about six weeks of his time would be required over a period of
three months, that he would bill for time spent each month, and that
his fee would be approximately $6,000 plus any direct expenses in
curred. By early April, the agreement between the two men had been
reduced to writing and Nelson was ready to begin his task.

Projections of Financial Requirements

As a starting point, Mr. Nelson first spent several days in a detailed
examination of the operating performance of each of Hastings-Robin
son, Inc.’s five rental yards. His purpose was threefold:
1. By distilling the experiences of the five yards, he was eventually
able to prepare a statement of the fixed and variable expenses con
nected with a typical rental yard. These operating ratios were care
fully reviewed with Messrs. Hastings and Robinson, and were subse
quently used in the preparation of projected operating statements for
both existing and new yards.
2. Four of the existing yards had been in existence for more than
four years and, in Mr. Hastings’ opinion, had “matured.” Mr. Nelson
studied the pattern of developing volume in each of these yards, con
centrating on the relationship between the inventory of equipment
available and incom e attrib u tab le to th a t equipm ent. H e then applied

the growth pattern to the Pittsburgh yard that had been open only for
the last year, and projected what its mature volume might be. This set
of assumptions was then carefully reviewed with the owners.
3. Finally, by reviewing the equipment inventory records for the
various classes of equipment in each yard, Mr. Nelson was able to pre
pare estimates of the capital expenditures that would be required to
replace the equipment inventory as it wore out. W ith this final set of
12
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estimates, he was then able to prepare a complete set of projected
operating and cash flow statements for the five existing rental yards.
Reviewing his work at this stage with the owners, Nelson pointed
out that profits from the existing operations could be expected to leveloff at a point somewhat higher than the profits achieved for fiscal year
1966, and that these yards would produce a steady flow of cash which
would be available to provide part of the investment in new yards.
“That’s the next step,” he said. “If you had unlimited financial re
sources, how many new rental yards could you open during the next
three years?”
Constraints on Expansion

As Mr. Nelson put it, “An expansion program in this industry will
require three things: markets, management, and money. Let’s forget
about the last one for a while and concentrate on the availability of the
first two.”
During the ensuing discussion, Nelson became convinced that
Messrs. Hastings and Robinson understood the marketing side of their
business quite thoroughly. In the owners’ opinion, their smallest
branch in Mansfield was successful even though the population in that
metropolitan area was less than 100,000 people. The population in the
cities served by the other four branches ranged from a little over a
quarter of a million in Akron to over a million in Cleveland. With the
exception of the new branch in Pittsburgh, the other three larger
branches each had equipment inventories of $400,000 to $500,000, in
terms of original cost. Mr. Hastings said that a half million dollar in
ventory was the most efficient size; large enough to be quite profitable,
but still not unwieldly. The critical factor in the success of a new
branch, according to Mr. Robinson, was its location. Both he and Mr.
Hastings were proud of their “knack” for picking locations.
Summing up the discussion of market opportunities, Mr. Hastings
said, “It really depends on the level of construction activity, but my
guess is that any industrial city with a metropolitan population of a
q u a rte r of a m illion or m ore can support a large rental yard; large

cities like Cleveland and Pittsburgh can easily support four or more.
So you don’t have to do much analysis to see that with only a couple
of dozen yards of that size in the United States today there are an
unlimited number of opportunities. We’ve already begun to look at real
estate in Columbus and Cincinnati and we are beginning to think in
13

terms of Indiana and Illinois. It takes three or four months to find the
right location in a given city, but I’m convinced that for the next two
or three years the availability of good market opportunities will not be
a limiting factor in our growth.”
“Management, on the other hand, is quite another matter,” Mr.
Hastings went on. “The success of a rental yard is vitally dependent
on the abilities of the manager, and it takes at least a year to train
someone to the point where he is able to make it on his own.” After
discussing this problem for a while, Mr. Nelson suggested that the two
owners spend some time over the next few days carefully inventorying
their personnel and evaluating the potential of each man for greater
responsibilities. During the next few days, all three men worked to
gether on this problem and finally decided that the availability of man
agerial personnel both in the field and at headquarters was indeed the
critical factor limiting the expansion plans for the company. At the end
of these discussions, the consensus seemed to be that Hastings-Robin
son, Inc. could open and staff three new branches in the spring of 1967
(fiscal year 1968), four more the following year, and six in the spring
of 1969. “And that’s probably as far as we’ll get,” Hastings concluded,
“because then we’ll have a lot more competition and it’s hard to predict
whether expansion will still be desirable.”
Financial Model of a New Branch

While the discussions described above were in progress, Mr. Nelson
was working on another aspect of the problem. “In effect,” he told the
owners, “I’m building a simple model of the financial aspects of open
ing and operating a typical new branch. A typical branch first starts
to spend money sometime in the fall, prior to the opening, when it
acquires real estate and has a manager assigned to it. Then it begins
to buy equipment, hires other personnel, opens its doors, and continues
to build its inventory in response to the local market during the next
year and a half. Headquarters administrative costs also go up some
what with each new branch added; all these things have to be con
sidered.”
Most of the assumptions necessary to describe the start-up and oper
ation of a new branch were drawn from Mr. Nelson’s earlier analysis of
the five existing branches. Once again, however, he reviewed all of his
assumptions concerning the fixed costs and variable operating ratios
with the owners to make sure that they also found them reasonable.
Finally, he constructed a complete set of financial and cash flow state
ments for a hypothetical new branch for the first eight years of its oper
14
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ation. “After eight years,” he said, “the mix in our equipment inventory
stabilizes and depreciation equals the cost of replacing old equipment.
Then the branch becomes fairly stable.”
A Program for Growth

With this preliminary work out of the way, Mr. Nelson was ready to
begin pulling everything together into a forecast of the new financing
that would be required to support the expansion program. His final
report, issued during the third week in July, was entitled, “HastingsRobinson, Inc.: A Program for Growth,” and the exhibits discussed
below are excerpts from that report. The transmittal letter, bound
into the front of the report, required two and a half pages to list all
the assumptions used in preparing the pro forma financial statements.
The opening paragraph of the transmittal concluded with the state
ment that, “The projected financial statements presented herein are
based upon several assumptions and estimates of operating efficiencies,
as detailed below, which were provided to us by the management of
the company. Where possible, we have tested the reasonableness of
these estimates against historical operating performance. However,
because of the prospective nature of these forecasts, particularly the
number and timing of new outlets to be established, we are unable to
vouch for the accuracy of the pro forma results.”
Much of the work in preparing the forecasts was merely a straight
forward computation, and was done by a staff man working under Nel
son’s supervision. The assistant first prepared projected cash flow state
ments, operating statements, and balance sheets for the five fiscal years
1968 through 1972. These projections included both the operations of
the five existing yards and the time-phased start-up of 13 new yards
during the next three fiscal years. The projected income statements
are shown in Exhibit 4, page 16.
As may be noted from Exhibit 4, one of the unusual aspects of these
projections was that they were calculated before taking into account
the source or amount of new financing required. As Mr. Nelson ex
plained it to the owners, “It’s the financing that we are really interested
in, so we calculated everything except the financing in order to permit
us to test the effects of a variety of financing programs. Our cash flow
projections show that it will take four million dollars of new funds to
finance the 13 new branches, with the peak need occurring on July 31,
1969. The question is, what’s the best way to raise that money?”
Mr. Nelson’s analysis of three alternative financial plans is presented
in Exhibits 5, 6, and 7. In Exhibit 5, page 18, for example, Mr. Nelson
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examined the effects of financing the entire expansion program through
various forms of senior debt. Using Hastings-Robinson, Inc.’s operating
budget for the current fiscal year, he first prepared a pro forma balance
sheet as of January 31, 1967. Only the liability side of the balance
sheet is shown in Exhibit 5 because the composition of the assets was
not influenced by the type of financing used. From the cash flow pro
jections, Mr. Nelson knew that $880,000 of new financing would be re
quired during fiscal year 1968, and he programmed those funds from a
Exhibit 4

HASTINGS-ROBINSON, INC.
Pro Form a Income Statements
For Fiscal Years E nded Jan. 31, 1967 T hrough 1972
(All Amounts in Thousands)
Fiscal Years
E nded January 31
1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

Rental income .................................
Gross profit of sales departm ent

$1,790
405

$2,782
405

$4,366
405

$5,614
405

$5,974
405

Total income
D irect expenses:
Labor and m aintenance
Depreciation of rental equip
m ent ...........................................
O ther direct expenses ................

$2,195

$3,187

$4,771

$6,019

$6,379

$ 713

$1,033

$1,549

$1,917

$2,037

384
208

605
285

948
406

1,170
460

1,224
478

Total direct expenses
Indirect expenses:
Salaries and office overhead
Property taxes and insurance

$1,305

$1,923

$2,903

$3,547

$3,739

$ 280
65

$ 360
108

$ 480
170

$ 480
200

$ 480
200

$ 345

$ 468

$ 650

$ 680

$ 680

Total indirect expenses
Total expenses

$1,650

$2,391

$3,553

$4,227

$4,419

Profits before interest, bonus and
taxes ................................................
Em ployee bonuses

$ 545
105

$ 796
123

$1,218
153

$1,792
197

$1,960
209

Profits before interest and taxes
Federal and state income taxes

$ 440
168

$ 673
245

$1,065
400

$1,595
793

$1,751
926

Profits before interest expense

$ 272

$ 428

$ 665

$ 802

$ 825

(The accompanying list of assumptions, as provided by management, is an integral
part of this statement.)
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combination of bank loans, equipment notes and long-term senior debt.
Profits before financing costs were then adjusted for interest expense on
both existing and new debt to arrive at a forecasted net profit on equity.
This same set of calculations was applied successively to each future
year. The same format was used in Exhibits 6 and 7 but with different
sources of financing. Exhibit 6 (page 20) programmed the sale of sub
ordinated debentures with warrants during fiscal year 1968, and Exhibit
7 (page 22) programmed the sale of common stock during that year.
Discussing these calculations with the owners, Mr. Nelson said, “The
real purpose of these calculations is to permit you to do a comparative
evaluation of the alternatives. For this purpose, the picture is sum
marized pretty well in the ratios at the bottom of each page. You’ll
want to look at both the debt ratio and the earnings per share figures;
the first is some measure of the risk to which the equity is subjected,
while the second measures the profit earned on the equity for exposing
itself to that risk. Naturally, the greater the risk, the greater the return
on your equity and vice versa.
“Another important consideration,” Mr. Nelson continued, “is the
availability of senior debt. Even if you wanted to follow the ‘all senior
debt’ program, it might not be possible to find the money. Your debt
ratio is now running around 55 per cent, but it would go to 63 per cent
by the end of fiscal year 1970, and would actually be somewhat higher
than that at the peak point during the middle of that fiscal year. With
the proven earnings record that you would have at that point, it might
be possible to raise that much senior debt, but you would clearly be
getting close to the limit.
“Selling subordinated debt or equity would reduce the senior debt
required. Subordinated debt is probably the most attractive because
it could be sweetened with warrants on stock and sold at a higher
price than you could probably sell the common stock for during 1967.
The subordinated debt plan would reduce the maximum senior debt
requirements to 55 per cent, but would only cut earnings per share
during fiscal year 1972 by about 4 per cent. In the common stock pro
gram (Exhibit 7, page 22), we’ve calculated the sale of only enough
shares to keep the senior debt ratio below 60 per cent. Even so, earn
ings p er share decrease by about 12 per cent in 1972.”
In addition to his analysis of the “maximum growth” alternative, Mr.
Nelson also prepared a rough set of figures projecting the financial re
quirements and earnings performance at slower rates of growth. A
brief discussion of these projections with the owners quickly led to their
rejection of any program leading toward a more modest growth. As
17
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$_____

Total new financing* ..............................................................

Interest on existing debt

...........................

$

—

Interest Cost of New Financing:
After-tax profits before interest ....................................................

$

69

$ 272

46

$ 428

$ 880 $1,417

—

$1,417

—

(70)
1,500

400

400

$ (13)

1969

80

1968

$_____ $ 880

1967

Total equity .................................................................................

Total senior liabilities ................................................................
Subordinated debt with warrants
C onvertible subordinated debts
Common stock:
N um ber of shares:
Net price per share
N et proceeds

Type and A m ount of Proposed Financing:
Short-term bank loans .....................................................................
Three-year equipm ent notes issued i n :
Fiscal year 1968 ...........................................................................
Fiscal year 1969
..............................................................
Fiscal year 1970 ...........................................................................
Long-term senior debt

34

$ 665

$1,684

—

$1,684

(135)
(250)
1,500
600

$ (31)

1970

30

$ 802

$ (608)

—

$ (608)

(135)
(500)
(250)

$ 277

1971

Fiscal Years E nded January 31

HASTINGS-ROBINSON, INC.
Pro Form a Results of Proposed New Financing
Using Senior D ebt Exclusively
(All Amounts in Thousands)

$

28

825

$(1,610)

—

$(1,610)

(60)
(500)
(500)

$ (550)

1972

Exhibit 5

$ 586

$ 359
227

$3,493 $5,148

$1,093 $1,437

463

236
227

55%
61%
223M
223M
$ 4.90 $ 6.44
.98
1.54
22%
27%

$

$

$ 502
1,903
720

$L937 $3,125

482
695
760

84

$ 344

$

$ 183

1969
137

535
2,948
1,280

532

788

561
227

63%
223M
$ 8.83
2.38
31%

$7,520

$1,969

$

$

$

$

$7,661

$2,632

975

216
1,000
1,200

720

105

228

1972
200

36%
223M
$ 15.03
3.23
24%

$ 6,784

$ 3,352

$ 1,016

789
227

$ 2,416

$

$

740 $
227

$4,054

754
2,060
1,240

663

139 $

302

1971
272

53%
223M
$11.80
2.97
29%

$

$

$

$

133 $

290

$4,763

$

$

$

$

1970
256

** Includes financing required to cover the cost of interest on borrowed money.
** Budget for fiscal year 1967.
*** After giving pro forma effect to the sale of $15,000 of subordinated debt and 2,000 shares of common stock to a key employee,
the transaction is expected to be consummated in December 1966.
(The accompanying list of assumptions, as provided by management, is an integral part of this statement.)

R atios:
Senior debt % of total capitalization
54%
Common stock: shares at year-end*** .......................................
223M
Book value per share ................................................................
$ 3.92
Earnings per s h a r e .......................................................................
1.00
R eturn on average stockholders equity ...........................................
29%

$2,717

Total capitalization .....................................................................

$ 368
$ 875

.......................................................

$ 141
227

$1,474

$

218

$ 224**** $
$ 417
657
400

54

$ 118

1968
49
$

$

$_____

1967

....................................................................

Stockholders equity

T otal secondary debt

D eferred taxes
Subordinated debt

Total senior debt

Pro Form a Balance Sheet:
Accruals and bank loans
............................................................
E quipm ent notes
..................................................................
Long-term debt

N et profit on operations

After-tax interest cost

T otal interest c o s t ............................................................

Interest on new d e b t .......................................................................
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$

Total interest cost .......................................................................

$ 272

Interest Cost of New Financing:
After tax profits before interest ............................................................

118

69
49

$ 880

T otal New Financing ................................................................

$

—
$ (100)

—
$ 600

In terest on existing debt
In terest on new d e b t .......................................................................

$ (1 0 0 )

$ 600

Subordinated debt with w a rra n ts ....................................................
N um ber of shares
8
N et price per share $12
Total New Equity ...........................................................................

$

$

$

182

46
136

428

$1,417

—
—

$1,417

$ 280

T otal senior liabilities .....................................................................

$

$

$

288

34
254

665

$1,683

—
—

$1,683

$

$

$

300

30
270

802

$ (609)

$ (509)

(70)
(70)
(250)
(500)
1,500
(250)
500 ______

$ 311

(30)
1,500

3

1971

200

$

1970

$ (53)

1969

80

$

1968

Type and Am ount of Proposed Financing:
Short-term bank loans .........................................................................
Three-year equipm ent notes issued in:
Fiscal year 1968
...........................................................
Fiscal year 1969
.............................................................
Fiscal year 1970 ...............................................................................
Long-term senior debt

1967

Fiscal Years Ending January 31

HASTINGS-ROBINSON, INC.
Pro Form a Results of Proposed New Financing
Using Subordinated D ebt in Fiscal Year 1967
(All Amounts in Thousands)

$

$

$

235

28
207

825

$(1,607)

—
$ (100)

$ (100)

$(1,507)

(30)
(500)
(500)
(100)

$ (377)

1972
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$ 875
$2,717

Stockholders equity .............................................................................

T otal capitalization .........................................................................

$1,437

$ 359
827
$1,186

$1,970

$ 561
827
$1,388

$4,162

46%
231M
$11.40
2.87
29%

$7,661

$2,634

$ 748
727
$1,475

$3,552

$ 782
2,030
740

$ 664

$ 138

1971

417
1,000
600

30%
231M
$ 14.51
3.10
24%

$ 6,784

$ 3,351

789
627
$ 1,416

$

$

108
717

$ 2,017

$
$

1972

* Budget for fiscal year 1967.
** After giving pro forma effect to the sale of $15,000 of subordinated debt and 2,000 shares of common stock to a key employee,
the transaction is expected to be consummated in December 1966.
(The accompanying list of assumptions, as provided by management, is an integral part of this statement.)

$3,493

$1,093

$ 236
827
$1,063

$2,525

$ 529
2,853
780

55%
231M
$ 8.53
2.31
31%

$ 141
227
$ 368

D eferred taxes ......................................................................................
Subordinated debt ...............................................................................
Total secondary debt

$1,337

$ 462
1,743
320

$ 533

$ 132

1970

Ratios:
Senior deb t % of total capitalization ..................................................
54%
38%
49%
Com m on stock: shares at year-end** ............................................
223M
231M 231M
Book value per s h a r e ....................................................................... $ 3.92
$ 4.73 $ 6.22
Earnings per s h a r e ...........................................................................
1.00
.94
1.49
R eturn on average stockholders equity .............................................
29%
22%
27%

$1,474

Total senior debt .............................................................................

$ 482
495
360

84

$ 344

$

1969

$7,520

$ 417
657
400

Pro Form a Balance Sheet:
Accruals and bank loans .....................................................................
E q uipm ent notes ..................................................................................
Long-term debt ....................................................................................

54

$ 218

$

1968

$5,148

$ 224*

After-tax interest cost .....................................................................

N et profit on operations .....................................................................

1967
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1,000
$1,408

............
$ 576

$ 297
$ 297
$ 873

Common stock:
N um ber of shares
33
N et price p er share $9.00
N et Proceeds .................................................................................
T otal New Equity .......................................................................
Total New Financing ............................................................

Interest Cost of New Financing:
After tax profits before interest ............................................................
Interest on existing d e b t ................................................................
In terest on new d e b t .......................................................................
Total interest cost .......................................................................

(80)
500

500

$ 272 $ 428
69
46
34
118
$ 103 $ 164

—
$1,408

$ (12)

1969

76

$

1968

Type and Am ount of Proposed Financing:
Short-term bank loans
Three-year equipm ent notes issued in:
Fiscal year 1968 ...............................................................................
Fiscal year 1969 ...............................................................................
Fiscal year 1970 ...............................................................................
Long-term senior d e b t .........................................................................
T otal senior liabilities .....................................................................

1967

$

18

1971

$ 665
34
227
$ 261

_____
—
$1,671

$ 802
30
242
$ 272

—
$ (622)

______

(170)
(170)
(80)
(170)
1,800
(300)
—
______
$1,671
$ (622)

$ 121

1970

Fiscal Years E nding January 31

HASTINGS-ROBINSON, INC.
Pro Form a Results of Proposed New Financing
Selling Common Stock in Fiscal Year 1967
(All Amounts in Thousands)

$

$

825
28
172
200

—
$(1,623)

______

(80)
(170)
(600)
(150)
$(1,623)

$ (623)

1972
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$ 417
657
400
$1,474
$ 141
227
$ 368
$ 875
$2,717

54%
223M
$ 3.92
1.00
29%

Pro Form a Balance Sheet:
Accruals and bank loans .....................................................................
E quipm ent notes ..................................................................................
Long-term debt
Total senior debt .............................................................................
D eferred taxes ......................................................................................
Subordinated debt ..............................................................................
Total secondary debt .....................................................................
Stockholders equity
........................................................................
T otal capitalization

Ratios:
Senior d eb t % of total c a p ita liza tio n .............................................
Common stock: shares at year-end** .............................................
Book value per s h a r e .......................................................................
Earnings per s h a r e ...........................................................................
R eturn on average stockholders equity

47 $
225 $

75
353

1969

47%
55%
256M 256M
$ 5.46 $ 6.84
.88
1.38
20%
22%

478 $ 499
795
993
360
1,320
$1,633 $2,812
$ 236 $ 359
227
227
$ 463 $ 586
$1,397 $1,750
$3,493 $5,148

$

$
$

1968

$ 644
1,830
1,240
$3,714
$ 748
227
$ 975
$2,972
$7,661

$ 125
$ 677

1971

59%
48%
256M 256M
$ 8.96
$11.61
2.13
_ 2.64
27%
26%

$ 684
2,473
1,280
$4,437
$ 561
227
$ 788
$2,295
$7,520

$ 120
$ 545

1970
92
733

30%
256M
$ 14.47
2.86
22%

33
980
1,050
$ 2,063
$
789
227
$ 1,016
$ 3,705
$ 6,784

$

$
$

1972

* Budget for fiscal year 1967.
** After giving pro forma effect to the sale of $15,000 of subordinated debt and 2,000 shares of common stock to a key employee,
the transaction is expected to be consummated in December 1966.
(The accompanying list of assumptions, as provided by management, is an integral part of this statement.)

$ 224*

After-tax interest cost .....................................................................
N et profit on e q u ity .............................................................................

1967
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Mr. Hastings put it, “The profit opportunities in new rental yards are
so great that I’d rather build a big chain even if I have to give up some
of the ownership.”
As these discussions were proceeding during the latter part of June,
the three men decided that they should also begin making initial con
tacts with possible sources of new financing. It was already clear that
a substantial amount of funds would be required, regardless of the
financing program chosen, and Hastings in particular was anxious to
get started with the search.

The Search for Buyers

Up to this point, the analysis prepared by Mr. Nelson in the HastingsRobinson engagement is illustrative of the type of analysis that might
be made in any major expansion program involving new financing, two
topics which have been dealt with at greater length in earlier technical
studies within this series.1 Normally, in such an engagement, the subse
quent steps would have involved establishing contact with a variety of
alternative sources of funds and the negotiation of mutually acceptable
financial arrangements. In this case, however, the nature of the en
gagement changed abruptly before this step was under way. In late
June 1966, Mr. Hastings was contacted by Mr. Carl Spatz, a vice presi
dent of Gotham Equipment Corporation of New York City and general
manager of that company’s equipment rental division; he and Hastings
had first met a few months earlier at a convention of the American
Rental Association. Spatz now explained that, as Hastings knew,
Gotham was planning to expand its activities in the construction
equipment rental field. To accelerate that expansion it intended to
acquire several existing companies in various parts of the country, and
Spatz was calling to find out if Hastings would be interested in dis
cussing the possibility of selling his business to Gotham. Subsequently,
the two men arranged to have a meeting in New York City in early July
at which Robinson and Nelson would also be present. The negotiations
at that meeting, and subsequent events, are discussed in the following
sections.
Under other circumstances, it is not uncommon for the CPA to play
1See “Analysis for Expansion or Contraction of a Business,” AICPA M an
agem ent Services Technical Study No. 3, and “Analysis for Purchasing and
Financing Productive E quipm ent,” AICPA M anagem ent Services Technical
Study No. 4.
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a somewhat more active role in helping to find a buyer for a client who
wishes to sell his business. There are several reasons why a CPA’s
services may be particularly valuable during the search phase. First,
the CPA has an intimate knowledge of his client’s business and should
have a good understanding of the motivations which led the client to
consider selling it. Second, the fact that a business is for sale is a matter
to be treated confidentially; if potential buyers believe that the busi
ness must be sold for some reason, their offering prices may be lower.
The CPA’s reputation and experience in handling confidential data
makes him one of the few persons with whom the client can discuss a
possible sale with assured privacy. Finally, most CPAs not only have
wide business contacts that might be potential buyers, but they also
can be objective enough about the transaction to do an independent
analysis of the types of potential buyers that might be interested in
purchasing the business. Such an analysis can pinpoint potential buy
ers which he can then contact on behalf of his client without disclosing
the name of the business that is available for sale.
The distinguishing characteristic of the CPA’s work is his analytical
approach to the job. What is there about this business that would make
it appealing to certain types of buyers on terms other than the direct
price? Who, specifically, are the buyers who might be interested in
these non-price advantages? Being aware of the advantages of the
proposed transaction from the point of view of each party is of great
value in finally negotiating an agreeable price, and the CPA can greatly
assist his client by assuring that all prospective buyers who might have
important non-price motivations have been contacted in the early
phases of the search.
Recognizing the importance of this type of analysis, Nelson initiated
two new lines of inquiry when he learned from Hastings of the pro
posed meeting with Gotham Equipment Corporation. First, he was
surprised to learn that the owners would even consider selling the
entire business, and he spent a couple of hours with each man discuss
ing the pros and cons of selling out. The two owners had obviously
spent a great deal of time discussing the matter between themselves,
and a composite of their views was that they felt an obligation both to
their families and to themselves to at least listen to the offer that
Gotham might make. Neither man had substantial assets other than
his ownership in the business, and both felt that some diversification of
investments would be desirable. Further, they recognized that the re
cent rapid growth in their business was due, to some extent at least, to
the boom in the construction industry that was then in its fourth year,
and they knew that the rental of construction equipment was highly
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vulnerable to fluctuations in construction expenditures. As Mr. Hast
ings put it, “If we are ever going to sell out, 1966 might well turn out
to be the peak year.” Finally, the owners also knew from the prelimi
nary figures that were emerging from Nelson’s analysis of the financing
required for expansion that substantial additional funds would be re
quired during the years immediately ahead and that their proposed
expansion program would also increase the risk to which their equity
was exposed. Again it was Hastings who summarized their feelings by
saying, “We’ve got to open the new yards, but we might sleep a little
better if we did it with someone else’s money.” At this point, neither
man was committed to selling the business, but they agreed that they
would be willing to do so if the price were attractive.
The other line of inquiry which Mr. Nelson pursued was an attempt
to catalog the reasons why Gotham was interested in acquiring Hast
ings-Robinson, Inc. He knew that Gotham was an aggressive, rapidly
expanding company with a reputation for good management. In addi
tion to its primary line of construction equipment, it had acquired
several other equipment manufacturers during the last few years, and
its 1965 annual report mentioned the success of its continuing diversifi
cation program. The company’s stock was traded on the New York
Stock Exchange and in June 1966 was selling at a multiple of 18 times
the 1965 earnings per share.
Discussing Gotham’s possible motivations with management, Nelson
learned that Mr. Spatz had mentioned two major reasons for his inter
est in Hastings-Robinson, Inc.: (1) Spatz had agreed with Hastings’
analysis that the construction equipment rental industry would mature
rapidly during the next few years, and as he put it, “If we’re going to
have operations in Ohio and the Midwest, it would be a lot quicker to
build on the Hastings-Robinson base than to start from scratch,” and
(2) he had made it clear that Gotham was not interested in acquir
ing Hastings-Robinson unless the owners were willing to remain active
in the business and manage an expansion of it throughout the Midwest.
Hastings-Robinson’s own analysis had shown that management person
nel was the primary constraint on expansion, and apparently Gotham
too believed that acquiring a well-managed small company would per
mit it to expand more rapidly in the field than if it had to train all of
its own management personnel. Summarizing this discussion with the
owners, Mr. Nelson said, “It looks like Gotham is a legitimate buyer.
They’ve already acquired one outfit on the West Coast, but they’re so
new to the rental business, and such a small factor in it, that there
shouldn’t be any problem with the FTC due to a lessening of competi
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tion. The real test now is to see just how attractive they are willing to
make it for you.”
Summary

As the discussion above illustrates, the CPA’s analysis on behalf of
a client who may sell his business includes many tasks. One way to
regroup these various activities is in terms of purpose. Three broad
categories of purposes may be identified, although many of the spe
cific analyses will serve two or more of these simultaneously:
1. The CPA must understand his client as an individual in order to
be able to understand the client’s aspirations and ambitions and his
motivations for wanting to sell the business.
2. He must understand the client’s business, the how and the why of
its success, in order to be able to explain to a potential buyer just what
it is that is for sale.
3. Finally, the CPA must help his client to explain what the business
is in financial terms that can be easily comprehended by a potential
buyer.
To the extent that he fulfills these purposes through a combination
of analytical competence and personal sensitivity to others, the CPA
will have already performed a valuable service to his client, and will be
in a position to assist him even further in the negotiations that follow.

IN ITIA L NEGOTIATIONS

The initial negotiation between buyer and seller is a critical event
for both parties. In one sense, the purpose of this meeting is merely
to see if further discussions should be held, but in order to reach a
decision on that issue, several important questions must be resolved, at
least in a preliminary way. First, the personalities of the principals in
volved must be sufficiently compatible to permit a fruitful discussion
of substantive matters; one of the most common, though frequently un
expressed, reasons for breaking off discussions is simply that the prin
cipals “couldn’t do business with each other.”
The second major question is usually the primary topic of discussion
at the first meeting: the rationale for the transaction from each party’s
point of view. Here, the discussion is intended to help each party un27

derstand the motivations of the other so that both may judge whether
there is sufficient potential synergy in the transaction to make further
discussions worthwhile. Dealing with each other in a guarded fashion,
both parties attempt to identify areas of potential conflict between
their interests that might subsequently prove to be significant enough
to thwart the consummation of the transaction. Subsequent discussions
will continue only if there appear to be sufficient points of mutual
advantage to suggest that the parties will be able to overcome a po
tential conflict in the course of more detailed negotiations.
Finally, and only if the first two questions seem susceptible to satis
factory resolution, the initial negotiations will deal, at least gingerly,
with the question of purchase price. Once again, the purpose here is a
mutual desire of the two parties to see if each other’s thoughts on the
matter of price are similar enough to permit the issue to be ironed out
in the course of subsequent negotiations. The buyer at this stage
usually has totally inadequate information on which to base a firm
offer; the result is that price is usually discussed in terms of either
(1) an asking price stated by the seller, or (2) a carefully qualified
tentative offer by the buyer, “subject to substantiation of the informa
tion already available and additional investigation.” Either approach
tends to establish one side of the bargaining range, and if the other
party feels that the first offer is within reasonable reach of the price
that will be acceptable to him, further discussions are usually planned.
These points, and several others, are illustrated by the initial negoti
ations between Hastings-Robinson, Inc. and Gotham Equipment Cor
poration.
The Meeting on July 8

At the request of Mr. Spatz, Messrs. Hastings and Robinson agreed
to meet with him in New York City on July 8, 1966. Prior to the meet
ing, Hastings had discussed the impending negotiations with his lawyer
and, although the counsellor was not present during any of the subse
quent discussions, he was kept informed of the progress. At the time of
the June 8th meeting, the owners regarded Gotham as their most
formidable potential competitor, and they were very reluctant to dis
close information which Gotham might find useful in improving its
own position in the equipment rental industry. Therefore, Hastings
replied negatively to Mr. Spatz’s request for recent financial statements,
saying instead that he would bring some information with him to the
meeting. Hastings then asked Nelson to prepare a set of highly con
densed, comparative financial statements similar to those shown earlier
28

ANALYSIS FOR PURCHASE OR SALE OF A BUSINESS

in Exhibits 2 and 3 (pages 7 and 8). These statements were distributed
to the Gotham representatives at the beginning of the meeting on
July 8.
The meeting was held in Gotham’s well-appointed executive offices
in mid-town Manhattan. During the initial pleasantries, Spatz intro
duced an assistant who sat in with him during the meeting, and Hast
ings introduced Mr. Nelson, explaining that the CPA was advising them
on the financial aspects of its expansion plans. The discussion began
with a general review of the type of rental business which HastingsRobinson, Inc. engaged in, and its similarity to the activities of
Gotham’s equipment rental division. Both Hastings and Spatz agreed
on the great potential for the construction equipment rental industry
during the years immediately ahead.
Mr. Spatz next directed the discussion to Hastings-Robinson’s in
come statements and inquired about the depreciation policies which
were used for the various types of rental equipment. Both he and
Hastings agreed that depreciation was both the largest and the most
subjective element of expense for an equipment rental company, and
that it was impossible to evaluate the earnings of such a company with
out knowing the details concerning its depreciation policies. As dis
cussion seemed to indicate that the policies followed by both companies
were reasonably compatible, Mr. Spatz also inquired about the salaries
that had been paid to the owners and about the rates of interest
paid on the debt carried by Hastings-Robinson, Inc. The salary
question led rather naturally to the question of employment contracts
for the two owners, and Mr. Spatz made it clear that he would not be
interested in the acquisition unless both men would agree to work for
Gotham for at least three years, and “hopefully, for a long time after
that.’’ When Mr. Spatz learned that each owner had taken a salary of
$20,000 and a bonus of $30,000 during the fiscal year ending January
31, 1966, he remarked that some adjustment in salaries would be re
quired to bring theirs in line with the salaries paid to other executives
of Gotham, but that their total income would probably not decline
because of the interest or dividends they would receive from investing
their proceeds from the sale of the company.
This com m ent th en led to a discussion of the form of the transaction,
and both parties quickly agreed that an exchange of stock was most
desirable because it could probably be treated as a tax-free exchange
by Hastings-Robinson’s owners. Mr. Spatz pointed out that HastingsRobinson stock was currently trading at about $62 per share and paying
a dividend of $2.00. Concluding this part of the discussion, he said,
“We’re definitely interested in acquiring Hastings-Robinson, Inc. It
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would really give us a strong foothold in the Midwest, and we need the
kind of management experience that you could bring to us. So you’re
‘sitting with a full poker hand’; what price do you want?”
Hastings refused to answer this question directly, stating that he and
Mr. Robinson were not sure that they wanted to sell out at this time,
but that they were willing to listen to whatever offer Gotham might
make. “We honestly haven’t put a price on the business,” he con
cluded, “but we think that we could continue to work with you and
we’ll give careful consideration to your offer.” Spatz and his assistant
then excused themselves for a few minutes to discuss the matter with
their associates.
Shortly before lunch Mr. Spatz returned with John Hudson, the
president of Gotham and introduced him to the three men representing
Hastings-Robinson. Mr. Hudson was most cordial and said that he was
quite impressed with the story that Mr. Spatz had told him of the rapid
growth of Hastings-Robinson and the management abilities of its
majority owners. He said that he could understand the unwillingness
to disclose detailed financial information at this stage, but that this
made it difficult to arrive at an offering price for the company. Never
theless, he said that he and Mr. Spatz had agreed that they would be
willing to offer $1 million worth of Gotham stock in exchange for all
the common stock of Hastings-Robinson, subject of course to further
investigation of the financial statements. The meeting broke up quickly
at that point as Mr. Hastings thanked Messrs. Hudson and Spatz for
their consideration and said that he and his partner would like to
think it over.
Once outside the Gotham offices, the three men were unanimous in
their disappointment about Gotham’s offer. As Mr. Nelson pointed
out, the offer was only a little over five times the historical earnings of
the company, about four times the prospective earnings for the current
fiscal year, and “seemed totally inadequate for a company with a
growth rate such as yours. If you do want to sell this company,” he
continued, “it shouldn’t be too much trouble to find a buyer who would
be willing to pay at least eight times earnings.” Mr. Hastings replied,
“Well, it didn’t hurt us any to listen to them, but I don’t think we’ll
bother to respond to an offer such as that.”
The Meeting on August 16

During the next three weeks, Mr. Nelson continued to work on his
report dealing with the financial requirements for Hastings-Robinson,
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Inc.’s expansion. The pressure of current operations during the peak
season of his client’s business precluded any opportunity for detailed
discussions between Nelson and the owners about beginning the search
for new financing or other possible buyers for the company. Then, in
early August Mr. Hastings received another telephone call from Carl
Spatz of Gotham.
Spatz expressed his disappointment that neither he nor Mr. Hudson
had had a response from Hastings-Robinson concerning Gotham’s
offer to acquire the company. Mr. Hastings explained that he had been
very busy, but that both he and his partner felt that the offer had been
so low that it did not merit serious consideration. Mr. Spatz said that
he was not surprised at that reaction and that he felt “something like
the man in the middle’ on this deal. As you know, Chuck,” Spatz con
tinued, “I think that Hastings-Robinson’s merger into Gotham makes a
great deal of sense for both companies, and I think that you agree with
me on that. I’ve told Mr. Hudson that you and Jim are smart enough
and capable enough to proceed with your own expansion program un
less he can make a really attractive offer to you. He’s now come around
a little bit, and he has told me that he would be willing to pay eight to
ten times your current earnings, after they were adjusted to a basis
that is comparable to ours. I don’t know what all the adjustments
would be in terms of depreciation, salaries and bonuses, and income
taxes, but I think that the multiple is about right. W hat do you think?”
Mr. Hastings replied to the effect that the proposal sounded sub
stantially different than the one discussed at their first meeting, and
suggested that it might be desirable to have another meeting in order
to explore the matter further. He said that he, Robinson, and Nelson
would be willing to come to New York again, and the date was set for
August 16.
In preparation for the forthcoming meeting, Nelson worked up the
calculation of the proposed selling price as shown in Exhibit 8, page 32.
Operating profits before taxes for the first six months of the fiscal year
were available from the company’s controller on August 10. This figure
had not been adjusted to reflect bonuses to the owners and employees,
and Mr. Nelson first estimated the amount of those adjustments. The
second adjustment in Exhibit 8 was to recast Hastings-Robinson’s
treatment of the investment tax credit. This matter had been discussed
briefly at the meeting on July 8, and Mr. Nelson had learned that
Gotham amortized investment tax credit over the life of the related
equipment. Hastings-Robinson’s practice had been to apply the in
vestment tax credit as a reduction in income tax expense in the year in
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Exhibit 8

HASTINGS-ROBINSON, INC.
Calculation of Selling Price
August 16, 1966
O perating profits before taxes, six months ended July 31, 1966
Less: Executive com pensation adjustm ent (to bring Messrs.
Hastings and Robinson to $30,000 a year each
Provision for employee bonuses ...........................................
Total

$243,000
$ 10,000
10,000

...................................................................................

$ 20,000

Revised profits before tax ..................................................................
Estim ated pre-tax profits for the final six months of the year, after
similar adjustm ents ...............................................................................

$223,000

Total estim ated pre-tax profits, fiscal year 1967 ............................
Provision for income taxes
C om bined effective rate (federal and state) of 53% $256,000
Less: Amortization of investm ent tax credit
over average 7-year life
C redit accrued in fiscal year 1965 $12,000
fiscal year 1966
41,000
fiscal year 1967
30,000

$483,000

Total accrued
1/7 credited to fiscal year 1967
N et tax expense for fiscal year 1967

260,000

$83,000
12,000
$244,000
$239,000

Adjusted profits after taxes

10
Price-earnings m ultiple
$2,390,000
Total selling price ................................................................
$66.00
M arket value per share of Gotham stock
36,212
N um ber of Gotham shares required
221,000
N um ber of Hastings-Robinson, Inc. shares outstanding
Exchange stock ratio of Hastings-Robinson, Inc. for
221,000 = 6.10 for 1
Gotham
36,212

which the equipment was acquired. Based on Mr. Spatz’s remarks to
Hastings about using adjusted earnings, Nelson inferred that an adjust
ment such as that on Exhibit 8 would be required. The net effect of
these adjustments was to yield an estimated profit figure for the fiscal
year ending January 31, 1967, of $239,000, slightly above the operating
budget that had been prepared at the beginning of that fiscal year.
Discussing this calculation with the owners, Nelson suggested that
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their asking price should be stated in terms of an exchange ratio of
Hastings-Robinson, Inc. stock for Gotham stock. Hastings then raised
a question about the subordinated debt which Hastings-Robinson had
outstanding. These debentures were owned by Hastings-Robinson,
Inc.’s stockholders, roughly in proportion to their ownership of the
common stock. Mr. Nelson said that, if Hastings-Robinson were con
tinued as a subsidiary of Gotham, the debentures need not be affected
by the stock transaction. On the other hand, he said that Gotham
might be willing to exchange its own debentures for those of HastingsRobinson, Inc. After further discussion, the owners finally agreed that
the asking price for the company would be a six-for-one exchange ratio
on the common stock, plus a continuance or exchange of the sub
ordinated debt.
The meeting in Gotham’s offices on August 16 turned immediately
to the subject of price. Both Mr. Hudson and Mr. Spatz were present,
representing Gotham, and Hudson confirmed his willingness to nego
tiate on a range of eight-to-ten times Hastings-Robinson’s adjusted
earnings. Mr. Nelson then presented Exhibit 8 on behalf of his client,
and explained how they had calculated the asking price and what it
was. He said that a six-for-one exchange would require 36,833 Gotham
shares and, using Gotham’s closing price for the previous day of $66
per share, would indicate a purchase price of about $2,431,000. Mr.
Hudson pointed out that the asking price was actually higher by $212,
000 because the subordinated debentures would remain, and he said
that he had been assuming that because these securities were owned
by the stockholders they would not be considered separately in the
transaction. After a brief discussion about the terms of the asking
price, Hudson and Spatz asked to be excused for a few moments and
left the room.
They returned about twenty minutes later, and Mr. Hudson said that
he had thought the matter over and had to insist that the subordinated
debentures be wiped out prior to an exchange of common stock. “The
tangible book value of this company is simply too low to justify such
a premium for goodwill; if I can add the subordinated debt to the
book value of the stock, the net worth is then about a million dollars
and I think I could justify that to my board of directors.” He went on,
“if Hastings-Robinson would go along with that adjustment,” he was
prepared to offer nine times their estimated earnings of $239,000. Mr.
Nelson calculated that this was equal to $2,151,000, or at $66 a share
for the Gotham stock, 32,591 shares. Nelson then suggested that he
and his two clients be given the opportunity to discuss this offer in
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private, and the representatives from Gotham left the room once again.
As soon as they were alone, Hastings and Robinson broke into smiles.
Although Mr. Nelson had never been present at any discussion of what
their “minimum” price would be, he had heard them say that any price
above two million dollars was “in the right ball park.” The three men
then spent fifteen minutes or so discussing the strategy for the next step
in the negotiations and finally decided to agree to the stipulation re
garding the subordinated debt and to offer an exchange ratio of 6½
shares of Hastings-Robinson for each share of Gotham. As Nelson
calculated it, this was equivalent to 34,000 shares of Gotham or a pur
chase price of $2,244,000. The Gotham representatives were then in
vited back to the conference room, and Nelson explained the terms of
his client’s counter-offer. After thinking for a few moments, Hudson
turned to the owners and said, “Well, it looks like we’ve got a deal.”
The final step that day was to prepare a letter of agreement between
the parties. Mr. Hudson pointed out that once their agreement had
been put in writing he would need an opportunity for his auditors to
do a thorough investigation of Hastings-Robinson, Inc.’s records in
order to verify the representations that had been made in the negotia
tions. Mr. Hastings said that there would certainly be no objection to
this, but Mr. Nelson stated that, nevertheless, he did not want his
clients to be a party to a binding agreement which would force them
to sell the company based on a formula determination of profits sub
ject to audit. He proposed that the letter state that Gotham in effect
had an option to acquire all the stock of Hastings-Robinson in ex
change for 34,000 shares of its own stock, such option to be exercised
any time prior to October 1. “That way,” Mr. Nelson pointed out, “you
won’t really have to make up your mind until after you have had the
benefit of your auditors’ investigation, but my client won’t be placed in
the position of having to argue over every last adjustment that they
might propose.” A letter to that effect was drawn and, after review
and minor redrafting by Hasting-Robinson’s counsel was signed on
August 18.

ANALYSIS FOR THE BUYER

The role of the CPA as analyst and advisor to a seller may be more
glamorous, but it is certainly no more important than the role that a
CPA can play on behalf of the buyer. Working for either party, one of
the critical factors which defines the scope of the CPA’s activities is
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simply how early he gets involved with the proposed transaction. In
the Hastings-Robinson, Inc. illustration, the CPA working for the seller
was actively engaged in useful analyses even before the possibility of
selling the business was seriously considered; the CPA’s role, therefore,
was quite an active one. On the other hand, the buyer in this illustra
tion did not ask his CPA to become involved until after an initial agree
ment had been reached with the seller. As a result, the buyer’s CPA
played a somewhat more traditional role in this transaction. Subse
quent cases in this bulletin will illustrate a variety of types of analyses
that a CPA may perform for a buyer, and several of the more important
of these are discussed briefly below.
Even if his engagement is restricted to a straightforward “investi
gation prior to acquisition,” the buyer’s CPA must acquire a thorough
understanding of the motivations of both parties to the transaction.
Such an understanding will permit him to conduct a better investiga
tion because it will help focus his attention on those aspects of the
transaction which are particularly critical to its success. And, of course,
if the CPA is involved in an earlier stage on behalf of the buyer, he
will need such a background if he is to assist the buyer in the valua
tion process and negotiations. Finally, the buyer’s CPA can play an
important role in (1) evaluating the financial history of the seller by
comparisons to industry data which may be available, and (2) making
adjustments to the seller’s financial statements to cast them in a form
suitable for comparison either to the buyer’s operating results or the
results of alternative acquisition candidates that are being considered.

Valuation Procedures

If involved early enough to play a part in determining the value of
the seller’s company, the CPA’s role is a demanding one. There is no
neat formula for arriving at a price for the bundle of assets and abilities
which the seller is offering; value cannot be determined in a vacuum.
Rather, the only meaningful valuation is one couched in terms of the
other opportunities or alternatives available to the buyer. The relevant
question is: How attractive is this particular company when compared
with other companies that might be purchased or with the direct
acquisition of assets and personnel resources that would accomplish
the same result? Approached in this way, valuation is a highly ana
lytical, even though imprecise, art. The goal of the analysis is not to
establish the price for which the transaction will be consummated, but
to assist the buyer in arriving at his own judgment concerning what
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the upper limit of the purchase price might reasonably be. The fact
that the subsequent negotiations may arrive at quite different values
does not mean that the careful analysis was not worthwhile; without it
negotiations may drift aimlessly, and a well presented analysis by the
buyer’s CPA might help to narrow the bargaining range. Three of the
most common valuation techniques are described briefly below.
Net worth or appraisal value. The owner’s equity in the value of the
tangible assets he is selling is probably the most commonly used way
of arriving at a price, particularly for very small businesses. The
rationale for “tangible net worth” as a valuation is simple: the buyer
has the alternative of acquiring a similar combination of physical assets
on a piecemeal basis and starting a like operation from scratch. The
owner-operator of a small service or distribution business may have
developed an established clientele as a result of a convenient location
and a pleasing personality. The latter is rarely for sale, and the former
is rarely unique enough to demand a large premium. On the other
hand, the net worth of such a business as stated in its financial state
ments may be quite misleading, particularly if the fixed assets have
been depreciated to a point below their replacement value. Thus, an
appraisal of the current value of all assets may be required, and de
pending upon the size and complexity of the task, the CPA may play
an active role in arriving at a revised statement of tangible net worth.
Normal auditing procedures (or an “investigation” to cover activities
since the last audit statements) will usually be adequate for the cur
rent assets and liabilities; the valuation of fixed assets may require spe
cial expertise beyond the competence of the CPA.
Cash flow or return on investment. Another common valuation tech
nique is that measured by the yield or rate of return on the investment.
Again, the measure is a relative one: W hat rate of return could be
earned on an alternative investment with similar risk characteristics?
The rate of return concept is particularly useful for valuing two types
of business: (1) businesses that are expected to have a relatively stable
pattern of future earnings that will permit excess cash to be with
drawn each year without impairing the earnings of future years, or
(2) businesses such as real estate ventures that are essentially the liqui
dation of fixed assets over time in which the total amount of money to
be recovered exceeds the current purchase price of the business. Busi
nesses in the first category produce a steady cash flow, either in the
form of dividends or payments to management for its services, which
may be treated as an annual yield on the investment. Businesses of the
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second type may be analyzed using discounted cash flow techniques
to determine the equivalent annual rate of return on the declining un
recovered investment. In either event, the critical factor is in arriving
at an appropriate rate of return percentage to use in capitalizing the
stream of earnings from the business. This point is really a matter for
the buyer’s judgment, but stating the results of the transaction in terms
of a rate of return percentage may make it easier for him to do relative
value comparisons against alternative investments that he might make.
Price/earnings multiples. Finally, as the Hastings-Robinson, Inc.
case illustrated, a price/earnings multiple is frequently used for valua
tion purposes. Even more than with the first two techniques, price/
earnings ratios are a clear example of the importance of relativity in the
valuation process; such ratios have no meaning except in comparison
with similar ratios for alternative investments. Because of this fact,
price/earnings ratios are rarely appropriate except in those situations
where there is a public market for the stock of companies similar to the
one being analyzed. Then, comparative valuations are possible al
though still extremely difficult. Normally, a privately-owned company
will not command a price/earnings multiple as high as that for an
identical company that is publicly traded, simply because the capital
invested in publicly traded securities has greater mobility. An even
more important adjustment is that required to take account of any
projected growth in future earnings of the company being acquired. If
future earnings are not expected to increase, the price/earnings multi
ple is merely the complement of the rate of return to be anticipated on
the investment; an 8 per cent return may be achieved by paying a
price equal to 12½ times the earnings, and so forth. On the other
hand, many publicly traded stocks sell at multiples of 20, 25, or higher,
and the owners expect that their return on investment will be reward
ing because earnings in the future will be substantially greater than
those of the recent past.2 Growth in future earnings is, of course, a
critical factor in evaluation of a business, and the utility of price/
earnings ratios lies in the fact that they are available for a large range
of publicly traded stocks. The job of the analyst here is to select those
companies that are most analogous to the one being acquired, with par
ticular emphasis on the rate of expected growth.
None of these evaluation procedures will be definitive in any par
2 A particularly illum inating recent book that deals w ith price/earnings
ratios in an analytical fashion is Knowlton, W inthrop, G rowth O pportunities
in C om m on Stocks (N ew York: H arper & Row, 1965).
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ticular circumstance; it may be appropriate to use all of them in an
attempt to define a reasonable range for price negotiations. When
negotiations between principals finally become serious, no mere set of
comparative calculations is going to carry the day, but they may be
an important buttress to the buyer’s judgment.
Evaluation of Operating Performance

Before a transaction can be consummated, the buyer must satisfy
himself that the operating capabilities of his potential acquisition are
sound. This task requires careful analysis of historical data, and is one
in which the CPA’s expertise can be especially valuable. The extent to
which the CPA is asked to perform this task will depend both on the
buyer’s personal knowledge about the industry in which the seller is
operating and the availability of in-house analytical capability within
the buyer’s organization. In the Hastings-Robinson, Inc. illustration,
the buyer was already operating similar businesses in other parts of the
country; thus he had a good basis for evaluating Hastings-Robinson’s
operations. The buyer was also large enough to have an analytical
staff capable of evaluating Hastings-Robinson’s record. The CPA’s
role in this case, therefore, was minimal. If either of these conditions
are missing, however, the buyer’s CPA may be asked to perform this
role.
When the buyer and the seller are operating in the same industry,
the buyer will already have a thorough understanding of the essential
requirements for profitable operations. Nevertheless, a careful analysis
of the seller’s profit record over the last several years is required, par
ticularly in those situations where the valuation of the seller is based
primarily on past performance. Such an analysis is especially important
in those situations where the seller has recently experienced a sharp
upward trend in earnings. Can earnings be expected to continue at the
new high level? Will the growth trend continue so that even higher
earnings can be expected in the future? Or has the seller simply
“dressed-up” the company for sale by recognizing some nonrecurring
profits or modifying some of its accounting policies to represent a more
favorable picture? Two techniques are particularly valuable in dealing
with these questions:
1. Ratio analysis. The simple device of ratio analysis is a powerful
analytical tool. When all operating figures are stated as a percentage
of sales volume, for example, the pertinent questions about the oper
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ating record become more apparent. W hy has the cost of sales per
centage declined in the last two years? W hy are certain operating
expenses showing favorable trends? There may be good answers to
these questions, but they are, nevertheless, questions to which the
buyer should have answers before he consummates the sale. In a
similar fashion, other operating ratios may be used to test the quality of
the seller’s management—ratios such as inventory turnover, the collec
tion period on receivables, and rate of return on invested capital. Analy
sis of this data will not only yield information about how the seller
has operated in the past, but may also pinpoint opportunities for im
provement in the business under the buyer’s management, thus helping
the buyer to quantify some of the intangible advantages of acquiring
the seller’s business.
2. Comparisons with industry data. The ratios developed above
take on additional meaning when compared against the operating per
formance of similar companies. The buyer’s own operating record
provides the best comparative data, both because more detailed in
formation is available and because a subsequent combination of the
two businesses must be evaluated in any event. Operating data about
other companies in the industry will also be useful, however, and the
prime source of this data will usually be the industry trade associa
tion. There are literally thousands of volunteer business associations in
the United States,3 and many of these perform a statistical service for
their members by collecting detailed operating information about
highly specialized lines of businesses. This data is intended for use
by management in evaluating their operations, but is also highly
useful to a buyer who is attempting to evaluate the business of a seller.
In addition, less detailed comparative data may be obtained from the
annual reports of any publicly-held companies that are operating in
the industry.
In the Hastings-Robinson, Inc. example, an analyst from Gotham
spent an intensive two weeks after the August 16th meeting studying
the operating record of each of the five rental yards operated by Hast
ings-Robinson. In addition to operating data from Gotham’s own
equipm ent ren tal division, the analyst also h ad available some industry

ratios prepared by the American Rental Association. Exhibit 9 (page
40) reproduces one page from an annual survey published by that as3 C ham ber of Commerce of the U nited States, Association Activities
(W ashington, D. C., 1955).
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—1.42
- 2 .4 3
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Total v a ria b le ................................................................
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Source: American Rental Association Survey, 1964.
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sociation, and illustrates the type of data that was available and that
had been used by Mr. Nelson earlier in preparing the growth projec
tions. Based on his study, the analyst was able to satisfy himself and
Gotham’s management that Hastings-Robinson’s operating record was
indeed a good one and was believable within the context of the industry.
In those circumstances in which the buyer does not have an intimate
knowledge of the type of business engaged in by the seller, the CPA’s
role may gain increasing importance. In addition to the types of
analyses described above, the buyer may also need some general back
ground information about the industry itself, and may commission his
CPA to help enlighten him. Intensive research may be necessary if the
CPA is to help his client gain a valid understanding of industry trends,
the effect of general economic fluctuations on the particular industry,
and a general appraisal of the risks inherent in operating in that in
dustry. An analysis of this type is presented in the Rio Puerco National
Bank case later in this study.

Adjustments to Historical Data

In most purchase-sale transactions of any size, the buyer’s CPA will
be asked to perform some sort of audit or investigation of the seller's
financial statements. In order to make appropriate modifications in his
normal audit procedures, the CPA’s first responsibility is to gain a
sufficient understanding of the proposed transaction to permit him to
focus his investigation on the most critical elements of the seller’s ac
tivities. If the purchase price rests on the tangible net worth of the
seller, for example, different procedures would be required than if the
purchase price were related to a multiple of the seller’s recent earnings.
The former might require a limited “balance sheet” type of audit which
would ignore minor adjustments in the recognition of the timing of
profits; profit adjustments become critical in the latter case where each
adjustment may be multiplied many times in the negotiation of the
final purchase price.
The Hastings-Robinson illustration is a good case in point. After the
tentative agreement reached on August 16, Gotham immediately con
tacted its regular auditors, Greer, Black & Co., a national firm of CPAs.
Mr. Craigie, a partner in that firm, had been in charge of the Gotham
account for five years. As such, he was familiar with both the regular
audit and the special management services engagements as performed
for the client. Among the latter, Mr. Craigie was personally involved
in an acquisition investigation for Gotham of a rental company in Cali
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fornia a few months earlier. “However,” Mr. Hudson pointed out when
he telephoned Mr. Craigie to give him the new assignment, “the Hast
ings-Robinson, Inc. deal is a lot different from the last one. In Cali
fornia we were paying only a small premium over the replacement
value of the equipment inventory. Hastings-Robinson, on the other
hand, has a much stronger business with an aggressive management
that’s expansion-minded. In order to get them, we’re paying a good
multiple of the earnings projected for the current year. They’ve got
unaudited operating figures for the first six months, and we’ve got to
be sure that we can rely on those figures.”
Mr. Craigie arrived in Cleveland on August 21 with a team of three
assistants. On September 12, he submitted a draft report on his
“limited review” of Hastings-Robinson, Inc.’s statements to Gotham.
While the report contained a balance sheet of Hastings-Robinson as of
July 31, 1966, Mr. Craigie emphasized that he had devoted particular
attention to the statement of earnings for the six months then ended.
Excerpts from his report reflecting the adjustment to the earnings state
ment are reproduced in Exhibit 10, page 44. “As you know,” he ex
plained, in reviewing the draft of his report with Messrs. Hudson and
Spatz, “the most critical expense item in this business is depreciation.
All we’ve done in this draft is to make sure that Hastings-Robinson’s
past depreciation policy has been consistently applied. But we’re also
doing a special analysis of what the depreciation expense would be
using Gotham’s depreciation policies. We should have that study com
pleted in a few more days, and it will probably result in one more ad
justing entry which will then put Hastings-Robinson, Inc.’s adjusted
earnings on a basis completely consistent with Gotham’s. Except for
that final adjustment, I’d say that the situation at Hastings-Robinson
looks pretty clean. For a small, rapidly growing company, their ac
counting records and controls are good, and most of the adjustments
that we’ve made are because they don’t make a tight cut-off for their
monthly statements between audit dates.”
After reviewing Mr. Craigie’s draft, Mr. Hudson decided to make a
copy of it available to Hastings-Robinson’s owners. In a brief phone
call to Mr. Hastings, Hudson suggested they have another meeting to
discuss the auditor’s report and work out the final terms of the trans
action. A date was set for September 22.
Summary

The role of the CPA engaged by a buyer, like that of his counterpart
engaged by a seller, may be a varied one. The CPA, as an analytical
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Exhibit 10

HASTINGS-ROBINSON, INC.
Pro Form a Statem ent of Income
For the Six M onths E nded July 31, 1966
(Examined by Independent Public Accountants Only to the Extent
Indicated in the Accompanying Accountants’ Letter)
Per Com pany
Financial Pro Form a Adjustments*
Statem ents
D ebit
C redit

$1,687,656

Sales ................................... $1,687,656
Cost of sales

1,033,524

(1)$16,612
(4) 5,029
(27) 7,300

Gross profit
$ 654,132
O ther in co m e:
Cash discounts earned
19,269
4,771
Interest ........................
5,006
Miscellaneous

$

$ 683,178

$

Total income

Expenses:
Selling, adm inistrative
and general .............. $ 394,332
(See Schedule 3)
33,692
Interest ....................
Cash discounts
3,692
allowed ................
Uncollectible
6,555
accounts expense ....
2,090
O ther
Total expenses

$ 440,361

N et income before taxes
on income .................... $ 242,817
Federal and states taxes
83,043
on income ....................
N et income ...................... $ 159,774

Pro Form a
Statements

(2)$15,325
(3) 2,091
957
(8)
(9) 9,000
27,373
28,941 $
—
-

(14)
(18)

28,941 $

$ 652,564

—
2,147
696

19,269
6,918
5,702

30,216

$ 684,453

(6)$ 1,591 (15)$ 6,200
554
(16)
(26) 26,000
(13) 6,330 (21) 5,244

(5)

1,035,092

$ 416,277
34,778

—

—

3,692

7,000
—

—
—

13,555
2,090

$

41,475 $

11,444

$ 470,392

$

70,416 $

41,660

$ 214,061

(25) 29,362 (28) 11,383

101,022

$

99,778 $

53,043

$ 113,039

* Numbers in parenthesis refer to the adjusting entries given in the pages that
follow.
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Exhibit 10, continued

HASTINGS-ROBINSON, INC.
Partial List of Pro Form a Adjusting Entries
July 31, 1966
(1)
Cost of sales—rental income (depreciation)
For depreciation—small tools
For depreciation—heavy duty equipm ent
Additional depreciation for six months ended July 31,
1966, as shown by the difference betw een the
am ount recorded and the am ount per data processing
runs.

(2)
For depreciation—small tools ...............................................
For depreciation—heavy duty equipm ent ..........................
Cost of sales—rental equipm ent ...................................
To relieve reserve accounts for accum ulated deprecia
tion applicable to rental equipm ent sales.

(3)
Rental equipm ent inventory—small tools ..........................
Cost of sales—rental equipm ent
To adjust for credit inventory for accum ulated depre 
ciation on equipm ent sales. C redit was m ade on
books to inventory rather than cost of sales.

(4)
Cost of sales—rental equipm ent (m aintenance of equip
m ent) ....................................................................................
Inventories— gas ................................................................
To w rite off inventory of gas per books consistent w ith
treatm ent at January 31, 1966.

$16,612
$ 9,160
7,452

7,232
8,093
15,325

2,091
2,091

5,029
5,029

(5)
Uncollectible accounts expense
Allowance for doubtful accounts
To increase provision for estim ated reserve require
m ents at July 31, 1966.

7,000
7,000
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(6)
Inventories—new equipm ent ..................................................
Inventories—parts ......................... ...........................................
Rental equipm ent inventory—heavy duty ..........................
Selling, adm inistrative and general expenses (d ata proc
essing) .....................................................................................
Selling, adm inistrative and general expenses (telephone
and telegraph .........................................................................
Plant and operating equipm ent .............................................
T rade accounts payable .................................................
To adjust for unrecorded liabilities at July 31, 1966.

$ 1,796
7,156
2,750
899
692
1,508
$14,801

(8)
T rade accounts payable ..........................................................
Inventories—used equipm ent
Cost of sales—new equipm ent
Cost of sales—parts ..........................................................
To reverse January 31, 1966 year-end adjusting entry
which com pany failed to reverse in current year .

13,082
12,125
519
438

(9)
Inventories—new equipm ent
Cost of sales—new e q u ip m e n t.......................................
To adjust for error in pricing cost of sales.

9,000
9,000

(13)
Interest expense .........................................................................
Prepaid interest
Accrued interest ................................................................
To adjust interest for six months.

6,330
5,185
1,145

(14)
Interest receivable .....................................................................
Interest income ..................................................................
To accrue interest on certificate of deposit.

2,147
2,147

(15)
Prepaid expenses .......................................................................
Licenses and taxes ............................................................
To set up vehicle license fees and privilege license fees
applicable to last six months of fiscal year.
(16)
Policy adjustm ents .....................................................................
Factory claims receivable ...............................................
To adjust for outstanding claim w ritten off in August.
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$
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$
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Exhibit 10, continued

(18)
Dealers’ finance reserve ..........................................................
Miscellaneous income ......................................................
To record finance incom e on customers’ notes dis
counted w ith Cleveland N ational Bank .
(21)
R etained earnings .....................................................................
Interest expense .....................................................................
To reverse interest for six months on notes payable to
stockholders for pro form a income statem ent.
(25)
R etained earnings .....................................................................
Provision for federal and state taxes on in c o m e ................
D eferred investm ent tax credit .....................................
To set up deferred tax credit and to provide for taxes
equivalent to investm ent credit for six months net of
am ortization of credit of $4,384.40.
(26)
Bonuses ........................................................................................
Officers’ salaries .........................................................................
Accrued salaries and wages ...........................................
To adjust pro form a statem ents for bonuses to be paid
to other than Hastings and Robinson and adjust
Hastings and Robinson’s salaries to $30,000 each per
annum
(27)
Cost of sales—R ental income (depreciation)
Cost of sales—R ental equipm ent
R etained earnings ............................................................
To adjust pro form a statem ents for the effect upon d e
preciation and gain on sales of rental equipm ent,
attributed to the failure to change to straight-line
depreciation on a retroactive basis.
(28)
Accrued federal and state income taxes ...............................
Provision for federal and state taxes on income
To reduce provision in pro forma statem ents for re
duction in net income before taxes.

696
696

5,244
5,244

41,468
29,362
70,930

14,000
12,000
26,000

5,800
1,500
7,300

11,383
11,383
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professional, can be of great assistance to the buyer in the evaluation
of a prospective acquisition. There are usually substantial amounts of
historical data, both about the seller’s business and its industry, which
will yield valuable insights about the proposed transaction if thor
oughly examined. The CPA rarely has a greater opportunity for an
explicit display of the value of his services than he does when engaged
by the buyer in advance of a major purchase transaction.
On the other hand, there is an important difference in approach be
tween engagements on behalf of the buyer or the seller. An analogy
to the position of opposing lawyers in a legal suit is unsound, because
in a purchase-sale transaction both parties are usually actively inter
ested in reaching a mutual agreement. But the CPA engaged by one
party in a transaction is in a different position than that of a disinter
ested auditor rendering an opinion on statements to be issued to third
parties. Acting for the seller, the CPA is careful to make no representa
tions of his own, but he does assist his client in the preparation of, for
example, projected operating statements which help express in quanti
tative terms the future profit potential which the buyer sees as accru
ing to him as the new owner.
Acting for the buyer, the CPA’s obligation is to shine the spotlight
of analysis on any aspect of the transaction which should be brought
to his client’s attention before the deal is closed. This inquiring ap
proach is intended to disclose those areas of potential conflict or mis
understanding which need to be dealt with before the final terms are
arranged. The buyer can rely on his CPA for a competent and compre
hensive analysis; thus, he has greater confidence in his own judgment
as he approaches the final negotiations.
RESOLVING CONFLICTS

Despite the best of intentions by both parties, and even after an
initial meeting of the minds has been reached, conflicts frequently
arise during the final stages of negotiations which must be resolved
before a purchase-sale transaction can be consummated. The CPA
is usually involved in the final stages because he may be called upon
to interpret his analysis and because his special skills may be required.
Although the specific items of conflict may take myriad forms, three
types of problems that are so common as to be almost generic in the
negotiating process are discussed briefly in this section.
1. Past vs. Future. As one of the owners of Hastings-Robinson, Inc.
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put it in his first meeting with representatives from Gotham Equipment
Corporation, “Looking at it from your point of view, I see that you
can’t buy our company based on what may happen in the future, but
I hope you see that I can’t sell it based just on what’s happened in the
past.” This apparent conflict in point of view is not as serious as it
might appear because, after all, the buyer is concerned with the future
of the company he is thinking about acquiring. Rather, the conflict is
perhaps better characterized as an optimistic view of the future by the
seller in contrast to a pessimistic view by the buyer. Nevertheless, this
difference in attitude between the two parties frequently is the cause
of a series of minor conflicts that may continue to crop up until the
deal is consummated.
2. Management Policies. Although the initial negotiations will be a
major step in resolving the differences in attitude about the future be
tween buyer and seller, another major area of potential conflict—that
of reconciling differences between management policies of the two
companies—is usually not resolved until the negotiations are fairly
well along. When measured against the magnitude of the total trans
action, the financial aspects of conflicting management policies may not
be significant, but they can have an important impact of a more per
sonal nature which may influence the subsequent course of the negoti
ations. For example, the not-so-simple matter of executive prerequisites
and privileges is an area where substantial differences in practice may
exist between the buyer and the seller. Particularly in cases where the
seller plans to continue as a manager of his unit within the larger
organization of the buyer, the seller may find his lower relative status
in the organization a difficult adjustment to make. Adjustments will
usually be required in his salary and other compensation arrangements.
On the other hand, certain existing policies of the buyer may accrue to
the benefit of the seller’s organization; many small companies do not
have pension plans, profit-sharing plans, or other fringe benefits that
they will be eligible for as a part of a larger organization. Both the
pluses and minuses, from each party’s point of view, must be resolved
before the transaction is closed.
3. Accounting Differences. Finally, even though a ten tativ e agree
ment may have been reached in the initial negotiations, subsequent
analysis may disclose significant differences in the accounting policies
between the buyer and seller. These differences are particularly sig
nificant where the buyer is a publicly-owned company and where the
buyer employs more conservative accounting practices. In either of
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these events the buyer will probably insist on recasting the seller’s
financial statements to the buyer’s accounting policies and, if the net
effect of such a conversion is to reduce the profits and/or net worth of
the seller, the entire issue of the valuation of the business may be re
opened. Here again, the initial negotiations should have anticipated
any major accounting issues, but minor points may still have to be
resolved near the end.
All of these problems, and some others as well, are illustrated by the
final negotiations in the Hastings-Robinson, Inc. case, as described
below.
The Meeting on September 22

A day or two in advance of the meeting with Gotham, scheduled for
September 22, the owners of Hastings-Robinson, Inc. and their CPA,
Mr. Nelson, carefully reviewed a draft of the report which had been
prepared by Greer, Black & Co., Gotham’s auditors. As Nelson ex
pressed it, “They’ve made a total of 18 adjustments that affect our in
come statement, but the net effect is small. A great many of the
adjustments are for normal accrual items, both pluses and minuses,
that occur only because you didn’t close your books at the end of the
month as carefully as you would at year-end. On balance, they came
up with an adjusted profit of $214,000 before taxes for the first six
months compared to our estimate of $223,000 (Exhibit 8, page 32).”
“I don’t know what Gotham plans to do at the meeting,” Mr. Hast
ings said, “but I’m certainly glad that we didn’t sign a tentative sales
agreement which was a formula taking adjusted earnings and multiply
ing it times nine and then dividing by the price of Gotham’s stock. Not
only are our earnings slightly lower than we thought, but Gotham’s
stock has also gone up 10 per cent and closed at $73 per share yester
day. At this point, the only agreement between us is that they have the
right to acquire all of our stock in exchange for 34,000 shares of
Gotham. I think we ought to leave it at that and see what Gotham
proposes to do.”
The three men then discussed alternative strategies for the forth
coming negotiation, finally agreeing to adopt Hastings’ proposal.
At the meeting in Gotham’s offices on September 22, Messrs. Hudson
and Spatz were joined by the company’s treasurer and by outside legal
counsel for both parties although Hudson handled the negotiations on
behalf of Gotham. Hudson explained that in addition to the adjust
ments that Greer, Black & Co. had made in their draft report, one final
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adjustment to Hastings-Robinson’s earnings would be required before
their earnings could be consolidated with Gotham’s. “Our depreciation
practices are not radically different,” Mr. Hudson explained, “but they
will have to be consistent. According to our auditors, that means you’ll
have additional depreciation expense of about $74,000 for the full fiscal
year.” This news was somewhat of a surprise to the Hastings-Robinson
representatives, and some time was spent discussing how the adjust
ments had been arrived at. Finally, Mr. Nelson said, “Before we pursue
this matter any further, why don’t you tell us what this means in terms
of Gotham’s intention to exercise its option to acquire our common
stock.”
By way of response Mr. Hudson then distributed to each of the
men from Hastings-Robinson a copy of the calculation presented in
Exhibit 11, page 52. He explained that because adjusted earnings for
the first six months were about $10,000 lower than the original esti
mate he had also lowered the estimated earnings for the final six
months of the current fiscal year. He had then made the special ad
justment for depreciation and had reflected income taxes at a some
what lower effective rate than had been used in the calculations for
the August meeting. The net result was an adjusted profit after tax of
$209,000, $30,000 lower than the figure that had been used to arrive at
a price in August. Applying the same price earnings multiple, and
using the price of Gotham’s stock as it existed on August 16, the new
calculation indicated that only 28,500 shares of Gotham stock would
be required in the exchange. “The overall adjustment to your earnings
is too great to ignore,” Mr. Hudson concluded, “and therefore we do
not plan to exercise our rights under the agreement calling for 34,000
shares. I was really reaching when I agreed to that figure to begin
with, and applying the same factors now, the best offer I can make is
29,000 shares. Why don’t we leave you alone for a few minutes and let
you have a chance to think it over?”
After the Gotham team had left the room, the three men from Hast
ings-Robinson, Inc. had a spirited discussion concerning the next step
in the negotiations. Hastings pointed out that, “At least the situation
is not all black; they’re still using the $66 value for the Gotham stock
even though the market is 10 per cent higher. But 29,000 shares is
quite a bit less than 34,000.” After some further discussion, a strategy
suggested by Mr. Nelson was accepted. He rehearsed briefly with the
owners what he planned to do, and invited the Gotham representatives
back to the conference room.
“We’re disappointed,” Mr. Nelson began, “that you don’t want to go
through with the deal the way it was originally set up. During the last
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Exhibit 11

HASTINGS-ROBINSON, INC.
C alculation of Selling Price Prepared D uring the M eeting
W ith Gotham Equipm ent Corporation
on Septem ber 22, 1966
N et income before taxes on income, for six m onths ended July
31, 1966, per accountants’ report ....................................................
Estim ated pre-tax profits for final six months, reflecting ad d i
tional adjustm ents for executive com pensation and employee
bonuses ................................................................................................
Total pre-tax profits
Less: Special adjustm ent for depreciation expense, to bring
Hastings-Robinson, Inc.’s provision into agreem ent
w ith G otham ’s existing policies
Adjusted pre-tax profits
Provision for income taxes:
Effective tax rate, per separate analysis by G oth
am’s accounts, 51.2% ....... ......................................
Less: Surtax credit for two subsidiaries
Amortization of investm ent tax credit
Net tax expense
Adjusted profits after taxes

$ 214,000

250,000
$ 464,000

74,000
$ 390,000

$199,700
(10,000)
(8,700)
181,000
$ 209,000

Price-earnings m ultiple— as agreed at m eeting on August 16th
9
Total purchase price
$1,881,000
M arket value per share of Gotham stock as of August 16th
$
66.00
N um ber of Gotham shares required
28,500

month, both companies have had a chance to get to know each other
better, and for our part, at least, we’re increasingly convinced that this
merger makes sense. On the other hand, in the euphoric atmosphere
of five weeks ago, we gave you a copy of my report about our expansion
plans as an independent entity. We still think those plans are sound,
and we don’t feel under any compulsion to sell at this time unless the
price is too attractive to pass up.

“You’ve modified your original offer primarily on the basis of some
accounting adjustments that reflect a more conservative accounting
practice. Our auditors have approved the depreciation policy and the
handling of the investment tax credit, but adjusting the earnings to
yours does cause a decrease which is then multiplied many times be
cause of the price/earnings factor. On the other hand, there are some
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offsetting factors which have not been included in your calculations,
such as the savings from eliminating some of the corporate overhead,
cheaper forms of debt financing that will be possible when they are
a part of the Gotham group, and some increased volume for the equip
ment manufactured by Gotham and its subsidiaries where they may be
using competitive makes now. All of these things will serve to increase
Hastings-Robinson’s profit contribution to the over-all Gotham group.
“Even more important, what Gotham really wants to buy here is not
earnings but the management team. Hastings-Robinson is strongly
positioned in the Midwest and they have the know-how and desire
to grow. You’ve got the desire, and also the money that they need for
their expansion, and the last few dollars on the purchase price today
will look small compared to the performance of Hastings-Robinson a
few years from now.
“That’s why,” Mr. Nelson went on, “I think that the real stumbling
block to closing this transaction is the use of a P-E ratio. Last month
there was an agreement to sell the company for 34,000 shares, equiv
alent to a price of $2,244,000. If our earnings on your basis will be
only $209,000, then that means that you are paying a multiple of about
10.7—and what’s wrong with that? Gotham’s stock is selling at a
multiple of 17 times earnings, so your present stockholders will be
getting an immediate leverage on the earnings as soon as the deal is
closed. So,’’ Mr. Nelson concluded, “my client thinks that the deal
struck a month ago was a fair one, and they see no reason to change
it now.”
Mr. Hudson said that he certainly agreed with many of the points
that Mr. Nelson had raised, and that he would like to discuss the m at
ter further with his associates. The Gotham team then excused them
selves and left the conference room once again.
Once they were alone, Mr. Hastings complimented Mr. Nelson on
his presentation of the Hastings-Robinson position, saying, “You put it
to them a little more strongly than I would have been able to, because
I’ve got to be able to work with these people for years in the future in
the event that we close this deal.” All three men recognized, however,
that any agreement was going to have to be a compromise. After some
discussion, management decided that if Gotham came back with a
counter-offer that indicated any willingness to negotiate toward a
middle ground, they would also make some concession from the posi
tion just stated by Mr. Nelson.
When the Gotham team returned, Mr. Hudson announced that they
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had decided to increase their offer to 30,000 shares of Gotham stock.
Mr. Nelson replied that he and the Hastings-Robinson, Inc. owners
had also been doing some refiguring. The original price had been
predicated on a 6½ for 1 exchange ratio, but the Hastings-Robinson,
Inc. owners had now decided that they would agree to a 7 for 1
exchange which would require 31,571 shares of Gotham stock. Mr.
Nelson pointed out that this figure was almost exactly halfway between
the original 34,000 shares and the 29,000 shares represented in
Gotham’s latest calculations. “We think that going halfway is about as
fair as you can be,” Mr. Hastings concluded. Mr. Hudson once again
took his team of negotiators out of the conference room, but returned
in a few moments saying, “Well, if it’s worth 30,000 shares, it must be
worth 31,000. Is that agreeable?” Messrs. Hastings and Robinson
glanced briefly at each other, then turned to Mr. Hudson, nodded, and
everyone broke into smiles. The legal closing of the transaction
occurred approximately three weeks later.
Later in the afternoon of September 22, the three men from HastingsRobinson, Inc. were reviewing the events of the day. “You really did a
fine job for us, Dick,” Mr. Hastings said, “especially in keeping Jim and
me from having to take a hard bargaining position with people we are
now going to have to work for. I don’t have any qualms about this
arrangement at all now; Hudson and Spatz conducted themselves like
real gentlemen throughout the whole show, and I’m sure that the
relationship is off to a fine start.”

Summary

The CPA’s role in the purchase or sale of a small business frequently
involves more than doing an audit or an investigation prior to an acqui
sition; he may serve as a business analyst, an advisor, a negotiator, or
some combination of all of these. The CPA can be particularly helpful
to his client in the latter group of management services both because
of his objectivity and because of his greater familiarity with the finan
cial aspects of such transactions. When engaged for these reasons, the
CPA’s approach to the problem is to attempt to make explicit the fol
lowing two types of information which are required before a mutually
satisfactory agreement can be reached:
1. Knowledge about the business. The buyer must have a thorough
understanding of exactly what he is acquiring from the seller. Such
understanding requires careful examination of both the history of the
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business and the critical characteristics of the industry in which it oper
ates. But the buyer is even more interested in the future of the busi
ness, and the CPA who is assisting the seller must try to translate the
seller’s views about the potential of his business into financial terms
that will be meaningful to the buyer.
2. Knowledge about the motivations of the parties. Of equal or
even greater importance, both principals in the transaction will be able
to negotiate more fruitfully if they understand the factors that are
motivating the other party. The CPA can be of great value to his client
by helping him to get a clear understanding of the motivations of
both parties, and by devising a negotiating strategy that capitalizes
on the elements of mutual interest.
With dedicated effort by all concerned, this knowledge will be
achieved, and the CPA will have the professional satisfaction of having
participated in an important and successful transaction on behalf of
his client.
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LIST OF CASES

The remainder of this bulletin consists of four case studies. The
cases are arranged roughly in order of increasing complexity in terms
of the amount of analysis required by the reader using the cases for
staff training purposes.
1.

Rio Puerco National Bank. A wealthy investor asks his CPA firm to
help him evaluate the proposed purchase of a majority interest in a
local commercial bank.

2. The Economy Supermarkets. The owner, approaching retirement,
has decided to sell his two supermarkets and wants his CPA to
“handle the whole thing for me.”
3. Radionics, Inc. This rapidly-expanding electronics company needs
more capital. The owner must decide what percentage of the equity
to sell in order to raise $50,000.
4. Rack Service Corporation. The latest proposed acquisition, after
three earlier ones, will further complicate an intricate set of corpo
rate-investor relationships. The CPA is asked to try to anticipate
some potential future problems and recommend a plan of action.
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Rio Puerco National Bank
In January of 1964, the Albuquerque, New Mexico office of Warner,
Simmons & O’Hearn, a major national accounting firm, was approached
by one of its clients, Robert Freeland, in connection with his possible
acquisition of a commercial bank located in the city. The managing
partner, Philip Harte, called in Frank Gordon, a manager in the firm’s
management advisory services section, and asked him to prepare the
requested evaluation.
Robert Freeland

Mr. Freeland had become a client of the firm in 1959 when he re
quested consultation on his personal tax return. After 1959 the firm
continued to provide him with advice on tax matters and, in addition,
had conducted several purchase investigations for him which cul
minated in his acquisition of an apartment house and a small manu
facturing company. Several other potential investments had been
rejected after the firm’s investigation.
Mr. Freeland, who was in his mid-thirties, was independently
wealthy, having inherited an estate of approximately $2 million. His
wife’s estate was said to be worth close to $6 million. His principal
occupation since graduation from college dealt with the investment of
those funds. He also spent a great deal of time working for charitable
organizations and in the past had served as treasurer of various private
schools and as the director of a number of fund drives. He normally
did not become involved in the active management of the companies
he acquired, but made an exception in the case of the apartment house
that he acquired in 1961. Much of his time since then had been spent
in improving the profitability of that investment, but as of mid-1963,
he turned the operation of the apartment house over to a resident man57

ager and began to look for other investment opportunities. His direct
involvement in the operation of the apartment house had whetted his
appetite, and he sought an opportunity to build a successful company
relying on his own management ability.
Through a golfing associate he heard that the aging owner of the
Rio Puerco National Bank in Albuquerque was considering selling his
interest in the bank. In explaining to Mr. Harte why he found the
prospective investment appealing, Mr. Freeland said, “First, banking is
a very respectable business and is thus compatible with my social posi
tion in the community. Second, because of my business contacts and
other investments, I believe I can substantially increase the volume of
any bank with which I become associated. Third, I believe that banks
in general provide an adequate return on investment with little risk.
Finally, and of great importance, I feel that a major acquisition of this
nature would give me a chance to prove to myself that I can be success
ful in my own right by revitalizing an important local institution.”
Mr. Freeland told Mr. Harte that he had discussed the opportunity
in general terms with his wife because the acquisition of the bank
would require the liquidation of a substantial portion of her holdings
in the common stock of the Dem-a-Lex Dynamics Corporation, a “blue
chip” company li sted on the New York Stock Exchange. The average
dividend yield of this stock in 1963 had been close to 4½ per cent, and
it was selling at a price equal to 15 times the earnings for that year.
This liquidation would be necessary since Mr. Freeland’s own funds
were tied up in the ownership of small companies rather than in the
common stock of larger companies traded on the stock market. He had
also expressed, on several occasions, his reluctance to borrow large
sums of money because of the mental strain and worry that he asso
ciated with outside funds.
A large part of Mrs. Freeland’s holdings had been placed in oil and
gas properties in order to obtain the associated depletion and drilling
cost write-offs. This resulted in a joint tax rate far below that which
might be expected based on their combined equities. Their joint return
for 1963 showed that they were in the 50% tax bracket.
The Rio Puerco National Bank

The Rio Puerco National Bank, located in Albuquerque, New
Mexico, had been founded by the father of its current president. It
was the second-largest bank in the city, with total deposits of over
thirty million dollars (the largest bank had nearly double these de
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posits). The president of the bank, in his mid-sixties, had decided that
he should sell his interest in the bank within the next three to five years
because he was reaching the age where he wanted to travel and had
no heirs who could take over the bank’s operations. He was proud of
the fact that he had doubled the size of the bank since taking it over
from his father. He attributed this to the many close friends he had
made in the community through various clubs and civic activities.
Albuquerque, the largest town in the state with a population of
150,000, was located on the old Santa Fe trail to California. It received
a substantial share of its income from the tourist trade but its prime
support came from oil, ranching and light industrial interests in the
adjacent region. It was also the seat of the University of New Mexico,
a rapidly growing institution. The city had shown above-average
growth during the past two decades but not the explosive growth of
Phoenix, Arizona, or many of the other larger cities in California.
After hearing that the stock in the bank might be for sale, Mr. Free
land contacted the bank president who confirmed that he would be
interested in discussing the sale of his stock. He pointed out that he
owned 51 per cent of the common stock or 15,300 of the 30,000 shares
outstanding and stated that he wanted to be paid in full for all of his
stock at the date of the transfer. He indicated that he wanted to retire
from the bank as of the date of the sale but stressed that the executive
vice president was a capable person and would be able to operate the
bank as he had done on past occasions when the president was absent.
He gave Mr. Freeland copies of various financial statements and agreed
to provide any additional information that would be required.
Interview with Messrs. Harte and Gordon

It was at this point that Mr. Freeland walked into Mr. Harte’s office
and asked him to have the potential investment evaluated. As he
handed him copies of the bank’s financial statements, he commented,
“I’m putting this in your lap, Philip. I don’t know anything about
banks, but I think this might be a good investment. The bank president
mentioned a preliminary sales price, but I’m not going to tell you what
it is now because I want you to look at this independently and tell me
what you think it’s worth. I don’t want you biased by the president’s
idea of what his stock is worth.”
Freeland further commented that he hoped the firm would be able
to complete its analysis within the next ten days, as he understood from
the bank president that two other parties were also interested in pur
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chasing the stock. One of these was a bank holding company. Harte
assured him that the firm’s study, for which Mr. Frank Gordon would
be responsible, would be completed within that time period.
Before starting his analysis of the investment opportunity, Mr. Gor
don reviewed the firm’s reference binder on banks, prepared by the
home office. During this review he made several notes on topics which
he felt might be relevant during his analysis. The following condensed
summary of these notes was subsequently provided to Mr. Freeland
for his own background information.

N otes

on

B anking *

Banks are financial institutions dealing in money and credit. The
traditional function of banks has been to lend money and this is
still their most important economic function. The receipt of de
posits and the transfer of money and credit are related operations
which have evolved as a result of the lending function. The
primary bank functions could be summarized as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

The
The
The
The
The
The
The

lending of money.
receipt of deposits.
payment of checks.
transfer of funds.
collection of sundry financial statements.
administration and safekeeping of property for others.
investment of funds.

Because of these functions, banking has long been recognized
as a business that is ‘affected by the public interest.’ The ‘public
interest’ has been responsible for the restriction of banking func
tions to reputable institutions, and the public regulation of those
who engage in the banking business.
Banks may be classified as state or national, as members or non
members of the Federal Reserve System, as commercial or savings
banks, and as insured or noninsured by membership in the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation.
State banks are banks incorporated under the general banking
laws of the respective state in which they operate. National banks
are chartered by the Federal government and are operated under
* Since 1964, w hen Mr. Gordon took these notes, m any changes have been
m ade in th e banking regulations. T he reader is asked to take this into con
sideration in reading these excerpts.
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the direction of the Comptroller of the Currency, a government
official. They may be located in any state and have greater uni
formity in powers and operating practices than state banks.
All national banks are required to be members of the Federal
Reserve System. State banks may become members upon applica
tion and acceptance. With few exceptions, both types of banks
operate under the same rules and regulations. Non-member banks
consist entirely of state banks and are predominantly small banks.
Commercial banks are organized primarily for the purpose of
lending money, receiving deposits, and transferring money and
credit. It is very common, however, for commercial banks to re
ceive savings deposits and to perform in a trust capacity in addi
tion to their commercial bank functions. Savings banks (and
savings departments of commercial banks) accept deposits on a
time basis. A regular rate of interest (or dividends in the case of
mutual associations) are paid on these deposits. The funds de
posited are invested chiefly in long-term securities, including
mortgages or real estate.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was organized to
protect the depositors of insured banks; the maximum insurance
protection for each depositor is $10,000. All members of the Fed
eral Reserve System (national and state banks) must participate
in the deposit insurance plan. Non-member banks of the Federal
Reserve System and mutual savings banks may become insured
banks upon application and acceptance.
National banks are established under the National Banking Act
of 1863. The Act provided, among other things, for a system of
national banks subject to uniform laws and regulations. A Comp
troller of the Currency (appointed by the President of the United
States and responsible to the Secretary of the Treasury) was desig
nated and charged with the administration of the laws relating to
national banks. At the present time, the major duties of the Comp
troller include:
1. The chartering of national banks.
2. The supervision of national banks through examinations and
statement calls.
3. The preparation of various reports, including an annual report
to Congress.
4. Acting as a director of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo
ration.
Once chartered, a national bank is subject to regulation and
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supervision. Supervision is accomplished primarily through bank
examinations and call statements. The bank examinations are
conducted by examiners appointed by the Comptroller, and na
tional banks are examined at least twice a year. The Comptroller
of the Currency has statutory authority to obtain three reports of
condition each year (referred to as “call reports” ) from every na
tional bank on forms prescribed by him. These reports must set
forth a detailed statement of assets and liabilities of the bank as of
the close of business on the date specified ( call d ate). The reports
must be transmitted to the Comptroller within five days after the
call. In addition to these reports of condition, every national bank
is required to file a report of earnings and dividends to the Comp
troller at the end of each six months—namely, June 30 and Decem
ber 31. The final report each year shows earnings and dividends
for the entire year.
State banks are subject to the supervision of state banking
authorities. Each state has laws and regulations covering the
chartering and organization of banks within its jurisdiction. The
administration of the applicable laws is similar in scope and pur
pose to that exercised by the national banking authorities. Ex
aminations of the banks are conducted and calls for statements are
made. While there are many variations between the various
states’ laws, the principal differences are concerned with capital
stock requirements and the loan limitations.
The Federal Reserve System was established in 1913 and is
comprised of the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The Board of Governors
The Federal Open Market Committee
The Federal Advisory Council
Twelve Federal Reserve Banks with 24 branches
Member banks numbering 6,900

One of the most important responsibilities of the Board of Gov
ernors concerns the credit policies of the System. Some of the
means by which this control is effected include (1) the establish
ment of reserves to be maintained by member banks against de
posits, (2) full representation on the Federal Open Market Com
mittee which regulates the open market operations carried on by
the Federal Reserve banks, (3) the determination of discount
rates charged by the Reserve banks on their discounts and ad
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vances, and (4) the promulgation of regulations designed to pre
vent an undue diversion of funds into speculative operations.
In connection with its supervision of the member banks, the
Board of Governors is authorized, among other things:
1. To pass upon the admission and termination of membership
in state banks and trust companies.
2. To examine and receive statements of condition from member
banks.
3. To limit the rate of interest which member banks may pay on
time and savings deposits.
4. To remove officers and directors of member banks for con
tinued violations of law or unsafe or unsound practices in con
ducting a bank’s business.
5. To suspend member banks from the use of the credit facilities
of the System.
6. To pass on applications of national banks for authority to exer
cise trust powers or to act in fiduciary capacities.
The number of directors usually varies with the size of the bank.
The regulations of the Federal Reserve System provide that mem
ber banks shall not have less than five or more than twenty-five
directors. Citizenship, residence, and stock ownership are basic
principles upon which directorships in national banks rest.
In commercial banking, deposits generally fall into two major
classes, demand deposits and time deposits. A demand deposit is
payable at any time the depositor elects to withdraw funds. They
are payable on written order, usually a check, and are commonly
found as commercial accounts in commercial banks. On occasion
demand deposits may be evidenced by certificates of deposit; how
ever, only a small proportion of demand deposits are in this
category.
Time deposits are those which are payable at a certain future
date. Savings accounts which constitute the largest group of time
deposits are normally paid by banks on demand; however, banks
may require thirty or more days advance notice of withdrawal.
Time deposits are also represented by time certificates of deposit
and time deposits on open account.
The general rule of distinction between the two classes is that
those deposits requiring thirty days’ notice (or more) prior to
withdrawal are classed as time deposits; all other deposits are
demand deposits. The distinction is important because of reserve
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requirements and the regulation on interest rates. The present
reserve requirements, for example, are 6% on time deposits, and
22%, 19% and 13% on demand deposits, depending on whether
the institution is in a central reserve city, a reserve city, or else
where, respectively. The payment of interest on demand deposits
is prohibited for members of the Federal Reserve System, and a
maximum rate is prescribed for time deposits.
The general accounting problems faced by banks do not differ
greatly from the problems faced by any financial institution. In
banks, however, the influence of tradition and conservatism has
been particularly strong. This, coupled with the influence of the
regulatory bodies, has resulted in certain accounting policies
which differ from normal commercial practice.
Historically, the method of accounting employed by banks was
the cash basis. In the majority of small banks, the cash basis con
tinues to be used. Thus income is recorded only when it is realized
and expenses become a matter of formal record only when paid.
[Note: Rio Puerco National Rank is no exception to this practice
as it keeps its books on the cash basis.]
From an auditing viewpoint a cash basis bank may present state
ment problems. On the asset side the failure to set up the accrued
income on loans and investments may represent a material item.
The failure to record the liability for Federal income taxes will
result in understatement of liabilities. If discounted loans are
relatively heavy, then unearned discount may be material. De
pending upon the date of the audit, the liability for savings inter
est may also have to be considered.
Small banks on a cash basis are well aware of the advantages of
the accrual basis. Normally they feel that they do not have the
staff to carry out the mechanics of the system. With the passage
of time and the growth of the bank, a transitional stage in the
method of accounting takes place. During this stage the bank
may be on the accrual basis for some accounts and on a cash basis
for others. In almost all large banks the books are kept on a full
accrual basis.
One of the long-standing practices in bank accounting has been
the rapid depreciation of property accounts. Thus, building and
furniture and fixtures may be written off over very short periods
of time, without regard for useful life. This practice, generally ac
cepted within the banking industry, stems from the banker’s desire
to remove items from the statement of condition which cannot
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readily be converted into cash. From the regulatory agencies’
point of view, such a write-off appears to be encouraged. In addi
tion, the lack of such a fast write-off sometimes seems to be used
by the regulatory agencies as an oblique criticism of undercapital
ization. After the fixed assets have been reduced to a nominal
value, it is not unusual to find that additions thereafter are
expensed.
Another feature of conservatism in bank accounting is the
creation of a reserve for contingencies. The components of such
a reserve may be earmarked, e.g., an additional reserve against
loans and discounts, or a reserve for decline in investments—or
they may be unspecified as to purpose. Such a reserve is generally
created out of undivided profits rather than by a charge against
profits.
The normal capital accounts of a bank are capital stock, surplus
and undivided profits. As in an industrial company, the capital
stock account reflects the amount of owner’s contribution dedi
cated to capital stock through the issuance of shares, normally
common shares.
Surplus in bank accounting is roughly comparable to capital
surplus or paid-in surplus in industrial practice. The surplus ac
count comes into being through stockholder’s contributions, that
is, the excess of the price paid for capital stock over the stated
value of the stock. Additions to surplus are made by transfers from
undivided profits until surplus is at least equal to capital stock. It
should be noted that the surplus account represents a permanent
part of the capital of the bank designed to provide additional
protection for depositors.
The undivided profits account in a bank is much the same as
earned surplus in an industrial corporation. Net profits are trans
ferred to undivided profits, and dividends are declared out of un
divided profits. In many small banks, however, the undivided
profits account may be treated as a profit and loss account with all
income and expenses, contingency provisions, etc., passing through
the account. Even in some of the larger banks, the undivided
profits account is used to absorb write-offs, a variety of provisions,
etc.
A bank which is incorporated under the laws of the U. S. and
which is subject by law to supervision and examination by state
or Federal authority having supervision over banking institutions
is subject to tax on its net income at the same rates as other corpo65

rations. It likewise is subject to the provisions of capital gains tax.
In the state of New Mexico, all bank income is also subject to a
6% excise or franchise tax. The interest earned on municipal
bonds as well as on obligations of a state or the District of
Columbia is exempt from taxation.
The Internal Revenue Code permits a bank to deduct as bad
debt losses each year an amount computed by applying a formula
percentage to total loans outstanding at the close of the taxable
year. The formula percentage is a ratio based on the actual loss
experience of the bank during a consecutive 20-year period of
time. This factor has been computed at .63% for the Rio Puerco
National Bank. This was .10 to .15% less than the average experi
ence factor for the Dallas Federal Reserve District.
Gordon’s Initial Approach

With this background, Gordon proceeded to examine the informa
tion that Mr. Freeland had obtained from the bank president on his
first visit. A condensed form of the call report as of December 31, 1963
is reproduced in Exhibit 1, page 67. The bank directors, however, did
not believe the values shown on the call report truly reflected its real
economic values. They had taken the call report capital account figures
and adjusted them upward to reflect other values which they felt
should realistically be included as part of the capital. These book
values as adjusted by the bank are shown in Exhibit 2, page 68. Mr.
Freeland had also obtained copies of the Earnings and Dividends Re
ports (income statements), as submitted to the Comptroller of the
Currency, for the period 1959 through 1963. Those reports have been
reproduced in comparative form as Exhibit 3, page 70. As in the case
of the statement of condition, the bank did not feel the reported earn
ings fairly reflected the earning capacity of the institution, and there
fore made certain adjustments to the earnings reported for 1963. The
bank believed that the adjusted earnings for 1963 gave a much better
indication of real earnings for 1963. The net income as adjusted by the
bank is shown as Exhibit 4, page 72.
After an initial examination of these statements, Gordon decided to
develop a preliminary plan of attack and determine what other infor
mation he would like to have. He planned to talk with the bank presi
dent within a day or two and knew it was essential to obtain any clarifi
cation of questionable items or additional facts at that point since time
was of the essence.
Before talking with the bank president, Gordon looked through
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Exhibit 1

RIO PU ER CO NATIONAL BANK
R eport of Condition at the
Close of Business, D ecem ber 31, 1963
Assets:
Cash on hand and due from banks
$5,364,580.72
U. S. G overnm ent securities due or callable
in less than one year .....................................
4,092,775.96
U. S. Governm ent securities due or callable
after one year ..................................................
7,475,245.51
O ther bonds ......................................................................................
Loans and discounts (net of loss reserve) .................................
Federal Reserve Bank stock
Bank building—furniture and fixtures
O ther real estate .............................................................................
O ther assets ......................................................................................

$16,932,602.19
1,537,456.10

16,693,484.57
48,000.00
501,657.77
105,000.00
5,886.09
$35,824,086.72

Liabilities:
Deposits ............................................................................................
C apital stock
$ 600,000.00
Surplus ...................................................................
1,300,000.00
U ndivided profits and reserves
250,000.00
Total capital accounts
Reserves for taxes and other expenses
D eferred income

$32,731,247.42

$ 2,150,000.00
650,000.00
292,839.30
$35,824,086.72

Moody's and other financial reporting sources to see if he might be able
to develop some tentative guidelines in terms of market prices, com
parative earnings and dividends, or other similar price standards. He
recognized that the term “book value” was anomalous and could
imply different values even in similar situations. For example, the book
value of a recently-established bank might be close to its market value,
while for an old established institution it might be only 50 to 75 per
cent of market value. He also knew that reported earnings might not
reflect the true earning capacity of a concern in the long run and that
the earnings figure could be affected by extraordinary items. Finally,
he felt that the market price of a stock was meaningless when the pur
chase of a controlling interest was planned rather than the purchase
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of a smaller number of shares for investment purposes. This question
would be further complicated if the stock was thinly traded.
In spite of these drawbacks, he believed that such figures from other
banks might provide him with useful ideas. From various sources he
Exhibit 2

R IO PU ER CO NATIONAL BANK
Book Values as A djusted by Bank
D ecem ber 31, 1963
C apital accounts:
C apital stock ......................................................
Surplus .................................................................
U ndivided profits ..............................................
Reserves ...............................................................
Personal loan reserve .......................................

$ 600,000.00
1,300,000.00
250,000.00
650,000.00
26,500.00

$2,826,500.00

Property:
Building—appraisal value .............................
Less book value ................................................

$1,425,000.00
445,000.00

980,000.00

F urniture and fixtures—appraisal value
Less book value ................................................

$ 275,000.00
161,008.00

113,992.00

Loan less r e s e rv e ...................................................
Loans charged off b u t co lle c tib le .....................
Interest collected, not earned ...........................
Accrued interest:
Loans ...................................................................
G overnm ent bonds ...........................................
M unicipal bonds ..............................................
Personal loans ....................................................
Prepaid expenses:
Insurance premium s .......................................
Postage in m eter ..............................................
Supplies (estim ated) .......................................

346,956.00
30,000.00
292,839.00
$

70,000.00
80,000.00
17,000.00
25,000.00

192,000.00

38,680.00
9,000.00
25,000.00

72,680.00

$ 100,000.00
15,000.00

115,000.00

$

Appreciation on bonds:
G overnm ent bonds ............................................
M unicipal bonds ..............................................
Adjusted book v a l u e ....................................

$4,969,967.00

Book value p er share* ............................
R ounded .....................................................

165.67
166.00

* Based on the 30,000 shares outstanding of which the bank president owns
15,300 or 51%.
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was able to obtain market price, book value, earnings, dividends, and
certain other information for various banks in the state. This data is
given in Exhibit 5, page 73.
Since the information available on local and regional banks was
limited and because Rio Puerco was one of the largest banks in New
Mexico, Gordon thought it would be desirable to obtain more detailed
but comparable figures for banks in an adjoining state. Since the stocks
of several banks in Colorado were publicly held by a large number of
shareholders, more information was available from published sources.
Exhibit 6, page 74 presents a compilation of market price, earnings
and dividends for five such banks. Further study of reference material
led to the conclusion that published financial information on banks and
bank stocks was scanty and that the data presented in Exhibits 5 and 6
was the most comprehensive and comparative information available.
Meeting with Bank Officials

After examination of the above information, Gordon made an ap
pointment to visit the president of the Rio Puerco National Bank the
next day. The president suggested they meet for lunch and that
Gordon could then spend the afternoon gathering the information he
needed. During lunch, the president spoke in glowing terms of the
rapid growth of the bank during the past few years and the tremendous
future potential of business in the Albuquerque area.
Afterward Gordon inquired of the president if he had any figures to
substantiate the bank’s past growth and of other banks in the area. The
president replied, “We do have a scrapbook with newspaper clippings
about all the local banks. We haven’t done much with it but you’re
welcome to browse through it.” This scrapbook contained published
call reports and various other social and personal information about
other banks in the area. From it, Gordon was able to compile compara
tive data with regard to loans and deposits for several local and regional
banks. This is included in Exhibit 7, page 76.
In response to a second question, the president commented that no
projections had been made of expected future growth but that based
on the expected growth of the state the bank could not help but
prosper. The president indicated that he did not feel further discussion
of this point would be fruitful.
Gordon then raised certain questions with respect to the adjustments
made by the bank to the book values. At this point the president asked
the bank’s chief accountant to take over. The president thanked
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N et operating earnings ..........................................................

O perating expense:
Salaries— officers ................................................................
Salaries—employees ..........................................................
Officer and employee benefits
D irectors’ fees ......................................................................
Interest expense ..................................................................
Net occupancy expense—premises .................................
F urniture and equipm ent—depreciation,
rent, etc ..............................................................................
D epreciation—building, equipm ent, etc ......................
O ther operating expense .................................................

Interest—U.S. Governm ent securities ..........................
Interest—other securities .................................................
Interest and discount on lo a n s .........................................
Service charges on loans .................................................
Service charges on deposits .............................................
O ther charges, fees, commissions ...................................
T rust departm ent fees ......................................................
Safe deposit rentals
O ther income ......................................................................

Operating income:

1960

1961

1962

1963

Exhibit 3

33,000
290,474
$ 929,471
$ 384,016

1,700
109,411

$ 176,981
317,905

$1,313,487

$1,709,853

84,072
90,337 (2)
32,000
30,000
288,984
418,730
263,984
268,550 (1)
$1,018,448 $1,175,641 $1,137,928 $1,274,275
$ 559,158 $ 479,223 $ 421,718 $ 435,578

1,720
157,238

$1,559,646

$ 211,823 $ 209,825
325,790
347,001
68,925
72,890
1,720
1,760
1,460
155,981
152,548
255,584
29,026
28,628

$1,654,864

$ 201,808 $ 212,988
336,698
356,222

$1,577,606

$ 293,256 $ 412,016 $ 455,066 $ 331,973 $ 357,123
11,770
20,719
33,734
38,409
44,991
805,664
916,747
935,221
900,502
1,042,587
5,167
6,228
8,663
9,516
8,980
129,328
143,964
154,521
153,585
158,100
14,196
16,322
11,239
6,970
7,496
40,498
47,451
34,950
97,628
61,615
11,930
12,478
12,344
12,304
12,987
1,678
1,681
9,126
8,759
15,974(1)

1959

RIO PU ERCO NATIONAL BANK
C om parative Earnings and D ividend Reports
For the Period 1959 - 1963

$

Cash dividends

75,000

242,216

167,780

14,003

153,777

409,996

25,980

(1,941)

27,921

453,101

238,385 $

$

60,000

$ 214,716

$

23,838

$ 214,547

$

$ (106,057) $

(1,503)

60,000

$ 304,984

374,897 $

37,490

$ 337,407

26,217

$ 235,957

$ 455,706

20,128

19,140
(2,065) (2)

3,053

1963

$

60,000

$

60,000

$(117,214) $ 193,532

296,697 $ 262,174

29,670

$ 267,027

$ 179,483

200,658 $ (242,235) $
$ 679,881

$

1962

$ 123,040 $
(261,516)
(2,572)
(101,374)
(1,825)
(2,385)

1961

$ (104,554) $ 205,055

1960

Notes:
(1) Rental income from offices in the bank building has been reclassified against “Other operating expenses” for this schedule.
(2) In 1962, $43,333 was reclassified from “Other charges” to “Furniture and equipment depreciation.”

$

N et income (loss) ..................................................................

$

$

Taxes on n et income:
Federal ................................................................................

State .......................................................................................

$

$

$

Profit before income taxes ..................................................

O ther (charges) or cred its:
Securities—profit (loss) on sale .....................................
Securities—valuation reserve .........................................
Loans— transfers from (to) reserves ............................
O ther ......................................................................................

1959

RIO PUERCO NATIONAL BANK

71

Exhibit 4

RIO PU ERCO NATIONAL BANK
N et Incom e for 1963 as Adjusted by Bank
N et income for year 1963 as shown on the
Report of Earnings and D ividends (see Exhibit 3)

$193,532.00

Add back:
Excess depreciation and writedowns deducted in
arriving at n et income:
F urniture and fixtures
$58,000.00
Real estate charge down ........................
35,000.00
Special loan reserve
6,360.00

99,360.00

Expenses paid in advance b u t deducted in arriving
at net income:
Clearing house assessment
$ 8,729.00
Advertising ..........................
7,426.00
Excess expense accruals
72,680.00

88,835.00

Trust income earned b u t not included (not billed)
in arriving at net income
Adjusted net income for 1963
Adjusted net earnings per share .........................................

4,000.00
$385,727.00
$12.82

Gordon for coming and offered to provide any further service he could.
The following section consists of excerpts from Gordon’s notes of his
conversation with the chief accountant. They first discussed adjust
ments made to the statement of condition, then to the report of earn
ings and dividends.

Statement of Condition

1. Appraisal value of building and furniture and fixtures. An inde
pendent appraisal firm had placed a value of $1,425,000 on the bank
building, the land on which it stood, and on an adjacent parking lot.
This land and the parking lot were appraised at $475,000 and $200,000,
respectively, while the value of the building was set at $750,000. The
building had been constructed in 1936, was in good repair, and was
located at the major downtown intersection. Offices in the building
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$62½ —58
27½ —25
23—22
55
425—375
28

Banks w ith resources under $30 million— 1962
Bank B .................................. $22,755
Bank E
22,228
B ankW
18,008
B ankX
16,904
B a n k Y ...................................
15,225
B ankZ
14,567
$1,586
1,425
857
1,235
1,070
1,114

$3,537
2,468
1,598
2,194
$63.44
27.94
28.57
61.74
428.07
22.28

$23.58
27.64
31.96
73.14

Book Value
Per Share
(N ote 3)

$3.50
N.A.
1.52
N.A.
N.A.
2.79

$3.18
N.A.
1.78
2.92

$ 3.25
1.00
1.00
2.50
17.00
.90

2.00

$1.50
1.90

N et
Cash
Income
Dividends
Per Share Per Share

Exhibit 5

Note: Rio Puerco National Bank’s market price has remained at $65 per share for the past several years.
Note 1—Complete data for 1962 for all banks included in the comparison is not readily available at this time. Income
statements of banks are not a matter of public record unless the banks voluntarily submit such information.
Income statements are generally not available for smaller banks.
Note 2—The market prices shown, particularly for the smaller banks in the comparison, are probably based on sale of
relatively few shares of stock. Market prices for the smaller banks may primarily represent the sales price to
present stockholders and may or may not be a true market value.
Note 3—Book value may not be comparable in that certain banks may follow a more conservative practice with re
spect to valuation of assets than other banks.

25
51
30
20
2.5
50

$42.00
42.00
35.00
65.00

N um ber of
Shares
M arket Price C apital
(000’s
Per Share
(000’s
om itted)
(N ote 2) om itted)

Banks w ith resources (assets) over $30 million— 1962
Bank A
$54,920
150
B ankC
41,980
65
Bank D
32,747
50
B ankV
31,495
30

Total
Resources
(000’s
om itted)

RIO PU ER CO NATIONAL BANK
Comparison of Prices, Book Values, Earnings and
D ividends for Selected New Mexico Banks (N ote 1)
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74

$ 24,022,325
$160.15
$404,209,453
$376,770,573

T otal assets ..................................................................

Total deposits ..............................................................

150,000
($50 par)

$320,851,531

$355,815,106

$ 30,242,065
$29.65

1,020,000
($10 par)

$40
33—50
1924
$1.20

Denver—U.S.
N ational
Bank
(D enver)

$260
225—310
1895
$6.50

Total capital f u n d s .....................................................
Book value per share (a) .........................................

N um ber of shares outstanding and
p ar value

Offering price, January 1963 ...................................
Price range, 1962 ..................... ..................................
Dividend record: each year s in c e ..........................
C urrent dividend rate ......................................................

First
National
Bank
(D enver)

December 31, 1962

500,000
($10 par)

$23
19—28
1945
$0.80

C entral
Bank and
Trust Co.
(D enver)

$193,351,841 $154,459,332

$211,278,180 $166,871,631

$ 14,673,160 $ 10,122,329
$65.21
$20.24

225,000
($25 p ar)

$80
76—108
1937
$2.60

Colorado
National
Bank
(D enver)

RIO PU ER CO NATIONAL BANK
Com parison of Five Colorado Bank Stocks

$ 51,576,567

$ 58,533,168

$ 4,191,384
$27.94

150,000
($10 par)

$41
39—41½
1951
$1.85

First
National
Bank
(Pueblo)
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$17.25
15.63
16.49
$16.46

$13.26
12.72
15.25
$13.74

N et operating earnings—per share after
estim ated income taxes:
1962 .................................................................
1961 ..................................................................
1960 ..................................................................

Three year average

N et incom e for dividends—per share
after write-offs and recoveries:
1962 ..................................................................
1961 ..................................................................
1960 .................................................................

Three year average

$2.54

$2.43
2.34
2,86

$2.29

$2.27
2.27
2.32

(25.4% )
24.2%

$5.60

$5.99
5.16
5.65

$5.88

$5.42
6.14
6.07

7.9%
31.1%

Colorado
National
Bank
(D enver)

$1.62

$1.67
1.59
1.61

$1.69

$1.75
1.61
1.72

8.1%
23.9%

C entral
Bank and
Trust Co.
(D enver)

$3.16

$3.06
3.57
2.86

$3.03

$3.06
3.37
2.67

11.1%
6.1%

First
National
Bank
(Pueblo)

(a) Book value includes no portion of liberal reserves provided by all banks for losses on loans or securities. Fixed assets may be
understated. The only reported understatement is the $6 million building write-off of the First National Bank of Denver.

8.5%
25.9%

Percent increase (decrease) over 1961 ..........
Percent increase last three y e a r s ........................

F irst
D enver—U.S.
National
National
Bank
Bank
(D enver)
( D enver)

RIO PUERCO NATIONAL BANK
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16,630,000
51,282,000
25,413,000
15,006,000

N.A.
41,280,000
23,721,000
13,260,000

$11,414,000
19,029,000
7,339,000
20,738,000
6,322,000
5,987,000

Total loans and d isco un ts:
Rio Puerco N ational Bank ....................
Bank A ......................................................
Bank B ......................................................
Bank C ......................................................
Bank D ......................................................
Bank E ......................................................
$12,395,000
22,823,000
7,823,000
25,233,000
8,221,000
6,973,000

$30,012,000
50,231,000
24,006,000

$25,524,000
43,764,000
21,653,000

1959

Total deposits:
Rio Puerco N ational Bank
—A lbuquerque ..................................
Bank A— A lbuquerque
Bank B—A lbuquerque ..........................
Total of four sm aller state banks in
A lbuquerque .........................
Bank C— C arlsbad, New Mexico
Bank D— Sante Fe, New Mexico .......
Bank E— Farm ington, New Mexico

1958

$13,384,000
23,961,000
8,136,000
23,329,000
10,339,000
8,596,000

17,930,000
48,603,000
27,898,000
16,449,000

$30,319,000
49,307,000
21,587,000

1960

R IO PU ER CO NATIONAL BANK
C om parative D eposit and Loan D ata
F or Selected City and Regional Banks

$12,971,000
24,727,000
7,737,000
22,348,000
12,989,000
10,802,000

18,577,000
45,012,000
29,733,000
20,508,000

$28,597,000
50,528,000
20,869,000

1961

1963

27,300,000
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.

$13,330,000 $16,693,485
29,184,000
N.A.
7,911,000
N.A.
26,253,000
N.A.
15,307,000
N.A.
11,031,000
N.A.

22,580,000
46,330,000
31,686,000
21,158,000

$30,128,000 $32,731,000
60,041,000 63,536,000
22,465,000 24,050,000

1962
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12,082,000 13,007,000
$81,370,000 $81,744,000

$ 5,153,000 $ 6,019,000 $ 5,151,000 $ 4,406,000 $ 5,323,000
6,398,000
5,560,000
5,917,000
11,903,000 11,643,000
2,389,000
1,531,000
1,860,000
1,734,000
1 ,358,000
2,265,000
2,071,000
3,001,000
4,077,000
5,453,000
$16,205,000 $15,181,000 $15,929,000 $22,120,000 $23 777 000

10,609,000
$71,986,000

1963
-----$19,003,000 $18,863,000
35,143,000 34,820,000
15,142,000 15,054,000

1962

U.S. Government,
state and other deposits:
Rio Puerco National Bank
Bank A
Bank B
Four smaller state banks in city
Total

10,851,000
$76,733,000

$17,248,000
30,638,000
13,491,000

1961

$ 6,755,000 $ 6,116,000 $ 6,239,000 $ 6,719,000 $ 8,545,000
11,253,000
9,873,000 13,973,000
12,995,000 17,073,000
5,839,000
5,678,000
5,518,000
5,589,000
7,638 000
4,693,000 _ 5,008,000
4,967,000
6,421,000
8,840,000
$28,540,000$26,675,000
$30,697,000 $31,724,000 $42,096,000

9,672,000
$76,134,000

Four smaller state banksin city
Total

$18,184,000
33,320,000
14,378,000

1960

Time deposits:
Rio Puerco National Bank
Bank A
Bank B
hour smaller state banks in city
Total

$18,104,000
32,580,000
15,778,000

1959

Rio Puerco National Bank
Bank A
Bank B

D em and deposits:
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were rented to professional men and to local business firms. The
furniture and fixtures had been appraised by the same independent
firm at a value of $275,000.
2. Undivided profits. This account consisted of profits which had
not been transferred to surplus. It was maintained at a substantial level
as reserves were set up from this account. For example, a personal loan
reserve of $26,500 had been set up from the account to cover a loan
of this amount when the debtor had declared bankruptcy. Subse
quently, however, the debt had been partially paid, a loss had been
recognized and the reserve had been closed into net income for 1963
which was subsequently closed into undivided profits.
3. Personal loan reserve. This account did not appear on the pub
lished call report. The chief accountant said it had been set up out of
undivided profits to cover a loan made to a local businessman who
subsequently declared bankruptcy. He had been instructed by the
treasurer to add this reserve to the capital accounts.
4. Reserves. The reserve account of $650,000 was composed of two
major items. These were:
Reserve for bond profit and loss
Excess expense accruals
Rounding

$261,516
380,000
8,484
$650,000

The reserve for bond profit and loss was a contingency reserve set up
out of capital to absorb any losses from the bond account. The chief
accountant pointed out that this was done out of conservatism and was
not a common practice in bank accounting. He pointed out that the
president’s experience during the great depression was the real reason
for this excess reserve. No charges had ever been made to this account
since its inception in 1939. The excess expense accruals of $380,000
had been estimated by the chief accountant. These were “excess”
am ounts beyond th a t required for the estim ated liabilities, even though

the cash basis financial statements reflected neither accrued assets nor
liabilities. Referring to his memorandum records on an accrual basis,
he provided the following data:
(a) Income taxes. The balance in this account on December 31, 1962
was $355,276.02. Provisions made during 1963 amounted to $262,
174.13. Payments made during 1963 were: 1962 tax due on Fed
eral return of $147,027; 1962 tax due on state return, $2,964;
payments on estimated 1963 tax for Federal of $58,000 and state
78
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(b )

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

of $37,000. The bank now estimates that 1963 Federal taxes will
be $195,000, and state taxes will be $37,000.
Interest on time deposits. The balance on December 31, 1962
was $54,821.14; provisions made during 1963 amounted to $252,000
while payments made during 1963 totaled $215,255.77. The bank
estimates that approximately $21,000 in interest on savings ac
counts and certificates of deposit remains unpaid as of December
31, 1963. Interest payment dates are June 1 and December 1.
Property taxes. The balance in this account on December 3 1 , 1962
was $27,142.66. Provisions made during 1963 amounted to $25,
200 while payments during the year totaled $29,278.40. Actual
1963 taxes payable in 1964 per assessment are $28,158.
F.D.I.C. expense. The balance in this account on December 31,
1962 was $22,037.76, while $12,000 more was provided during
1963. A payment made during 1963 amounted to $9,234.61. In
January 1964, a payment of $9,939 was made covering actual 1963
F.D.I.C. expenses. The total assessment for the year 1964 is ex
pected to be $9,976.
Clearing house dues. The account balance on December 31, 1962
was $8,003.85. An additional provision of $8,400 was made during
1963 while payments of $7,675.02 were recorded in 1963, repre
senting dues for 1964. The clearing house requires that dues be
paid one year in advance.
Insurance. The account balance on December 31, 1962 was
$10,364.87 while an additional amount of $28,314.66 was provided
during 1963. Payments of $38,679.53 were made in 1963. Ap
proximately $30,000 of this amount was prepayment of premiums
on a three year policy running through early 1966.
Advertising. The balance in this account as of December 31, 1962
was $10,044.32. An additional provision of $30,000 as well as pay
ments of $32,618.31 were made during 1963. The latter included
a prepayment of $8,754.

5. Loan loss reserve. The bank had provided an allowance for loan
losses of $346,956 on total loans outstanding of $16,880,000. The bank
contended that they had examined all loans on their books and had
concluded that all of them were good loans. Thus, they believed that
the entire value should be added back to capital. The chief accountant
said that this was reasonable since the bank’s loss experience factor for
the past twenty years had averaged only about .063%. The bank also
increased surplus by $30,000 for loans charged off in the previous years
79

but which they were confident would be collected during the current
year.
6. Interest collected, not earned. The bank had collected $292,839
interest in advance on installment loans (the loans were discounted at
the time they were m ade) and felt that this should be added to capital
since the present bank management had generated this income, even
though it might not be recognized for several years.
7. Accrued interest. The amount of $192,000 represented interest
earned but not yet collected. The bank felt they should increase
capital by that amount since it had been generated by the present bank
management.
8. Prepaid expenses. The chief accountant stated that postage in
the meter amounted to $9,000 and that he estimated unused supplies
would approximate $25,000. Prepaid insurance as noted earlier
amounted to $30,000.
9. Appreciation on bonds. Bonds held by the bank were currently
worth $115,000 more than original cost. Thus the bank contended that
capital should be increased by this amount.
Statement of Earnings and Dividends

The following items were added to net income by the bank to arrive
at a more realistic value. The explanations given were those stated by
the chief accountant.
1. Excess depreciation— furniture and fixtures. In 1963 the bank
had purchased a substantial amount of new, modern bookkeeping
equipment. In order to be conservative, accelerated depreciation
amounting to $58,000 had been recorded. The bank contended that the
$58,000 was not in fact real depreciation, but only book depreciation
and therefore should not be charged to net income for 1963.
2. Real estate charge down. This $35,000 represented a portion of
the value of the parking lot. The bank was instructed by the bank
examiner to reduce the value of the land by this amount since a bank
was not supposed to be a dealer in real estate. The bank contended that
the land did not, in fact, depreciate in value, and thus net income for
1963 should not be forced to bear the burden of this charge. The ad
justed statement of condition included the land at its appraised value.
3. Special loan reserve. A special reserve of $6,360 on an installment
loan was established out of 1963 income.
4. Prepaid expenses. Several expenses had been paid in advance
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but were deducted in arriving at net income for 1963. The balance of
the prepaid expenses of $72,680, shown on the adjusted statement of
condition, was the first item added to net income. The balances shown
in the clearing house dues and advertising accounts were also added to
net income for 1963.
With this information, Gordon returned to his office and began his
analysis of the bank as a prospective investment opportunity. He
realized that he had only a day or two to prepare his presentation but
that he had to reach a reasonable conclusion with regard to the merits
of this investment for Mr. Freeland.

Questions

1. Develop a preliminary plan for the evaluation of the bank as an
investment.
2. Using the information obtained from the bank’s accountant, pre
pare accrual basis financial statements for 1963.
3. Using information from external sources, what do you believe
would be a reasonable price for Mr. Freeland to pay for the controlling
interest in Rio Puerco National Bank?
4. Based on your analysis, how would you advise Mr. Freeland?

Gordon’s Analysis

In his purchase investigation of the Rio Puerco National Bank,
Gordon attempted to develop some guidelines or limits within which
Mr. Freeland could operate in negotiating the final purchase price. As
a background he used various ratio and percentage comparisons that
had been computed for other local and regional banks. It was his in
tention to develop a range of possible prices rather than to compute a
single “equitable price.”
In order to compute the ratios, it was necessary to first adjust the
bank’s book value and reported earnings figures in order that they
might reflect the true economic value of the bank. These adjustments
were broad in scope rather than detailed since it was felt that refine
ments could be made if negotiations showed that there was a possibility
of reaching common ground. On the same basis, the appraisal values
and other figures used in the adjustments were accepted by the public
accounting firm without question. If it later appeared that an agreed81

upon selling price was possible, then a detailed examination of these
figures would be made.
After the initial contact with Mr. Freeland, Gordon thought about
the approach he would use in making the purchase investigation. In
addition to developing guidelines, he tentatively outlined his plan of
attack and made an estimate of the time required to complete the job.
Three days after the initial contact, Gordon and Mr. Harte, the manag
ing partner, met with Freeland for a half hour to outline their proposed
approach to the investigation. At this time they estimated that the job
would require approximately 100 hours and stated that Mr. Freeland
would be charged at Gordon’s regular billing rate of $18.00 per hour
plus expenses.
The preliminary outline, shown in Exhibit 8, page 83, was discussed
with Mr. Freeland at the meeting. Gordon pointed out that the ratios
discussed in the outline might not be appropriate in this case, since
they reflected the price when individual shares were sold, not the price
when control was purchased. However, they were the best figures
available and Gordon concluded that they would probably provide
useful guidelines. The deposit and the loan and discount information
for selected city and regional banks, as shown in the first two headings
of Exhibit 7, was also attached to the tentative outline, but it was not
discussed at the meeting.
Gordon pointed out that additional information would be required
to compute the desired ratios and that a visit to the bank would be
necessary in order to verify the bank’s book value and adjusted earn
ings figures. Mr. Freeland accepted the tentative outline without
reservation or comment. The meeting adjourned with the understand
ing that another meeting would be held in the next few days when the
final report was completed.
After the meeting with Mr. Freeland, Gordon arranged to visit the
bank and obtained the information presented earlier (pp. 67-72). In
beginning his analysis, his first action was to examine the detailed
information behind the excess expense accruals of $380,000 included
in the $650,000 of reserves shown on the statement of condition (Ex
hibit 2). In order to compute the actual excess expense accrual, he
analyzed the information given him by the chief accountant as shown
in Exhibit 9, page 86. He then proceeded to analyze the other adjust
ments made by the bank to the statement of condition. His analysis of
the bank’s adjustments and his own adjusted book value figures are
given in Exhibit 10, page 88. Appended notes explain each of these
adjustments. The final adjusted book value per share as computed by
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Exhibit 8

Outline of General Considerations
for Acquisition of Rio Puerco National Bank
1. The price at which a large block of the stock of any bank is sold is
not generally subject to factual determination; however, a range of
prices based on generally accepted criteria can usually be estab
lished.
2. In some cases a satisfactory price is determined as follows:
A. Compare the earnings, book value and most recent stock prices
of the bank to be sold with the earnings, book value and most
recent stock prices of other banks of reasonable comparative size
in similar communities.
B. Determine the price at approximately the same ratio to the
bank’s earnings and book value as sales of the stock of other
similar banks bear to their earnings and book value.
Example:
Ratios Based on
Net Operating Book
Earnings
Value
Highest ratio
$xxx
$xxx
Lowest ratio
xxx
xxx
Average ratio ...................................................
xxx
xxx
(Price then negotiated using d ata obtained above)

3. In a similar study made recently we discussed the matter of pricing
bank stock with several local brokers and obtained the following
informal opinions:
A. A fair price may result using a price-earnings ratio of between
12 and 15. Use of this ratio assumes there is a broad enough
market to consider earnings as a basis in establishing stock price;
the importance of the ratio ( as a criterion in determining stock
price) declines if the issue is not well known and the stock does
not have a fairly wide marketability. Thus, book value may be
a better basis for determining price if there are limited stock
holders and limited marketability.
B. Determination of fair prices in relation to book value varied
from a market price slightly under book value to 178% of book
value based on preliminary calculations for selected city and
regional banks. (See attachment, page 84.)
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A ttachm ent to Prelim inary Outline of
General Considerations for Acquisition of Rio Puerco N ational Bank
Comparative Book Value Data For Selected City and Regional Banks
as of December 31, 1962
M arket Price
Per Share
Rio Puerco
National Bank1
Bank A
Bank B
Bank C
Bank D
Bank E

$

65.00
42.00
62½ —58.00
42.00
35.00
27½ —25.00

Book Value
Per Share

M arket Price as a %
of Book Value

$67.24
23.58
63.44
27.64
31.96
27.94

97%
178%
95%
154%
110%
94%

1 For the year ending December 31, 1961, Rio Puerco’s figures for the above
column headings were $65, $73.14, and 89% respectively.
Note: These figures were subsequently incorporated into the more comprehensive
tabulation included as Exhibit 5.

Gordon was $140 as contrasted with the per-share value of $166 de
veloped by the bank.
He then analyzed the statement of earnings and dividends ( Exhibit
4) in the same manner based on the information given earlier. From
this he developed an adjusted earnings per share figure of $11.96 in
contrast with the bank’s computed per share earnings of $12.86. These
computations are shown in Exhibit 11, page 92. In order to observe
the earnings potential of the bank apart from the loss and gain on
securities and other special charges, Gordon prepared Exhibit 12, page
94. He contended that these charges camouflaged the bank’s true
earning potential since they were non-recurring non-regular items, and
therefore should not have an effect on reported income.
He further reasoned that a bank was not in business to buy and sell
securities, but to earn interest on its deposits. Therefore, if gains and
losses on securities are included in the net income, distortion of real
net income occurs. In many instances, bond profits and losses are
planned so that the losses occur in one year, and profits the next so that
profits will not offset losses. Thus, profit could be substantially affected
by the sale of securities at an appropriate point in time. Furthermore,
he contended, the sale of such securities constituted the liquidation of
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earning assets. The figures computed in this exhibit, however, were
not used in subsequent comparisons or analysis. They had been used
for information only.
In order to compare the growth of Rio Puerco with similar banks in
the region, Gordon computed ratios showing Rio Puerco’s relative
growth in deposits over a period of time in comparison with other
regional and city banks. These computations are summarized in Ex
hibit 13, page 96, and are based on the figures given in Exhibit 7.
From Exhibit 5, he then calculated three commonly used measures of
the relative value of a bank’s stock. These are: market value as a
per cent of book value, a price-earnings ratio and yield based on cash
dividends. These respective ratios for selected banks in New Mexico
are shown in Exhibit 14, page 97. Similar measures of performance
and stock values were calculated for the five Colorado banks shown in
Exhibit 6. These ratios are summarized in Exhibit 15, page 98.
From these various computations, Gordon constructed a range of
prices per share ranging from $140 at 100% of book value to $280 at
200% of book value. This range appeared reasonable based on the
percentage of book to market value of other bank stocks. Similarly,
with selected earnings in multiples of from ten- to fifteen-times earn
ings, the price of the stock ranged from $121 to $182 per share. The
expected return on investment for the above range of stock prices was
from 4.4% to 10.0% before taxes. The after-tax return (based on
Mr. Freeland’s current tax bracket) was from 2.2% to 5.0%. These
summary calculations are given in Exhibit 16, page 100.
The purchase investigation thus completed, Gordon was ready for
a final meeting with Mr. Freeland. His report consisted of the follow
ing exhibits with Exhibit 16 serving as the frontispiece and focus of
the report: Exhibits 16, 10, 9, 11, 3, 12, 13 and 7, and 14 and 5 (in that
order). There was no written summary, description, or cover letter
attached to the report which was sent to Mr. Freeland and a meeting
was scheduled for two days later.
The meeting was held with Gordon, Harte (the managing partner),
Mr. and Mrs. Freeland, and the Freeland’s lawyer in attendance. The
first point of discussion centered around Exhibit 13. This exhibit
showed that Rio Puerco had slowly been losing its share of the market
and that it had not shown any substantial growth. Furthermore, Gor
don pointed out that the smaller new state banks had been growing
at the expense of the larger established banks in the community. Those
in attendance at the meeting concluded that Rio Puerco was not
(text continued on page 93)
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Balance,
December 31, 1962 ................
Provisions during 1963 ............
Payments during 1963 ...........
Balance,
December 31, 1963 ................
Computation of accruals by
Warner,
Simmons & O’Hearn:
Excess accrual balance,
December 31, 1963 ............
Excess provisions
during 1963 ........................
Adjusted estimated expense
provision at
December 31, 1963 ...........

(2)
(3)
Interest on
Property
Time Deposits
Taxes

(4)
F.D.I.C.
Expense

(5)
Clearing
House

(7)
Advertising

(6)
Insurance

Total

(8)

$ 91,565.37

$ 70,565
$ 36,744

$ 21,000

$372,459.36

$235,459

$ 30,174

$137,000

$28,158

$(2,958)

$(5,094)

$23,064.26

$ 9,939

$ 2,061

$14,864

$24,803.15

725

$(7,675)

$

$16,404

$8,728.83

$(30,000)

$15,442

$30,000

—

$(8,754)

$ 6,136

$16,180

$ 7,426.01

$149,668

$ 88,324

$378,378

$528,046.98

$355,276.02 $ 54,821.14 $27,142.66 $22,037.76 $8,003.85 $10,364.87 $10,044.32 $487,690.62
262,174.13
252,000.00 25,200.00
12,000.00
8,400.00
28,314.66 30,000.00
618,088.79
(244,990.79) (215,255.77) (29,278.40) (9,234.61) (7,675.02) (38,679.53) (32,618.31) (577,732.43)

(1)
Income
Taxes

RIO PU ER CO NATIONAL BANK
Analysis of Expense Accruals

Exhibit 9

Book
Excess Book
Provision Provision
$296,697
$ 43,406
374,896
102,600
238,385
64,463

(2) Accrual is for both savings accounts (interest paid on
June 1 and D ecem ber 1) and certificates of deposit.
Approximately $164,000 was paid on savings accounts
in 1963 (rate increase was included in first half—
$80,000 paid). The estim ate of the excess provision
represents the excess of the am ount provided in 1963
over the am ount paid. The ending accrual should
represent only D ecem ber 1963 interest which is esti-

Federal State Com bined
1962
$215,327 $37,964 $253,291
1961
236,521 35,775 272,296
1960
171,202 2,720
173,922

The Bank also estimates that the D ecem ber 31, 1963
accrual is excessive by $235,000, representing the ex
cess of the $372,000 ending accrual over the $232,000
estim ated tax reduced by the $95,000 paid on 1963
declarations. Following is a com parison of the tax
liabilities to the respective tax provisions per books:

The Bank’s estimates of 1963 taxes are $195,000 F ed 
eral and $37,000 state, or a total of $232,000 which is
$30,173 less than the $262,174 provision.

(1) Paym ents during 1963 represent the F ederal ($147,027)
and state ($2,964) tax liabilities for 1962 and th e 1963
declaration for Federal ($58,000) and state ($37,000)
taxes.

(7) The 1963 paym ents of $32,618 include a prepaym ent
of $8,754 so th at the paym ents applicable to 1963
expense were only $23,864. Accordingly, the provision
of $30,000 is considered excessive by $6,136. T he b al
ance in the account should be w iped out and the
$8,754 prepaid asset recognized.

(6) The $38,680 paym ent in 1963 represents principally a
three-year prepaym ent of premium s, of which $30,000
should be treated as a prepaid expense. Expense for
the year should be about ⅓ of $38,680, causing an
overaccrual of $15,442.

(5) E ntire $8,729 balance is considered as over-accrued
as the dues are always one year prepaid. The $7,675
paid in 1963 represents the amounts due in January
and July 1964, and should be treated as a prepaid
expense.

(4) T he estim ated excess provision represents the excess
of the $12,000 provided over the January 1964 pay 
m ent of $9,939. The excess accrual balance represents
the excess of the $24,803 balance over the January
payment.

(3) Actual 1963 taxes payable in 1964, per assessment, are
$28,158, resulting in an underaccrual at D ecem ber 31,
1963 of $5,094.

m ated at $21,000. The Bank also estimates th at 1964
interest w ill be $240,000 ($20,000 m onthly).

Notes to Analysis of Expense Accruals
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$

$ 292,839

Loans charged off but collectible

Interest collected, not earned

30,000

$ 346,956

$ 113,992

$ 980,000

$2,826,500

Loan less re s e rv e ........................

$ 275,000
161,008

$1,425,000
445,000

Property:
Building— appraisal value
Less book value

F urniture and fixtures—
appraisal value
Less book value ......................

$ 600,000
1,300,000
250,000
650,000
26,500

C apital accounts:
C apital stock
Surplus .....................................
U ndivided profits
Reserves
Personal loan reserve

Adjusted Book
Value Per Bank

$(170,000)

$(106,344)

$ (28,000)

$(245,000)

$ (62,861)
(26,500)

(4)

(3)

(8)

(8)

(1)
(2)

Adjustments M ade
by W arner, Simmons
& O’H earn (see notes)

Book Value as Adjusted by Bank and by
W arner, Simmons & O’H earn

RIO PU ER C O NATIONAL BANK

85,992

30,000
$ 122,839

$

$ 240,612

$

$ 735,000

$ 600,000
1,300,000
250,000
587,139

Book Value
as
Adjusted

Exhibit 10

25,000

38,680
9,000

70,000
80,000
17,000
25,000

72,680

$
$

(27.14)
(27.00)

$(814,385)

$ (35,000)

$ (38,680)

$(102,000)

(7)

(6)

(5)

Adjustments M ade
by W arner, Simmons
& O ’H earn (see notes)

* Based on the 30,000 shares outstanding of which the bank president owns 15,300 or 51%.

165.67
166.00

$
$

Book value per share*
R ounded .............................

$ 115,000

$

$ 192,000

$4,969,967

$ 100,000
15,000

$

$

A djusted book value

A ppreciation on bonds:
G overnm ent bonds
M unicipal bonds ....................

P repaid expenses:
Insurance premiums
Postage in m eter
Supplies (estimate, to be
inventoried)

A ccrued interest:
Loans .........................................
Governm ent bonds ...............
M unicipal bonds ....................
Personal loans

Adjusted Book
Value Per Bank

80,000

34,000

90,000

$
$

138.53
139.00

$4,155,582

$

$

$

Book Value
as
Adjusted
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Notes to Exhibit 10— Adjusted Book Value
(1 ) Reserves
Excess accruals (including setting up prepaid expenses for clearing
house, insurance, and advertising) are $378,378 per Exhibit 9, but the
estimated liabilities (net of prepaid items) should be recorded at $149,
668 in order to reflect book value on an accrual basis. Adjusting for
58 % tax impact (52% Federal plus 6 % state) as on other items below,
reduces this to $62,861.
(2 ) Personal loan reserve
Collection of this item is apparently unlikely. Since it has been written
off already, it should not be added back.
(3 )

(4 )

Loan loss reserve
Total loans (approximately) at December 31, 1963 ....

$16,880,000

Average loss experience f a c to r...........................................

.063%

Estimated required reserv e..................................................
Per bank required re se rv e ....................................................

$

106,344
—

Adjustment ..........................................................................

$

(106,344)

Unearned interest
Interest collected, not e a rn e d ..............................................

$

292,839

Adjustment, representing income taxes to be paid
thereon at 58% (rounded) (52% Federal plus 6%
state)
(5 )

Accrued interest
Accrued interest on loans and securities

$ (170,000)*

$

Adjustment, representing income taxes to be paid
thereon, except $17,000 municipal, at 58%
(rounded) ............................................................................

192,000**

$ (102,000)

* Additional adjustments may be proposed representing the oper
ating costs which will be incurred in collecting the $292,839 un
earned discount during the periods of maturity, and also based on
the present value of the next income to be realized.
** Includes $25,000 on personal loans which would indicate this
amount may represent unearned discount already taken into un
divided profits through earnings, since the following were noted:

90

Interest collected, not earned per 1 2/28/63 report of condition ....
Interest collected, not earned per 1 2 /31/63 internal statement of
condition ..............................................................................................

$317,780.29

If so, adjustment should be made ......................................................

$ 24,940.99

$292,839.30

RIO PUERCO NATIONAL BANK

Notes to Exhibit 10—Adjusted Book Value, continued
(6) Prepaid items
D elete prepaid insurance treated in Exhibit 9 and included in adjust
m ent (1) above.
(7) Appreciation on bonds
A ppreciation on bonds per Bank ................
A djustm ent (rounded) representing
income taxes to be paid upon sale,
at 31% (25% Federal plus 6% state) .......
(8) Property
L and and buildings
Appraised value—
Land—
Banking premises land
Parking lot
Building

$115,000

$(35,000)

$475,000
200,000

$ 675,000
750,000
$1,425,000

N et book value—
bank building and land, and
parking lot .............................................................
(original cost
$175,000)
Excess of appraised value over book value

445,000

......

A djustm ent at 2 5 % ........................................................... ......
Furniture, fixtures, equipm ent
......
Estim ated value (to be inventoried)
N et book value ..................................................................
Excess of estim ated value over book value
Adjustm ent at 25% ......................................................... ......

$ 980,000
$ (245,500)
$ 275,000
161,000
$ 114,000
$ (28,500)

Determination of a mutually fair value is principally a matter for negotiation and
there are a number of alternatives to be considered in such determination. Con
siderations include:
(1) Step-up in basis not available to buyer except through purchase of assets
rather than stock. Depreciation is not available on the appreciation.
(2) The value of the appreciation increment inures to the buyer only if it is in
tended to use the assets in the business as opposed to disposing of them.
(3) Income tax payable by the seller on realization of the appreciation. (25%
capital gains tax)
(4) Alternatives to both the buyer and seller in disposition and ultimate owner
ship.
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Exhibit 11

RIO PU ER CO NATIONAL RANK
N et Incom e for 1963 as Adjusted by Bank
and by W arner, Simmons & O’H earn

Per Bank

Adjustments
(see notes)

N et Income
as Adjusted

Net income for year 1963 as
shown on R eport of Earnings
and Dividends (Exhibit 3) .....

$193,532

Add back:
Excess depreciation and
write-downs deducted in
arriving at net income:
F urniture and
fixtures
$58,000
Real estate
charge down
35,000
Special loan reserve 6,360

99,360

$(26,500)

(1)

72,860

Expenses paid in advance b u t
deducted in arriving at net
in co m e:
Clearing house
assessment
$8,729
Advertising
7,426
Excess expense
accruals
72,680

88,835

(511)

(2)

88,324

Trust income earned b u t not
included (not billed) in ar
riving at net income
A djusted n et income
for 1963 .................................
A djusted net earnings
per share ...............................

$193,532

4,000

4,000
$385,727
$12.86

$(27,011)

$358,716

$(.90)

$11.96

Notes:
(1) Represents the $26,500 personal loan reserve closed to income for 1963 and
to undivided profits. The net income of $193,532 included this transfer as
income when in fact it was transfer of a reserve (Note 2, Exhibit 10).
(2) Excess expense accruals per Bank .....................................................
Excess expense accruals per Exhibit 9 ................................................
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(text continued from page 85)

“setting the world on fire” and that its performance in relation to
competitive banks was acceptable but not outstanding.
Gordon pointed out that future growth had not been projected as
there appeared to be no forseeable factors that would change the
present trend of the bank’s growth pattern. He did conclude, how
ever, that if negotiations proved that a common meeting ground could
be reached, then such a projection might be desirable.
Mr. Freeland agreed with Gordon’s analysis on this point but con
cluded that this finding was not alarming as he was confident he could
draw deposits away from other banks and generate substantial new
deposits because of his business contacts. He said he was quite sure
he could materially increase the bank’s growth and therefore its medi
ocre past performance would not make or break the deal.
Gordon next explained his adjustments to the book value and re
ported earnings figures. These were accepted by Mr. Freeland without
comment.
The focus of the meeting next turned to the summary figures (Ex
hibit 16, page 100) and at this point Mr. Freeland showed renewed
interest. Gordon pointed out that if the stock could be purchased at
book value of $140 per share, this would provide an after-tax return on
investment of 4.4 per cent. If, however, he had to pay 150 per cent of
the book value, he would receive an after-tax return of only 2.9 per
cent. Gordon again pointed out that purchase of a controlling interest
was different from merely purchasing shares of stock but that no in
formation on price was available with respect to the purchase of con
trol. All present concluded, however, that the ratio of market to book
value still provided a very useful guideline. It was also noted that the
book value of a bank stock was a much more meaningful figure for a
bank than for a manufacturing concern, where price-earnings ratios
seemed to be of paramount importance.
Mr. Freeland at this point stated that the bank’s president was asking
$240 per share for his stock. This meant that his after-tax return on
this basis would be less than 2.5 per cent. Although this was not com
pletely ridiculous in his eyes, it certainly was not spectacular. In
comparison with tax-free municipal securities or even with the return re
ceived on his current employment of funds, the anticipated return at
$240 per share did not seem acceptable. He did conclude, however, that
it might be worth talking with the bank president to determine whether
or not he might be open to an offer which would provide him with
a before-tax return closer to 8 per cent or 9 per cent. The thought of
93
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$

Special (charges) and credits:
Securities— gain or (loss) on
sale, n et of tax effect (N ote 1) ......................

N et income and special
charges and credits ...............................................

A dditional provision for in
come taxes (N ote 1 ) ...........................................
19,000

(1,941)

$ 242,216

$

160,800
$ 223,216

Taxes on n et income
(Notes 1 , 2, 3 and 4) .........................................
N et income ..................................................................

Transfer (to) from reserves,
net of tax effect (Notes 1 and 3)

$ 384,016

N et operating income
before incom e ta x e s ...........................................

20,941

$1,313,487
929,471

O perating in c o m e ........................................................
O perating expenses ...................................................

1959

$ 214,716

(64,464)
$ (118,244)

(1,503)

$ (52,277)

226,198
$ 332,960

$ 559,158

$1,577,606
1,018,448

1960

For the Years of 1959 through 1963

RIO PU ER C O NATIONAL BANK
C om parative Earnings Summaries

(102,600)
39,604
$ 262,222

$

(4,398)

$ 146,602

256,605
$ 222,618

$ 479,223

$1,654,864
1,175,641

1961

(322,512)

92,280

$ (74,452)

(43,407)
$ (273,639)

$

222,531
$ 199,187

$ 421,718

$1,559,646
1,137,928

1962

17,075

2,290

$ 193,532

(29,411)
$ (10,046)

$

232,000
$ 203,578

$ 435,578

$1,709,853
1,274,275

1963

Exhibit 12
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Exhibit 12, continued

Notes:
(1) The tax effect of capital gains and losses on security sales was computed at
25% on gains and 52% on losses. Gains or losses on security sales are shown
net of the tax effect so determined and a corresponding adjustment was made
to “Taxes on net income” to reflect in that category only the taxes applicable
to net operating income. The additional provision for income taxes represents
the difference between the actual tax liability and the tax provision per books.
Also see Exhibit 9.
(2) Depreciation deducted for tax purposes but not for book
purposes ...................................................................................... 1959 $65,690
1960
49,794
1961
53,837
1962
14,157
Equipment expensed for book purposes, but capitalized for
tax purposes ...............................................................................

1959
1960
1961
1962

$ 5,081
2,032
22,823
14,363

(3) Bad debt expense of $82,235 was deducted for tax purposes in 1961 but not
deducted for book purposes until 1962. The tax effect of this deduction,
approximately $42,760, has been added to 1961 taxes on net operating in
come to provide income taxes on the income to which the taxes relate, and
deducted from the 1962 transfer to reserves.
(4) Taxes on net income in 1963 were estimated by the Bank to be $195,000
Federal income tax and $37,000 state income tax.

managing a bank with its associated prestige and an opportunity to
create larger deposits still appealed to Mr. Freeland even though it did
not appear that this was an investment which would yield a substantial
return.
Gordon and Mr. Freeland then made an appointment to visit the
bank president the next day. As directed, Gordon gave the bank a
copy of the report he had prepared for Mr. Freeland and explained his
approach and computations as he had done with Mr. Freeland. The
bank president was interested in the approach taken by Gordon as he
had never seen most of these comparisons before. He objected to the
fact that no allowance had been made for future growth but again was
unable to substantiate his optimistic feelings. He did not appear
adamant on this point. He also believed that the entire loan loss re
serve should have been added back to book value as he contended the
bank had no noncollectable loans on its books. At this point he ap
peared to resent all adjustments made to the bank’s value, but con
ceded that they were reasonable.
The bank president examined the figures shown in Exhibit 16 with
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Exhibit 13

RIO PU ER CO NATIONAL BANK
Comparisons Showing Rio Puerco as a Per C ent of
Total and Increases (D ecreases) of Various Categories
(Based on Exhibit 7)
1960

1961

1962

1963

23.8%
23.7

23.7%
22.9

24.0%
20.3

23.4%
21.2

23.1%
20.3

31.8
24.8

39.6
25.6

32.3
24.1

19.9
22.3

22.4
22.2

(5.5)%
3.6
(3.3)

5.2%
18.8
7.6

7.8
(5.2)
9.8
9.6

3.6
(7.4)
6.6
24.7

21.5
2.9
6.6
3.2

.4%
2.3
(8.9)
12.2
.8

(5.1)%
(8.0)
(6.2)
(2.2)
(6.2)

10.2%
14.7
12.2
13.9
13.0

(9.5)%
(12.3)
(2.8)
6.7
(6.5)

2.0%
41.5
(2.8)
( .8)
15.1

7.7%
(7.0)
1.3
29.3
3.3

1959
Per cent of Rio Puerco to total for
following items:
D em and d e p o sits..................
Tim e d e p o sits........................
U.S. Government,
state and other deposits
Total d e p o sits........................
Percentage increase (decrease)
for following categories:
Total deposits:
Rio Puerco N ational Bank
Bank A .............................
Bank B
Total of four smaller banks
in A lbuquerque
Bank C
Bank D
Bank E ..............................
D em and deposits:
Rio Puerco N ational Bank
Bank A
Bank B
F our sm aller state banks
Total
Time deposits:
Rio Puerco N ational Bank
Bank A
Bank B
F our smaller state banks
Total ..............................
U.S. Government,
state and other deposits:
Rio Puerco
Bank A
Bank B ...............................
F our smaller state banks
Total
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1.0%
17.6%
(2.9)
14.8
10.9
(10.1)

24.2
7.1
13.2

16.8%
(13.1)
(35.9)
(8.6)
(6.3)

8.6%
5.8
7.1
20.9

(.7)%
(.9)
( .6)
7.7
.5
27.2%
31.4
36.7
37.7
32.7

(14.4)% (14.5)% 20.8%
101.2
6.4
(2.2)
21.5
(6.8)
(21.7)
44.9
35.9
33.8
7.5
4.9
38.9

RIO PUERCO NATIONAL BANK

interest and commented that it was wonderful what accountants could
do with figures. “You can prove anything you want with figures if you
just know how.” The suggestion of a lower price seemed unacceptable
to him; he insisted that the analysis completely ignored prospects of
future growth. The suggestion that if this were done probable in
creases in interest rates paid on deposits would also have to be con
sidered seemed to be of little interest to him. The meeting was con
cluded when he asked for additional time to look over Gordon’s report.
(text continued on page 100)
Exhibit 14
RIO PUERCO NATIONAL BANK
Commonly Accepted Measures of Relative
Stock Values Computed From Information
Given in Exhibit 5
Yield Based
Market Value
Priceon Cash
Earnings
as % of
Dividends (Note)
Book Value
Ratio
Banks with resources (assets)
over $30 million— 1962:
13.2

3.57%
4.52

A ..............................
C ..............................
D ..............................
V

178%
152
110
89

19.7
22.2

3.08

Average ..........

132%

18.4

3.72%

Banks with resources (assets)
under $30 million— 1962:
Bank B ..............................
Bank E ..............................
Bank W
Bank X ..............................
Bank Y
Bank Z ..............................

95%
94
79
89
93
126

17.2

10.0

5.40%
3.82
4.45
4.55
4.27
3.21

96%

14.0

4.28%

Bank
Bank
Bank
Bank

Average

14.8

Note: The value of this comparison of cash dividends to market price may be
limited, since one bank may be paying dividends entirely from current
earnings while another bank may be paying dividends from previously
accumulated earnings. This cannot be determined for those banks for
which net income per share was not available. The possible limitation
on market value data discussed in Note 2, Exhibit 5, applies to this de
termination also.
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1. C entral Bank & T rust Co.
(D enver) .........................................
2. Colorado National Bank
(D enver) .........................................
3. D enver U.S. N ational Bank
(D enver)
4. First National Bank (Pueblo)
5. First National Bank (D enver)
Average five banks

1.
2.
3.
4.

1. First National Bank (Pueblo)
2. First National Bank (D enver)
3. C entral Bank & T rust Co.
(D enver)
4. Colorado National Bank (D enver)
5. D enver U.S. N ational Bank
(D enver)
Average five banks

1. D enver U.S. N ational Bank
(D enver)
2. First N ational Bank (Pueblo) ..............
3. Colorado N ational Bank (D enver)
4. C entral Bank & Trust Co.
(D enver)
5. First N ational Bank (D enver)
Average five banks
15.3%
15.7%
13.4%

10.6%
12.3%
13.2%

Net operating earnings to
capital funds ____________

Deposits to capital funds

First N ational Bank (Pueblo)
4.51%
C entral Bank & Trust Co. (D enver) .... 3.48%
Colorado N ational Bank (D enver)
3.25%
D enver U.S. National Bank
(D enver)
3.00%
5. First N ational Bank (D enver)
2.50%
Average five banks
3.35%

M arket value as per cent of book value

Yields

Summary of Relative Positions of Five Colorado Rank Stocks
December 31, 1962

RIO PUERCO NATIONAL RANK

14.9%
15.8%

12.5%
14.0%

8.6%
8.3%
7.7%
9.3%

20.9%
16.5%

To gross
income
11.0%
10.8%

134.9%
146.7%
162.3%
136.0%

122.7%

113.6%

Exhibit 15

C entral Bank & Trust Co. (D enver)
F irst N ational Bank (Pueblo)
C olorado National Bank (D enver)
F irst N ational Bank (D enver)
D enver U.S. National Bank
(D enver)
Average five banks

13.6
13.5
13.6
15.8
17.5
14.8

13.1
13.4
14.8
15.1
17.6
14.8

3-year
1962 average
1. Colorado N ational Bank
(D enver)
2. First National Bank (Pueblo)
3. C entral Bank & T rust Co.
(D enver)
4. D enver U.S. National Bank
(D enver) ..........................................
5. F irst National Bank (D enver)
Average five banks

N et income for dividends

15.7
18.9
15.2

14.2

13.8
16.5
19.6
15.3

14.3
13.0

3-year
average
13.4
13.4

1962

The figures in the above tabulations represent the more popular criteria by which bank stocks can be compared, the importance of
which will depend upon the individual investor’s respective needs and objectives.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

N et operating earnings

P rice E arnings M ultiple

RIO PUERCO NATIONAL BANK
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(text continued from page 97)

This was Gordon’s last contact with Freeland and the bank president.
His firm’s engagement was terminated at this meeting.
Subsequently it was learned that Mr. Freeland had offered the bank
president $165 per share for his interest and that the bank president
had promptly turned down the offer.
Exhibit 16

RIO PU ERCO NATIONAL BANK
Summary Calculations Showing Price
Based on Various Per Cents of Book Value
And Earnings M ultiples
Investm ent Based on Adjusted
Book Value (Exhibit 10):
Investm ent, if based on:
100% of $140 book value
125% of $140 book value
150% of $140 book value
175% of $140 book value
200% of $140 book value

per
per
per
per
per

share
share
share
share
share

....

Per Share

Total
Investm ent (1)

$140
175
210
245
280

$2,142,000
2,678,000
3,213,000
3,749,000
4,284,000

$120
144
179

$1,835,000
2,200,000
2,740,000

Investm ent Based on Adjusted
Earnings Per Share (Exhibit 11):
Investm ent, if based
10 times earnings
12 times earnings
15 times earnings

on price:
per share of $11.96
p er share of $11.96
per share of $11.96

R eturn on Investm ent, Based on
Earnings Per Share of $11.96 and:
Price
Price
Price
Price
Price

of
of
of
of
of

$140
$175
$210
$245
$280

per
per
per
per
per

Before
After
Personal
Personal
Incom e Taxes Incom e Taxes(2)

share
share
share
share
share

8.7%
7.0
5.8
5.0
4.4

4.4%
3.5
2.9
2.5
2.2

Price of $120 per share
Price of $144 per share
Price of $179 per share

10.0%
8.4
6.7

5.0%
4.2
3.3

(1) Based on purchase of 15,300 shares, representing 51% of the 30,000 shares
outstanding.
(2) Assumed tax rate of 50%.
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The Economy Supermarkets
Burton Krueger, CPA, had been performing tax and auditing services
for Daniel Dameron, owner of two successful supermarkets in a major
metropolitan area for almost two decades. For the past several months,
Mr. Dameron had been talking in semi-speculative terms of disposing
of his supermarket properties. Thus, it was not with complete surprise
that Krueger received Dameron’s telephone call in late April 1961.
“Burton,” Dameron commenced, “I’ve decided—and you know how
many things are involved—to sell both of my supermarkets. I want
you to handle everything for me, and I’m willing to make liberal
financial arrangements depending, of course, on the kind of deal I
get. We’ve talked casually about doing this, but now I’m ready for
action. I haven’t any idea at all about who might make a good prospect.
I specifically want you to handle that part of it. If you handle the
whole deal for me and if you can find an acceptable purchaser for me,
I’ll be willing to pay your fee as you had proposed earlier. Otherwise,
we can work out some other arrangement that will be in our best
interest. What do you say? I’m ready to move, and I want you to
handle this for me.”
Krueger’s mind flashed back over his long and pleasant professional
association with Mr. Dameron. He had a high degree of respect for
Dameron, and had reason to believe that Dameron’s feelings reflected
a comparable level of confidence. Although the proposal was unlike
any of the work that he had done for Dameron in the past, Krueger
had been involved in such assignments for other clients. The two men
arranged to have lunch later in the week for an initial “brass-tacks”
discussion.
History of Daniel Dameron’s Supermarket Operations

As soon as he had cleared his desk of other matters, Krueger re
viewed his knowledge of the development of Dameron’s operations.
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He noted significant points as he reflected on the past years, feeling
that he would gain some additional insight into the problem of de
veloping a good disposal plan for his client.
For a number of years, Daniel Dameron had held a major super
visory position with a national retail grocers organization. He also
had sufficient private retail experience to know (1) what he was
looking for and (2) what abilities he felt he could bring to his own
retail grocery operation. In 1944 he located an area that appeared to
hold promise for future development. He had spent considerable time
studying various locations within this geographic area, and finally
concluded that a market in the “Economy Shopping Center” of a fair
sized metropolitan district was what he was looking for. He acquired
a lease on the premises and opened the “Economy Supermarket.”
Dameron operated with a high degree of success at the Economy
location to the expiration of his first lease in mid-1949. At that time
his landlord complimented him for doing such a fine job of developing
his supermarket. He also informed Dameron that considering the suc
cess of the operation he felt it proper to ask for increased rental on the
lease renewal. He then made what Dameron described as impossible
demands. Dameron replied in effect, “No, you can’t do that to me.”
But the landlord maintained his position and Dameron, exercising his
only alternative, vacated the premises.
In March of 1950, Dameron opened a new store in the Maryvale
area, a semi-suburban area of the city. The store was successful almost
immediately. From the beginning of Dameron’s business activities in
that area, Burton Krueger had done his audit and tax work.
In the early part of the 1950’s, Dameron’s office manager resigned.
Krueger recommended a good friend of his (also a certified public
accountant) who was ultimately hired and who stayed with Dameron
for a period of four years. He left after feeling that he had “reached
his potential” and was replaced by a man from a national mail-order
organization.
In 1955, after the new “accountant” had had some time to acclimate
himself to the Economy operation, Daniel Dameron’s son—a graduate
of a well-known school of business administration—decided to leave
his position with a national manufacturing concern. Clayton Dameron
joined his father’s business, starting literally at the bottom of the
ladder.
Approximately a year later, Daniel Dameron completed arrange
ments for the purchase and development of a new market in the West
brook section of the city. This operation, unlike the three previous
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leasehold arrangements, was to be owned outright by Mr. Dameron.
Clayton Dameron, having had a year in which to fit into the organiza
tion, was transferred to the new Westbrook Economy Supermarket as
an assistant manager.
After a time, the company’s accountant turned out to be the wrong
man for the job and he was released. Young Dameron asked for the
job and his father agreed that such a move into top-level management
was a good thing. So, Clayton assumed the duties of “office manager,
accountant, and operations manager.” Krueger observed that the
younger Dameron was quick to adapt to his new position and con
sistently demonstrated the ability to manage the business intelligently.
The next several years of operations, from 1957 to 1961, saw the two
Economy Supermarkets grow and prosper. During this period Daniel
Dameron became ill and began to think in terms of planning his estate.
He assumed some of the characteristics of semi-retirement. Concur
rently, Clayton Dameron took on—along with the two store managers
—increased management responsibility.
By early 1961, however, Clay Dameron had decided that, for a
variety of reasons, he did not want to commit himself to continuing the
supermarket operations for an extended period of time. He and his
father came to the conclusion that it would be most advantageous to
sell the properties if suitable terms of sale could be arranged. Thus,
Daniel Dameron called Burton Krueger in April 1961, and formally
announced his intentions. It was not unusual for him to call Krueger;
the two men had enjoyed a long and satisfactory relationship. Krueger
knew the inner workings of the Dameron operations as thoroughly as
did either of the men. Both Daniel and Clayton Dameron felt it per
fectly natural to look to Krueger for assistance in the liquidation of
their supermarket investment.
Burton Krueger’s Appraisal of the Situation

As Krueger viewed the proposal from Mr. Dameron, he realized im
mediately that he had no “specific guides to go by.” He decided that
his first step would necessarily have to be the formulation of some
reasoned approach to the task at hand. He was also concerned about
his inability to specify a basis for measuring the value of his services.
The two problems were closely associated as he saw it, and he would
have to deal with each very early in the engagement.
On the latter point, Krueger was confident that he and Dameron
would come to a working agreement about the appropriate fee ar
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rangement. Dameron had already indicated an awareness that he was
asking for more than conventional CPA services. For his own benefit,
Krueger attempted to summarize his potential involvement and he
wondered how he should deal with such things as ( a ) his provision of
specific services, (b ) the formulation of “ideas”, (c ) the time involved
in developing and implementing a plan of sale, and (d ) his personal
and professional involvement in the course of actual negotiations.
As an initial piece of work, Krueger studied his files on Dameron and
the Economy Supermarkets. He believed that it was essential to clearly
picture what was involved in the sale proposal. He surveyed the data
at hand and listed the assets that would be involved. Krueger also
noted other items that directly related to the sales transaction. (See
Exhibit 1, page 105.)
Once he felt that he had a clear idea of the elements covered in the
engagement, Krueger began to bring together financial information.
Of course, he had extensive data on hand for this phase of the review.
In short order he had compiled an analysis of operations for the past
ten-year period, with some additional detail for the most recent five
years. (See Exhibits 2 and 3, pages 106 and 108.) Also, from recent
conversations with his client, Krueger had in his files all of the informa
tion necessary to provide a basis for estimating the 1961 business year.
( See Exhibit 4, page 109.)
Krueger knew that it would be important to remember that the busi
ness was owned and operated in two different forms. The grocery
operations at both locations were held as properties of the Daniel
Dameron Corporation; the corporation also owned the land at West
brook. Within each of the markets, the liquor department was owned
separately ( stock and fixtures) and was the property of Daniel Dam
eron operating as a sole proprietor. While this distinction did not
influence the handling of the initial analysis, Krueger knew that it
would be important later in connection with tax planning.
At this point in his review, Burton Krueger paused. One question
remained that was, to him, of such importance that it demanded im
mediate consideration. His telephone conversation with Daniel Dam
eron notwithstanding, Krueger knew that for all practical purposes
he could choose to serve his client in one of two roles—that of “advo
cate” or that of “advisor.” He was not certain which of the two roles
would be most appropriate under the circumstances.
Krueger’s relations with Dameron had been informal in the past.
No engagement letters had ever been used. His annual billings—on
the basis of per diem rates—amounted to roughly two thousand dollars
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Exhibit 1

ECONOM Y SUPERMARKETS
Inventory of Assets, Equities, and O ther Factors
April, 1961
Physical Assets Being Sold:
Fixtures and equipm ent at both locations:
book value, approxim ately
original cost, approxim ately
Liquor licenses, separate license for each location; no value
on books; estim ated current real value
Inventories, both liquor and groceries at both locations ap 
proximately

O ther Equities Being Sold:
Present and future sales volume for both locations; currently
in excess of
Advantageous locations; semi-captive m arket
Experienced m anagers as to store operation and class of
customers
Recognized, established store names
Existing lease at M aryvale; 8 years to run on present lease
w ith renew al option; renew al term s subject to negotiation
Sale should be consum m ated before October; gives purchaser
best q u arter of year
Parking facilities adequate for full volume at each location

$

65,000
240,000
14,000
200,000

$5,200,000

Com petition:
At W estbrook—two established chain outlets
At M aryvale—one established chain now; one more expected
to come in

Sales Proposal Does Not Include:
Cash
Accounts receivable
Land (ow ned at W estbrook store)
Investm ent (deposit) in San Fernando Grocery Com pany
Specified other assets (such as deposits, prepaid insurances,
etc.)
Accounts payable
Accrued tax liabilities
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Comparative Operating Data
For the Ten Years December 31, 1951 to 1960
1960

1959

1958

1957

1. Sales .........................
2. Cost of s a le s ............

$5,237,350
4,136,160

$4,895,470
3,870,770

$4,628,900
3,689,000

$4,194,800
3,324,400

3. Gross profit ............
4. Operating
expense .................
5. General office ........

$1,101,190

$1,024,700

$ 939,900

$ 870,400

$ 800,330
74,100

$ 735,770
55,920

$ 699,900
56,500

$ 648,200
48,900

$ 874,430

$ 791,690

$ 756,400

$ 697,100

6. Operating
income ................
7. Other income ........

$ 226,760
11,670

$ 233,010
10,970

$ 183,500
15,900

$ 173,300
19,300

8. Total income ..........

$ 238,430

$ 243,980

$ 199,400

$ 192,600

9. Management
bonuses .....................

74,150

73,100

65,300

61,000

10. Profit, pre-tax ..........

$ 164,280

$ 170,880

$ 134,100

$ 131,600

3.13%

3.49%

2.89%

3.14%

21.03%

20.93%

20.31%

20.75%

18.07

18.72

18.63

17.44

Profit as percent of
sales .......................
Gross profit as
percent of sales ...
Inventory turnover
per year ..............
Dollar sales per
square foot of
sales area ............
Dollar sales per dol
lar of fixed assets
Rental costs as
percent of sales ....
Number of
employees 12/31
Number of stores ....
Number of partici
pants in manage
ment bonuses .....
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$

246.91

$

230.80

$

218.23

$

197.76

$

22.17

$

20.91

$

18.35

$

17.08

2.40%

2.46%

2.46%

2.54%

93
2

91
2

84
2

79
2

15

15

15

14
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Exhibit 2

1956

1955

1954

1953

1952

1951

$3,132,400
2,540,900

$1,828,300
1,468,400

$1,662,100
1,332,600

$1,551,700
1,233,700

$1,414,100
1,156,300

$1,243,100
1,023,000

$ 591,500

$ 359,900

$ 329,500

$ 318,000

$ 257,800

$ 220,100

$ 472,900
28,100

$ 236,600
23,400

$ 217,800
15,000

$ 205,900
14,700

$ 187,900
13,800

$ 159,300
14,300

$ 501,000

$ 260,000

$ 232,800

$ 220,600

$ 201,700

$ 173,600

$

$

99,900
19,300

$

96,700
2,600

$

97,400
1,700

$

56,100
700

$

46,500
600

$ 100,900

$ 119,200

$

99,300

$

99,100

$

56,800

$

47,100

36,100

38,100

$

90,500
10,400

64,800

$

81,100

33,100
$

66,200

33,500
$

65,600

15,000

18,300
$

38,500

$

32,100

2.07%

4.43%

3.98%

4.23%

2.72%

2.58%

18.88%

19.68%

19.83%

20.49%

18.23%

17.71%

14.41

14.44

12.20

12.50

13.56

12.39

$

331.58

$

303.33

$

286.86

$

265.60

$

235.02

$

22.46

$

29.64

$

28.06

$

26.14

$

23.88

2.33%

2.34%

1.96%

1.85%

1.82%

1.88%

74
2

46
1

45
1

42
1

35
1

34
1

9

7

7

6

5

5
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Exhibit 3

ECONOM Y SUPERMARKETS
Summary of Com parative O perating D ata
For the Five Years Ended December 31, 1956-1960
1960
Sales
Percent increase in
sales over the
previous year

1959

1958

1957

1956*

$5,237,350 $4,895,470 $4,628,900 $4,194,800 $3,132,400

6.98%

33.92%*

—

Dollar increase in
sales over the
previous year

$ 341,880 $ 266,570 $ 434,100 $1,062,400

—

N et income

$ 164,280 $ 170,880 $ 134,100 $ 131,600 $

Percent increase in
net income over
previous y e a r .........
Dollar increase in
net income over
previous year
$

3.86%

(6,600)$

5.76%

27.43%

36,780 $

10.35%

1.89%

2,500 $

65,000

102.46%

—

66,600

—

*Store # 2 open for only 6 months of 1956

per year. Krueger pondered whether a more formal arrangement was
needed for this engagement. He decided to concentrate his thinking
on these two important questions (i.e., his proper role, and the ap
propriate degree of formality) before proceeding with further financial
analysis or investigation.

Questions

1. Do you think Mr. Krueger should undertake the engagement to
act as agent for Dameron in the sale of his supermarket properties, or
should Krueger’s activities be limited strictly to that of an advisor
to Mr. Dameron?
2. Assuming that Mr. Krueger agrees to accept an active role in the
sale of Mr. Dameron’s properties, what type of fee arrangement do
you believe would be professionally appropriate? How formal should
the fee arrangement be between the two parties?
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3. Based on your analysis of the data available in the case, what
would be a reasonable asking price for both of Daniel Dameron’s
supermarkets?
4. Outline, as specifically as you can, a plan of action for this en
gagement which Krueger might use in organizing his work. How
might Krueger proceed to implement each of the steps involved in
sale negotiations?
The Role Assumed by Krueger

Burton Krueger decided to operate much as he had done in the
past. Thus, he assumed an active “agent” role, ready to represent the
Dameron interests throughout the sale negotiations. He determined,
however, that the informal relationship that had existed in the past
was not desirable under the present circumstances. Together, he and
Mr. Dameron drafted an engagement letter which spelled out, to the
extent possible, Krueger’s responsibilities. As had been the case in all
their prior dealings, the question of fees was resolved by simply extend
ing their prior per diem arrangements, with an understanding by

Exhibit 4

ECONOM Y SUPERMARKETS
Estim ated O perating D ata
For the Year Ended December 31, 1961
Projected 1961 sales (both stores)
Projected 1961 income (before federal
income taxes):
M aryvale:
L iquor
Grocery
W estbrook:
L iquor
Grocery

$5,500,000

$ 82,100
109,900

$192,000

$ 32,000
15,600

47,600

Total projected income
Less: estim ated federal income taxes
Projected 1961 income (after federal
income taxes) ..........................................................................................

$239,600
119,100
$120,500
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Dameron that it was impossible to predict how much of Krueger’s
time might be required before a sale of the markets was consummated.
Based on his knowledge of the business, Krueger felt that the asking
price should be somewhere between $500,000 and $1,500,000. To come
up with valid support for a dollar proposal in an appropriate range, he
studied the five- and ten-year analyses of performance that he had
prepared and reviewed the projected data for 1961.
After he had analyzed the available data, Krueger calculated sales
price proposals at varying capitalization rates and for varying combina
tions of considerations. Dealing with the total package, he calculated
selling price figures based on the average of the 1958-1960 operations;
on 1960 operations; and on the 1961 projected operations. (See Ex
hibits 5 and 6, pages 111 and 112.) Krueger also computed a sales
price for each of the two locations separately on the basis of the 1961
projected data. (See Exhibit 7, page 113.)
By the time he and the Damerons met in early May to review the
situation, Krueger had summarized his analyses, deducing from them
a range of proceeds that could be expected from the sale of the markets.
Krueger was not disturbed at the possible range of prices resulting from
the calculations. As he explained it to the Damerons, “Putting a price
on a business is not an easy matter. Some of the calculations are ex
tremes. Nevertheless, I think these figures do give you some feel for the
range of possible prices.” The three men reviewed and discussed the
projections and analyses. On the basis of their intuitive feel for the
situation, and considering the range of selling prices suggested by
Krueger’s analysis, the Damerons were generally in favor of an asking
price of $750,000, and this became the figure around which their
thinking revolved.
The Search for a Buyer

From the time of Daniel Dameron’s telephone call to Burton Krueger
to the tim e th a t they w ere actually ready to look for a buyer, about

three months had passed. During that period, Krueger estimated that
he had been in contact with either Daniel or Clayton Dameron roughly
twice a week. About half of the contacts were by telephone, and half
were in person. Some were at Krueger’s office and some were at
Dameron’s office; the visits lasted for as little as five minutes, although
some lasted for as long as two hours. Much of the discussion had to do
with the strategy to be employed in selecting likely prospects to whom
an offer to sell the market property might be made.
110
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Exhibit 5

ECONOM Y GROCERY & MARKET
Calculation of Sales Price— # 1
Both Stores
Projected
1961

Actual
1960

Average
1958-1960

$ 239,600

$ 214,000

$ 208,000

119,100

106,000

102,600

N et income after taxes

$ 120,500

$ 108,000

$ 105,400

C apitalization of earnings:
7 ½ X earnings ............................
8
X earnings ............................
8½ X earnings ............................
9
X earnings ............................
9 ½ X earnings ............................
10 X earnings ............................
12 X earnings ............................
15 X earnings ............................

$ 904,000
964,000
1,024,000
1,085,000
1,145,000
1,205,000
1,446,000
1,807,500

$ 810,000
864,000
918,000
972,000
1,026,000
1,080,000
1,296,000
1,620,000

$ 791,000
843,000
896,000
949,000
1,002,000
1,054,000
1,265,000
1,581,000

*Net income before
federal income taxes
Less federal income tax:
30% X $25,000
52% balance .................................

*The difference between the income figures in this exhibit and those in Exhibits 2
and 3 arises from adjustments made by Burton Krueger to exclude management
bonus payments made to the Damerons.

The men referred to information from trade sources and other avail
able data in their search for clues of likely prospects. Together they
studied lists of supermarket operators with an eye toward selecting
purchase candidates. Their plan was to select not more than eight
prospects and to keep their proposal “quiet and confidential.”
When the men had compiled their list of prospects, Burton Krueger
prepared a letter of inquiry to be mailed to the selected operators. The
letter, as mailed, appeared over Krueger’s signature on the letterhead
of the CPA partnership. (See Exhibit 8, page 115).
Response to the letter was disappointing. Krueger received one
acknowledgement by mail and one telephone response. The telephone
call came when Krueger was not in the office and no follow-up call
was received. It was at that point that the senior Dameron decided to
establish direct contact with Mr. Paul Reich, president and a major
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stockholder of Universal Stores. Although Mr. Reich had received one
of the letters of inquiry, he had not replied. When he found that
Daniel Dameron’s markets were the subject of the letter, Reich ex
pressed more than a casual interest and arranged for an interview.
Initial Sale Negotiations

Shortly after Dameron’s telephone discussion with Paul Reich, a Mr.
Andy Jacobs called Krueger to arrange an appointment with the prin
cipals. Jacobs was associated with another national chain and had

Exhibit 6

ECONOM Y GROCERY & MARKET
Calculation of Sales Price— # 2
Both Stores
Projected
1961

Actual
1960

Average
1958-1960

$5,500,000

$5,200,000

$4,920,000

$ 440,000
680,000

$ 416,000
680,000

$ 393,000
680,000

603,000

540,000

527,000

Total

$1,723,000

$1,636,000

$1,600,000

Average

$ 574,000

$ 545,000

$ 533,000

Sales .........................................
Tangible assets consisting of:
Inventories:
Grocery
$138,000
L iquor
83,000 $221,000
Fixed assets— net
58,000
San F ernando Grocery,
investm ent
14,000
33,000
O ther assets
Increase in liquor
14,000
licenses
Total
Sales price based on:
8% X sales .........................
2 X equity
5 X n et income after
federal income taxes,
per Exhibit 5
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$340,000
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Exhibit 7

ECONOM Y GROCERY & MARKET
Calculation of Sales Price— # 3
1961 Projected
Maryvale
N et income,
before tax
Total income before tax for
each store
Less: Federal
income taxes
52% ...............
30%; 52% ..........
Net income
after taxes
C ap italizatio n :
5 X earnings and
8 x earnings ........
6
8

W estbrook

Liquor

Grocery

Liquor

Grocery

Total

$82,100

$109,900

$32,000

$ 15,600

$ 239,600

$ 47,600

$ 239,600

$192,000

99,800
19,200
$ 92,200

$ 28,400

$461,000

X earnings and
X earnings

553,000

7 X earnings and
10 X earnings

645,000

8 X earnings and
10 X earnings

738,000

$227,000

$ 688,000

227,000

780,000

284,000

929,000

284,000

1,022,000

written the only letter received in response to Krueger’s initial, formal
inquiry. Jacobs arrived for his appointment with two assistants and
expressed a real interest in discussing the Dameron proposition. Both
Damerons were at the meeting, as well as Burton Krueger.
After the initial formalities and casual conversation, the talk turned
to Dameron’s proposal. When the question of price arose—early in the
discussion—Daniel Dameron proposed a purchase price of $750,000.
Jacobs, in a snide manner, said, “Well, sir, if you think you can get
$750,000, you go right ahead. I’ll give you $400,000.”
Krueger, somewhat taken aback by Jacobs’ approach, answered,
“Sir, if you can buy this kind of property for $400,000, you go right
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ahead.” Krueger’s response concluded the interview; Jacobs and his
associates left at that point. Afterwards, Daniel Dameron said to
Krueger, “That’s the way I like it, Burt.”
In the meantime, someone not privy to the information that Dam
eron intended to sell his markets came up with a proposal to buy them.
(See Exhibit 9, page 117.) Essentially, the proposal provided for a
minimum downpayment, and for future payments related directly to
future earnings.
Krueger discussed the proposal with the Damerons. He pointed out
that an arrangement with future payments tied to earnings, coupled
with an advisory role for Daniel Dameron, was, in a practical sense, a
near-extension of the present situation. The Damerons rejected the
offer.
It was at that point that Paul Reich of Universal acted upon his
earlier expression of interest. He visited with Krueger and the Damer
ons and reviewed the proposition. Krueger observed that Reich was
not very much interested in the detailed operating analyses and projec
tions that the CPA provided. Rather, Reich wanted to know: ( a ) What
is the current volume of each store?; (b ) W hat are the lease arrange
ments for each of the locations?; and (c) W hat are the parking char
acteristics at each location? Reich was not concerned with Dameron’s
methods of operation; he was interested solely in obtaining answers
to the three questions enumerated.
Apparently satisfied with the general answers to his questions, Reich
made Dameron an offer. He offered $375,000 for the existing lease on
the Maryvale property, $14,000 for the two liquor licenses, $24,000
minimum annual rental at the Westbrook location (subject to a 10-year
lease, with 10-year renewal option; lessee responsible for insurance
and real estate taxes), and cost value for the inventory.
On the basis of the estimated inventory value of $220,000, Krueger
figured that Reich’s offer amounted to approximately $633,000 during
the first year; Reich proposed to pay this with $300,000 worth of
Universal Stores preferred stock and cash for the balance. Mr. Reich
also proposed to pay directly to Daniel Dameron an annual “salary”
of $12,000 a year for the next three years. Reich’s proposal was ac
cepted for consideration and the conference was concluded.
Solicitation of a Competitive Deal

Although he was generally well pleased with the substance of Paul
Reich’s proposal, Daniel Dameron wished to solicit at least one addi114
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Exhibit 8

Solicitation L etter
August 23, 1961
Mr. Lipay
Food C hain M arkets
2000 N orth W est Avenue
City
D ear Mr. Lipay:
This letter is being w ritten at the request of a client who owns and oper
ates two w ell-established superm arkets in the m id-city area and, who, for
personal and non-financial reasons, has decided to dispose of them . H e has
chosen this approach to you because he knows th at he has a valuable asset
to sell and does not care to reveal pertinent facts about his operations to
anyone except those who show a real interest in acquiring his m arkets and
their potential. T he purpose of this letter is to determ ine w hether or not
your organization is interested in acquiring these markets.
A brief description of the m arkets and their operations follows:
a. Total sales 1960—$5,237,000
Total sales 1959— 4,895,000
Total sales 1958— 4,629,000
b. N et income before taxes:
I960—$164,000
1959— 171,000
1958— 134,000
c. T he total sales for the first seven months of 1961 has shown an increase
of approxim ately 7% over the first seven m onths of 1960.
For the same period, n et income has shown a higher percentage of
increase than sales volume.
d. Location: W ell-established m iddle and upper class areas.
e. Leases: Favorable as to term s and length of lease.
f.

Parking area: W ell above average.

g. Physical condition: Building m odern and in excellent condition. One
building needs m inor paint and floor repair.
O perating assets: All m odern and in excellent condition.
h. Com petition: Leading superm arket in each trading area.
You realize th at in a letter such as this we cannot give you all of the
necessary statistics to properly evaluate the real w orth of these markets, b u t
if you are interested we can and will furnish them prom ptly on a confiden
tial basis.
O ur reasons for contacting your organization are:
115

Exhibit 8, continued

1. If you are interested in expanding your operations to this area, these
two m arkets would be ideal since their location, volume, etc., would
insure im m ediate success.
2. W hile my client is flexible as to financing the sale of his markets, we
do not believe financing the project would be a problem to your
organization.
Any negotiations and correspondence betw een your organization and my
client will be treated as a confidential m atter. If you are not interested in
this proposal, we ask that you treat all inform ation as com pletely con
fidential.
If you are interested in acquiring these markets, please contact me and
a conference w ith my client at a convenient tim e and place will be ar
ranged. At th at time we will be prepared to furnish any specific inform ation
requested.
A reply to this letter in the near future would be appreciated since we
have contacted four other parties.
Sincerely yours,
SS: Burton Krueger
of Alexander, Krueger, W eiss & W eiss
BK:ck

tional proposal, if for no other reason than to bolster his bargaining
position. Krueger discussed the possibility of calling the president of
Metro Stores; Dameron agreed that this would be desirable and pro
ceeded to arrange for a conference. (Daniel Dameron and Burton
Krueger were casually acquainted with Harvey Rasmussen, president
of M etro.) A meeting date was arranged, and Krueger and the Dam
erons prepared to meet with Mr. Rasmussen.
When, several days later, Harvey Rasmussen arrived at Burton
Krueger’s office, he w ent directly to th e m ajor issues. Just as Paul
Reich had done, Rasmussen asked primarily for information about the
sales volume and the lease provisions. He had, since Dameron’s initial
phone call, personally surveyed the parking situation at both locations;
he required no further information on that point.
After his questions had been answered, Rasmussen requested Dam
eron’s asking price. Dameron responded that, while he had studied the
situation carefully, he would prefer to receive an offer from Rasmussen,
acknowledging his role as an expert in the field. Rasmussen then made
116
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Exhibit 9

L etter of Inquiry
O ctober 9, 1961
Mr. D aniel Dam eron
Econom y Superm arket
213 Spring Boulevard

City
D ear Mr. Dameron:
W e desire to make the following offer for the purchase of certain assets
w hich you now own including those of the Daniel Dam eron Corporation.
Specifically, we desire to purchase the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.

M erchandise inventories at the W estbrook and M aryvale stores.
All fixtures and equipm ent at the W estbrook and M aryvale stores.
The M aryvale leasehold.
The right to use the Economy Superm arket name.

W e plan to form a new corporation to be jointly owned by the under
signed and an associate. This corporation would propose to purchase the
assets described above for the following p ric e s:
1. Book value for the m erchandise inventories as of the date of purchase
as counted and priced in accordance w ith your usual practices.
2. $200,000 for items 2, 3, and 4 above.
This offer would be contingent upon the following:
1. The execution of a lease to the new corporation covering the W est
brook store for a period of fifteen (15) years at an annual rental of
1 ½ % of sales.
2. The execution of a contract betw een the new corporation and your
self whereby, for a period of ten (10) years you would be available
for consultation in exchange for com pensation at the rate of 7 ½ % of
all net profits before taxes up to a maximum paym ent of $50,000 per
year, payable to you or your estate, plus an additional 5% of net
profits before taxes in excess of $666,667 per year as long as you
furnish consultive services.
This means you would participate in all future profits from newly
opened or otherw ise acquired stores of the new corporation or its
affiliates or subsidiaries. Also your continued advice and counsel in
the future is something we consider vitally necessary.
3. It is the express intention of the undersigned to make no changes in
present personnel because continuity of your m anagem ent policies is
essential to the future grow th of the enterprise.
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Exhibit 9, continued
4. W e propose the following terms of payment:
a. $100,000 on the date of purchase.
b. $100,000 payable ninety (90) days after date of purchase.
c. The balance payable in four (4 ) annual installments of $30,000
commencing one (1 ) year after date of purchase.
d. Interest shall be paid on the unpaid balance from the date of
purchase at the rate of 6% per annum.
W e would be pleased to meet with you and discuss these points in greater
detail.
Sincerely yours,
BJA:foh

Barth J. Alexander

an offer that amounted to about $625,000 for the first year. He offered
$375,000 for the lease at the Maryvale property, a $30,000 minimum
annual rental at Westbrook (based on a 20-year lease; insurance and
property taxes to be paid by the lessee), and cost value for the inven
tory. Rasmussen proposed that the transaction would be an all-cash
deal; his proposal was accepted for consideration, and the conference
was concluded.
In the meantime, Paul Reich apparently surmised that Daniel Dam
eron was bargaining and modified his original offer. Reich’s second
proposal increased his first offer by $180,000, preferred stock of Uni
versal accounting for the full additional value. Shortly after Dameron
received Reich’s new proposal, Harvey Rasmussen called Burton Krue
ger for information on the status of his offer.
Krueger advised Rasmussen that Mr. Dameron had received other
offers, some a little better than his. The president of Metro Stores then
modified his original offer; he proposed to pay $400,000 for the lease at
Maryvale, increased the annual minimum rental from $30,000 to $36,
000, and continued the cost-value offer for the inventory.
The Final Selection

With two firm offers in hand, Burton Krueger concluded that it
was time to compare the proposals and to prepare a final report for the
Damerons. He analyzed both offers, and summarized the major ele
ments of each. ( See Exhibit 10, page 119.)
Krueger reviewed his notes, and his analysis of the offers. He recog
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THE ECONOMY SUPERMARKETS

nized that the aggregate value of Universal’s offer was better than the
offer from Metro. However, he believed that the Metro offer was
better suited for his client because of the inclusion of a substantial
amount of preferred stock in the Universal package. This element,
Krueger concluded, was inconsistent with Dameron’s motives for
liquidating his holdings in the first place. Burton Krueger advised
Daniel Dameron of his feelings and Dameron ultimately accepted the
purchase proposal from Metro Stores.
Once the Metro deal had been chosen, legal formalities and attendant

Exhibit 10

Burton Krueger’s Comparison
of Universal and Metro Offers
Offer from
Universal Stores

Offer from
Metro Stores

$ 375,000

$ 400,000

Payment for fixtures and
Maryvale lease
Payment for liquor licenses

14,000

Approximate cost value of
inventory

220,000

Additional payment added to
basic offer

.....

Sub-total: Offer for going concern
Three-year salary to
Daniel Dameron
Present value at 6% on
$1,000 per month for 3 years
Annual rent, discounted to
present value at 6%
Universal: $24,000
Metro:
$36,000

220,000

180,000
$ 789,000

$ 620,000

32,871

279,162
418,743

Value of total offer

$1,101,033

$1,038,743

Terms of payment:
Cash at date of transfer
Stock at date of transfer

$ 309,000
480,000

$ 620,000
0

$ 789,000

$ 620,000

Total
(Plus salary and rental payments)
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arrangements were handled quite rapidly. Dameron called in his
attorney who proceeded with the arrangement of legal formalities.
Krueger was included in the consultations, but his role was far less
dominant than it had been up to the time of legalizing the negotia
tions.
The final conference between the interested parties was held on
November 12th; Krueger attended, bringing with his other papers a
“final checklist of points to be considered.” Agreement was reached
that the inventory should be taken in time for an effective transfer date
of December 3rd. ( Krueger supervised the tax planning aspect of the
negotiations; however, full consideration of the tax planning aspect is
beyond the scope of this publication.)
Late Negotiations

During the period of legal consultation and final negotiations, Dam
eron attempted to “keep Universal on the hook.” He did not wish to
terminate the relationship between himself and Paul Reich (at Uni
versal) until the Metro deal was concluded. One unanticipated diffi
culty arose at the Maryvale store. The entire deal between Metro and
Dameron was dependent on negotiating favorable lease transfer pro
visions. At Maryvale a third-party landlord was involved; when Ras
mussen insisted on an expansion of the parking facilities at Maryvale,
acceptable lease provisions were difficult to negotiate. After some de
lay, three-way agreement was reached and the final details were settled.
Partly arising from the difficulty in arranging the Maryvale lease,
Metro was not afforded access to the markets until December 17th,
two weeks after the agreed-upon date for transfer. Consequently, Ras
mussen asked for credit against the contract price to compensate him
for the delay. Largely because of the importance of the occupancy
privilege during a prime selling season, Rasmussen felt that Metro
should be indemnified. Dameron agreed to pay Metro $6,000 a week.
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Radionics, Inc.
On November 6, 1962, Jack Windsor, the owner of a large machine
tool company, offered to invest $50,000 in Radionics, Inc., a California
electronics company, in return for a 25 per cent equity in the company.
After receiving his offer, Frank Stack, the president and sole owner of
Radionics, was in a quandary as to how to evaluate the proposal.
Earlier in 1962, Mr. Stack had discussed Radionics’ financial situa
tion with Peter Hall, the company’s CPA. That discussion led to an
engagement wherein Mr. Hall developed a report indicating that the
required amount of additional funds was $50,000. In addition, he
suggested various sources for obtaining the funds and the advantages
and disadvantages of each. Mr. Stack then tried unsuccessfully to bor
row $50,000 from local banks on favorable terms. He also sought to
negotiate several sale and lease-back agreements, but rejected all the
proposals because he considered the interest rates too high. Mr. Stack
rejected another alternative, that of factoring his accounts receivable;
he believed that the proposed factoring costs were unreasonable.
As a result of his unsuccessful search for debt capital at a reasonable
price, Stack concluded that what Radionics needed was to raise addi
tional equity capital. Hall discussed at length with him the potential
problems and added responsibilities of selling common stock to an out
side investor and pointed out, “In a business this size, it’s almost like
having a partner, and you’ll want to be sure that you can get along with
him.” Stack had planned to discuss with Hall the number of shares an
investor should receive for $50,000, but Windsor’s offer to invest in
Radionics had come before he had had a chance to examine this aspect
of the expansion program.
Looking for guidance, Stack phoned Hall and described his problem
in the following terms:
“Jack Windsor has offered to invest $50,000 in Radionics and he
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wants a 25 per cent ownership interest for that amount. He has
seen Radionics’ financial statements and I have discussed my
expansion plans with him. He doesn’t want to be part of manage
ment. He just wants to make an investment. He said that he al
ready has a full-time job running his own machine tool company.
“Jack did not say that he doesn’t want a nonvoting stock deal; he
wants straight stock without any restrictions. Should he ever wish
to sell, however, he is willing to agree to give me the first oppor
tunity on any equity in Radionics that he holds. This seems fair
to me.
“Peter, you know that we need the $50,000, but how big a piece
of the company do you think Jack should get for that amount?”
Peter Hall

Peter Hall, a certified public accountant, was an individual prac
titioner. He had been the auditor and business advisor to Radionics
ever since the company was founded in 1959. In addition to the Radi
onics account, he acted as auditor for a variety of small privatelyowned manufacturing companies, nearly all of which also retained
him in a financial advisory capacity.
Hall’s personal relations with Stack had been very close. The men
played golf together regularly and their wives visited frequently. With
the exception of Radionics’ audited year-end statements, all of the
business contacts between the two men were carried on in an informal
way. Stack had retained Hall on a continuing basis since early 1960
when he had felt the need for outside help in the day-to-day operations
of his business. From that time on, Stack had consulted Hall on almost
every major business decision he faced.
In answer to Stack’s question, Hall replied, “Frank, I’m tied up dur
ing the next couple of days on an audit for another client. However, I
will be happy to work on your problem. Why don’t we get together in,
say, three days and discuss this matter over lunch. I’ll give you my
opinion then as to how much equity Jack should get for $50,000.”
Stack agreed to this proposal and a luncheon date was set for
November 9, 1962.
Immediately after talking with Stack, Hall instructed his secretary
to get a copy of Moody’s Manual of Industrials so he could study that
along with the additional materials that he had on file. Later he col
lected the following information pertaining to Radionics and several
of its publicly-owned competitors. Based on his analysis of this in
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formation, Hall proposed to recommend to Stack the number of shares
that should appropriately be issued to Windsor for $50,000.
Radionics, Inc.

Radionics, Inc., was incorporated in late 1959 by Frank Stack, a pro
fessional engineer. The company’s 1962 sales volume of about $603,000
was derived from manufacturing and consulting activities in the elec
tronics field. Prior to forming Radionics, Stack had been a successful
radio engineering consultant.
Radionics’ business was conducted through two divisions: the Con
sulting Division and the Production Division. The Consulting Division
was an extension of Stack’s consulting work prior to the time he created
Radionics. Hence, the consulting aspect of Radionics’ business had op
erated continuously since the company’s organization in 1959. Through
the Consulting Division, the company performed a variety of engineer
ing services for applicants and licensees in the commercial and short
wave broadcast field, particularly in matters before the Federal Com
munications Commission and other regulatory agencies. In addition,
the division performed engineering consultation for industrial concerns
on electronic questions, designed broadcasting equipment and made
field adjustments to broadcasting equipment. Other consulting ac
tivities included site selection studies for AM, FM and TV broadcast
facilities and appraisals of existing broadcast facilities.
Since 1959 the Consulting Division had done work for approximately
150 AM, FM and TV broadcast stations throughout the United States
and foreign countries (there were approximately 5,000 AM, FM and
TV stations in the United States). This work was primarily on an indi
vidual case or project basis, but many of these clients had retained the
company’s services for more than one job. Approximately 50 of these
150 broadcast stations were currently considered active accounts.
The Production Division was created in early 1959 as an outgrowth
of Radionics’ consulting work. The activity of this Division embraced
the production and sale of individual electronic components as well as
the design, production and installation of certain communications
equipment which utilized various components produced by the com
pany. Since its organization, the major objective of the Production
Division had been the development of a line of proprietary components
and communications equipment. Stack believed that substantial prog
ress had been achieved by Radionics in the development of several
proprietary products, such as coils, relays, switches and sampling loops.
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In the near future, he expected an increasing market acceptance of
these products. The necessary research and development work re
quired to create these improved products was conducted by Produc
tion Division personnel. Such research was largely financed by Radi
onics from its own resources, rather than by research and development
contracts with the government or larger companies.
Beginning in late 1961, Radionics’ Production Division had played a
major role in the activities of the space surveillance program of the
Navy, especially in the procurement, modification, and installation of
several powerful transmitters for missile tracking stations. The installa
tion work on the Navy tracking station project was performed by the
company’s field service section which had available to it the technical
staff personnel of both the Consulting and Production Divisions. The
total contract price for this Navy job was approximately $300,000, most
of which had been received by Radionics during 1962.
Sales and Earnings. The net sales of the company, by division, for
the last three years w ere:
Fiscal year
(October 31)

Consulting division

Production division

Total sales

1962
1961
1960

$194,553
208,979
234,733

$408,039
110,310
107,319

$602,592
319,289
342,052

The net profits after taxes of the company for this same period w ere:
Year

Net Profit

1962
1961
1960

$17,1401
8,512
1,197

More detailed income statements for the fiscal years 1960-62, in
clusive, are shown in Exhibit 1, page 125. Detailed financial data for
1959 is not included. Hall did not consider the financial reports for
that period representative of the company’s long-run performance
since they included only six-months’ consulting income. In 1959, con
sulting revenues were some $90,000 with profits of about $2,000. A
balance sheet for 1962 is presented in Exhibit 2, page 126.
Despite a substantial increase in Radionics’ 1962 profits over the
1 W ithout the Navy contract, Stack estim ated Radionics’ 1961 earnings
would have been about $10,000 after taxes. W indsor was not aw are of this
figure.
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Exhibit 1

RADIONICS, INC.
Statem ents of Income
For the Years Ended October 31, 1960, 1961 and 1962

N et sales
Cost of sales:
M aterials purchased
O perating expenses (other than
those listed below)
Repairs and m aintenance
Provision for depreciation
Rent
Taxes, other than taxes on income

1962

1961

1960

$602,592.01

$319,289.09

$342,052.55

$202,893.00

$ 71,767.97

$ 38,919.55

236,164.58
1,081.68
12,451.55
16,873.70

133,317.01
1,079.28
5,837.38
12,985.00

161,525.17
1,148.97
4,672.47
12,291.00

10,459.81

4,535.36

2,927.84

Total
(In crease)/d ecrease in inventories
Cost of sales

$479,924.32
11,249.88
$491,174.20

$229,522.00 $221,485.00
(28,585.18)
(9,205.88)
$200,936.82 $212,279.12

Gross profit on sales
Selling, general, and adm inistra
tive expenses (other than those
listed below
Taxes, other than taxes on income

$111,417.81

$118,352.27

$129,773.43

$ 76,881.21
2,090.24

$ 80,388.25
770.53

$102,893.70
1,000.04

$ 78,971.45

$ 81,158.78

$103,893.74

$ 32,446.36

$ 37,193.49

$ 25,879.69

$

337.05
385.00

$

966.26

$

67.66
112.06

$

722.05

$

966.26

$

179.72

Total expenses
O perating profit
O ther incom e:
Interest
Miscellaneous
Total
O ther deductions:
Interest expense
Loss on disposal of assets
Bonuses (officers & employees)

$ 33,168.41

$ 38,159.75

$ 26,059.41

$

$

$

3,444.84
3,426.90
4,000.00

1,999.61

348.93

24,000.00

24,000.00

$ 10,871.74

$ 25,999.61

$ 24,348.93

N et income before taxes
Federal taxes

$ 22,296.67
5,155.90

$ 12,160.14
3,648.04

$

1,710.48
513.14

Net income

$ 17,140.77

$

$

1,197.34

Total

8,512.10

See notes to financial statements. Exhibit 2.
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Exhibit 2

RADIONICS, INC.
Statem ent of Financial Position
October 31, 1962
ASSETS
C urrent assets:
Cash .......................................................................
Notes and accounts receivable:
T rade notes
T rade accounts ...............................................
Less allowances
U nbilled costs and fees on contracts
Inventories at lower of cost (first-in, first-out
m ethod) or m arket:
Finished goods
W ork-in-process
M aterials .....................................
Prepaid expenses

$
$

3,113.88
88,199.29

$ 91,313.17
4,300.00

Less allowances for depreciation
O ther assets:
D eferred research and developm ent expenses
— (N ote A)
D eferred financing expense
O ther
Total assets

126

87,013.17

4,120.63

$

2,050.49
14,021.84
25,602.09

41,674.42
1,763.18
$136,416.52

Total current assets
Equipm ent:
Technical equipm ent
Office furniture and fixtures
Factory equipm ent
Vehicles
Leasehold improvements

1,845.12

$ 65,681.83
23,993.92
11,201.19
6,465.00
8,689.46
$116,031.40
25,638.78

90,392.62

$ 59,374.07
4,000.00
1,940.74

65,314.81
$292,123.95
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Exhibit 2, continued

LIABILITIES

and

NET WORTH

C urrent liab ilities:
Notes payable:
Banks— unsecured— (N ote B)
$ 18,750.00
Trade creditors—unsecured— (N ote B)
26,967.47
Officers—unsecured
14,976.32
Others— (N ote B)
8,339.54
Total
Salaries and wages, payroll taxes, and taxes
w ithheld from employees— (N ote C)
Custom er’s advance
Accrued interest

33,523.99
19,114.70
5,490.31
$127,162.33

Total current liabilities
Stockholders’ equity:
Common stock, no par value—
Authorized 1,000,000 shares, issued and
outstanding 200,000 shares
Deficit (N ote D )

$ 69,033.33

$200,000.00
(35,038.38)

164,961.62
$292,123.95

Notes to Financial Statements
Note A: During the period from April 1, 1962 to August 31, 1962, the company
engaged in an extensive research and development program on a number of com
mercial products and capitalized materials, labor and overhead applicable to this
research and development totaling $59,374.07. This amount will be amortized
over a five-year period beginning November 1, 1962. Other research and develop
ment expenses prior to April 1, 1962, and subsequent to August 31, 1962, have
been expensed as incurred.
Note B: Notes payable of $15,000.00 to a bank and of $22,991.91 to a trade
creditor have been personally endorsed by officers of the company.
Subsequent to October 31, 1962, a bank loan of $3,750.00 was paid and an
additional bank loan of $25,000.00 was obtained (personally endorsed by the
president of the company and his w ife).
Note C: Included in the amount ($33,523.99) shown on the statement of
financial position for salaries and wages, payroll taxes, and taxes withheld from
employees is $6,634.93 which is past due to the United States Government for
federal withholding and Federal Insurance Contribution Act taxes.
Note D: In 1961 the company sold certain fixed assets at a capital loss, which
was written-off against retained earnings. Originally these assets had been ob
tained from Mr. Frank Stack in return for common shares of Radionics.
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prior year, Stack believed his profits for 1962 should have been greater
by about $7,000 after taxes. He based this belief on three facts:
1. During the year, half of the plant was shut down for one week
due to a change in layout of the equipment.
2. Lack of capital to provide the greater inventories of materials
and supplies necessary to process the increased volume of business had
resulted in delays in production schedules and an inability to take ad
vantage of other potential operating economies.
3. The expansion of the work force due to the Navy satellite track
ing station contract resulted in temporary overstaffing.
As noted later, Stack anticipated that with additional capital he
could quickly improve the company’s efficiency, permanently increase
its sales volume and realize substantial operating economies.
Marketing. Radionics’ products and services were sold primarily in
the United States. The company’s principal customers were commer
cial enterprises; except for the Navy’s Space Surveillance Program, the
company had not performed significant engineering design or installa
tion services for the government. Nevertheless, Stack considered the
government a major potential customer for certain Radionics products
and engineering services.
The company’s principal customer was a large manufacturer of
radios and TVs which over the years had been both a direct customer
for Radionics’ products and services and a source of additional revenue
through subcontracts. Sales to this customer during fiscal 1961 ac
counted for approximately 70 per cent of the gross sales of the Produc
tion Division and 15 per cent of the revenues of the Consulting Divi
sion. However, Stack’s analysis of the current backlog of production
orders indicated a broadening of his customer base, and he expected
this trend to continue.
From its inception, Radionics had operated without a separate sales
department; all sales were made through the personal efforts of the
company’s top executives. By mid-1962, however, the satisfactory de
velopment of the proprietary product line had led Stack to the con
clusion that Radionics’ sales activity should be formalized and intensi
fied. Accordingly, he planned to increase his sales effort with outside
sales assistance supplemented by a small Radionics sales organization.
Already, he had arranged to use the services of an international manu
facturer’s representative in the electronics field for export sales. Also,
within the past fiscal year, Stack had authorized a domestic manu128
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facturer’s representative to act as the exclusive agent for Radionics
along the East Coast. In addition, as soon as he could raise some new
long-term capital, Stack planned to set up his own two-man sales
force to cover the West Coast. Later, he planned to service the re
mainder of the country through selected manufacturer’s representa
tives. This new sales organization, Stack believed, could be estab
lished within three months after he acquired the capital to undertake
the sales expansion program.
Plant and Facilities. Radionics’ plant and facilities were located in
two cities: Los Angeles and Culver City, California. The offices of the
Consulting Division were situated in a large office building in Los
Angeles. These offices, at a rental of $820 per month, were occupied
under a three-year lease expiring August 31, 1964.
The facilities of the Production Division were housed in a converted
movie studio lot in Culver City. Radionics had a three-year lease on
this plant expiring on November 30, 1964. Rent was payable at the
rate of approximately $470 per month.
Finally, based on a recent study by Stack, the appraised resale value
of Radionics’ fixed assets and equipment, excluding leasehold improve
ments, was almost $150,000. The undepreciated book value of these
same assets was about $90,000. The difference between these two
figures resulted from many improvements Stack had built into his test
ing and production equipment subsequent to its purchase. The costs
of these improvements had been expensed as incurred, in that the bet
terments did not enhance their useful life.
M anagem ent and E m ployees. In November, 1962, the company
employed 34 persons including 14 engineers, 7 draftsmen, 7 production
employees, and 6 administrative employees. Earlier during 1962, engi
neers employed in both divisions had reached a total of 21. However,
upon completion of the satellite tracking station for the Navy, the engi
neering staff had been cut back.
The top management of the company consisted of three men—
Frank Stack, president; Harold Patterson, manager, Production Divi
sion; and Len Sims, manager, Consulting Division. All three were
registered professional engineers in their late forties.
Stack, Patterson, and Sims were regarded as competent managers
and engineers within the Los Angeles electronics manufacturing and
consulting community. In particular, Stack was noted for his inventive
skills which already had resulted in significant improvements in several
radio broadcast equipment components.
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Expansion Plans

The $50,000 addition to equity capital was needed to support future
business expansion by Radionics, particularly in the manufacturing
and sales area. Stack planned to invest the $50,000 as follows:
Inventory of finished materials
and manufacturing supplies
Sales promotion
New production equipment

$30,000
15,000
5,000
$50,000

With this amount of new equity capital in the business, Stack was
quite confident that Radionics’ operations would grow over the next
three years as follows:
Sales
Year
1963
1964
1965

Consulting Division
$200,000
250,000
250,000

Production Division
$300,000
400,000
500,000

Profits
After Taxes
$15,000
20,000
30,000

Stack had discussed Radionics’ growth potential with Hall on many
occasions, and in working out the rough estimates shown above, Stack
had said, “There’s a real opportunity for increasing the Production
Division’s sales volume from customers other than our prime customer.
These estimates are just for the normal growth that I’m sure is possible,
and reflect the decline in volume because our Navy contract is now
finished. I’ve made no allowance in these sales estimates for other
large one-shot contracts, such as the Navy tracking contract, because
of the uncertainties associated with winning such jobs. Therefore, I
really think that these sales and profit estimates are somewhat on the
conservative side. On the other hand,” Stack pointed out, “we must
have new capital to achieve these results. If additional capital is not
obtained, I would expect that Radionics would continue to operate at
about its 1961 level over the next few years.”
Hall had pointed out in reply that, “The value of your equity is really
determined by the buyer’s expectations of the future performance of
your company, and sales is a critical factor. I’m going to use your
figures and focus my efforts on a method for determining a fair price.”
Competition. Radionics had a number of competitors. For instance,
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there were many small firms consisting of one or two engineers offering
consulting and engineering services similar to those of Radionics’ Con
sulting Division. Most of the company’s more significant competitors
in this phase of its business were located in the Los Angeles area.
However, of these firms, Radionics was perhaps the best known
throughout the broadcasting industry. Consequently, Radionics was
one of the more active firms rendering consulting services.
Many firms, both large and small, were engaged in the production
and sale of components for the broadcast industry. Some of Radionics
larger and more diversified competitors had substantially more ex
tensive research and production facilities than Radionics. Rather than
compete with these large firms in all areas of broadcast products, Radi
onics sought to develop a specialized line of broadcasting products.
Therefore with respect to its major products, such as coils, relays,
switches, sampling loops and phase monitors, the company faced direct
competition from only a limited number of other producers. The com
pany’s chief competitors with respect to its major products were Audi
onics, Inc.; Sound Age, Inc.; Stevenson Associates; Hightone, Inc.;
Masters, Inc.; and Foster & Cohen, Inc. Each of these companies made
one or all of the products Radionics produced. In addition, a number
of them also offered consulting services.
Three of the companies Radionics competed directly with in the
manufacturing and consulting areas were publicly owned: Audionics,
Inc., Hightone, Inc., and Masters, Inc. Each of these companies is
briefly described below. Selected financial data which Hall gathered
concerning these companies is summarized in Exhibit 3, page 132.
Audionics, Inc. This company produced high quality loops, relays,
and phase monitors. Its president, Peter Watkins, was a prominent
consultant in the broadcast industry. His firm had won two large con
tracts ($100,000 each) associated with the same Navy missile track
ing program Radionics had just completed. Over the last three years,
this company’s sales had risen from $600,000 to $1,000,000, principally
because of additional government contracts. Audionics’ stock was
traded infrequently in the over-the-counter market.
Hightone, Inc. A manufacturer of sampling loops and phase moni
tors exclusively. Hightone offered limited consulting services. Like
Radionics, about 60 per cent of its production was sold to one company.
Between 1958 and 1962, Hightone’s sales rose steadily from $1,000,000
to $1,300,000. A “thin” over-the-counter market was maintained in
Hightone’s stock.
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Masters, Inc. This company’s consulting activities rivaled Radionics
in size and scope. Masters manufactured coils, relays, and phase moni
tors (for which it was best known). From 1959 when it was founded
to 1962, Masters’ sales rose to $700,000. In contrast to Radionics and
most of the other small companies in this field, Masters maintained a

Exhibit 3

RADIONICS, INC.
Com parative Stock Prices and Financial D ata on Selected Com petitors
Audionics, Inc.
7/31/61
Sales (000 om itted)
N et income (000 o m itted )1
after federal taxes
Return on net w o rth 2
Earnings per share:
1962
1 9 6 1 .....................................
1960 ....................................
1959 .....................................
M arket price (bid 9 /1 /6 2 )
Price earnings ratio :3
1962 (9 /1 /6 2 )
1961 (7 /3 1 /6 1 ) ..............
1960 (7 /3 1 /6 0 )
1959 (7 /3 1 /5 9 ) ..........
C urrent dividend rate
1962 book value share
Common shares outstanding
(000 om itted)

$1,000

Hightone, Inc. Masters, Inc.
7/31/61
6/3 0 /6 1
$1,300
60
20%

(40)
negative
net worth
$ (.40)
( .52)
.10
.20
.80

$700

$

.30
.16
.08
.10
9.00
30x
25x
22x
20x

19
10%

$

.19
.13
.04
founded 1959
4.75

(-)
(-)
21x
15x
-0 negative

-0 $ 1.50

25x
23x
16x
—
-0 $ 1.50

100

200

100

1 All three companies had deferred substantial research and development costs
during the last four years.
2 Income
X 100%
Net Worth
3
Market price at date shown
Earnings for period ending on date shown
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small sales force of its own. The market for this company’s stock
was “thin.”
On June 1, 1962, a leading financial journal published the following
comments in an article on the broadcast component industry:
. . . In the highly specialized production of coils, relays, and
switches, three small firms (Radionics, Audionics and Stevenson
Associates) are competing successfully with the larger more
diversified firms. This specialized end of the business requires
expert “know-how” which only a few people, such as Frank Stack
of Radionics, possess. . . . Likewise, in the manufacture of sampling
loops and phase monitors four small firms ( Hightone, Sound Age,
Radionics and Masters) can hold their own with the industry
giants. . . . Nobody within the industry anticipates that these
small firms will lose their grip on the specialty markets, which in
dustry experts expect will continue to expand by some five per
cent each year. . . .
The public demand for the stocks of such companies as High
tone far exceeds the supply, with the result that these stocks sell
at price earnings ratios of about 30. . . . Investment analysts spe
cializing in this segment of the radio industry are “bullish” in their
investment recommendations. . . .

Questions

1. What portion of the equity of Radionics, Inc. should Frank Stack
offer to Jack Windsor for $50,000?
2. W hat strategy should Stack follow in his negotiations with
Windsor?
3. W hat alternative sources of equity capital might be available to
Stack, besides the Windsor offer?
4. Should Hall bill Stack separately for this project? How many
man-hours do you think are involved?
Peter Hall’s Analysis

Jack Windsor, the owner of a large machine tool company had
offered to invest $50,000 in Radionics, Inc., in return for a 25 per cent
equity in the company. Several days after receiving the offer, Frank
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Stack, the president of Radionics, met with his certified public ac
countant, Peter Hall to discuss how large a share of Radionics’ equity
Windsor should expect to receive for $50,000. Excerpts from their
meeting are presented below:
Stack: Peter, I have checked with my lawyer and he will take care of
all the legal aspects of any issuance of new securities. What I
thought we ought to discuss is the number of shares I should
offer to Jack. Do you think I should accept his offer?
Hall:

No. I think from what I have found, that you ought to be able
to get a much better offer, if not from Jack Windsor, then per
haps from somebody else.

Stack: How did you come to that conclusion?
Hall:

Well, first let me say that to value a potential minority interest
in a small company which depends on the genius of one man is
not an easy matter. I want to make this very clear to you at the
start so that you will not over-rate the reliability of my recom
mendation.

Stack: Thinks for the warning.
Hall:

The first thing I did in my analysis was to place a value on
Radionics under the going concern concept. In fact, by using
different valuation techniques, I arrived at several values.

Stack: How did you arrive at these valuations?
Hall:

I used three methods. First, I calculated the book value, using
your 1962 balance sheet figures. Second, I determined a market
price for the company, using the price-earnings ratios of several
similar companies whose stock is publicly traded. Finally, I
hypothesized a stream of dividends that Radionics would be
able to pay based on its anticipated future earnings, and
capitalized the dividends at several d ifferent yield percentages.

Now, let’s look at each one of these individually.

The book value of Radionics is $164,000. This figure is simply
the difference between your total assets and liabilities. On a
book value basis, if Windor put in $50,000 the total equity
would be $214,000 and his pro rata share, that is, 50 out of 214,
would be 23.4%. Since he has suggested a 25% piece, we can
surmise that he’s either just establishing a starting point for
further negotiations, or perhaps he’s making some adjustment for
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your deferred research and development expenses. In terms of
tangible net worth, eliminating both the research and develop
ment and deferred financing expense, we show just over $100,
000. On that basis, Windsor’s $50,000 cash would give him a
one-third interest, so he is apparently accepting most of your
intangibles if he’s using book value to arrive at a price.
The next method I applied, called the market value approach,
gives us another set of values for Radionics. The market value
approach is based upon the following assumption: If Radionics’
stock were publicly traded it would be selling at about the same
price-earnings ratios as that of similar companies.
Of course, Radionics’ stock is not traded publicly, but the
stock of two similar companies, Hightone and Masters, is traded
over-the-counter. Here are some brief comparative statistics of
these two companies and Radionics (see Table 1, page 137).
As you can see from these figures, Radionics and Masters are
very similar. Masters, of course, has only 100,000 shares out
standing against Radionics’ 200,000, so Masters’ per share figures
are all about twice those of Radionics’. Radionics has a slightly
higher return on net worth than Masters. Also, Radionics has a
better profit trend than Masters. Both companies were founded
in 1959, and Masters did better during its first year, but between
1961 and 1962 Radionics doubled its earnings while Masters’
earnings rose only 46 per cent.
Obviously, Hightone is a larger and more successful company
than Radionics. Nevertheless, I have included Hightone on the
table because its earnings have grown during the last couple of
years at about the same rate as Radionics’ earnings. Also, I
think as you get more and more into the manufacturing busi
ness, your company’s operations will come closer to resembling
Hightone’s operations than they currently do.
Stack: I ’ve always thought of Radionics being somewhat similar to
Audionics. Why did you exclude Audionics from the table?
Hall:

Primarily because Audionics has reported losses during the last
two years. In that important respect it is different from Radi
onics. And what I was after was a price-earnings multiple that
I could apply to our stock; a company like Audionics that shows
a loss doesn’t have any price-earnings ratio.
Using the multiples that Hightone and Masters have had over
the last three years, and applying them to Radionics’ earnings,
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I came up with market values of $516,000 and $430,000, re
spectively. Here are my calculations (see Tables 2 and 3, page
137).
On the basis of these two stock prices, Jack Windsor’s $50,000
would buy 19,380 or 23,256 shares. Since we already have
200,000 shares out, he would end up with about 10% ownership
in Radionics.
Finally, as a third approach, which in my opinion is really the
most realistic one, I tried to recognize that what an investor is
buying is a stream of future earnings and dividends. Now, we
can’t see very far ahead in this business, but from my analysis,
it appears that $50,000 in new capital will permit your company
to develop a business that will earn approximately $30,000 per
year. The question is, what happens then? If you don’t grow
any further, the $30,000 could be paid out in dividends, so you
may wish to look at the dividend yield. More likely, some or all
of the profits will be plowed-back so that the company can con
tinue to grow. If you try to put a value on that you can really
get into some “wild blue yonder” projections, and besides, that’s
what the market prices for Hightone and Masters are reflecting.
The only justification for earnings multiples of 25 or 30 is the
expectation that earnings will continue to increase rapidly.
The dividend yield approach, on the other hand, is really not
as theoretical as it might first appear. For example, if you earn
$30,000 in 1965, that money will belong to the stockholders, you
and Windsor. Hopefully, you two will be able to agree on how
to use that money. If the potential for further profitable growth
looks good, you’ll probably leave it in the business, but you’ll
really be making a new investment in the company because you
could have paid it out in dividends if you wish. It’s even pos
sible to do both, that is, pay $30,000 in dividends to the existing
stockholders and find a new investor to buy $30,000 of stock to
finance the continued growth. The point is that the profits are
there, and Windsor is really buying a piece of these profits.
Looking at the valuation problem this way, the question then
is: How much of those profits should belong to Windsor? For
analytical purposes, suppose Windsor might accept a dividend
yield of 8% to 12% on his investment. Given that assumption,
here are some calculations which show what that means (Table
4, page 138.)
On this basis, Windsor would get 13 to 20% of the ownership
136

RADIONICS, INC.

Table 1

Com parative Statistics—Radionics, Hightone
and Masters, 1959— 1962
Radionics
Sales— 1962 ..............................
N et income after federal taxes
(000)-1962 ..............................
R eturn on net w orth— 1962
Earnings p er share:
1962 .........................................
1 9 6 1 .........................................
1960
1959 ........................................
C urrent dividend rate
Book value— 1962
Common shares outstanding
(000 om itted) ....................

Hightone

Masters

$600

$1,300

$700

$ 17
11%

$

$ 19
10%

$

$

0.086
0.043
0.006
founded 1959
-0 $ 0.83

60
20%
0.30
0.16
0.08
0.10

$

0.19
0.13
0.04
founded 1959
-0 $ 1.50

-0 $

200

1.50
200

100

Table 2

M arket Price of Radionics
Using H ightone’s Price-Earnings Ratio
Year

Earnings

Price-Earnings
Ratio

P rice/S hare

1962
1961
1960

$0,086
0.043
0.006

30 X
25
22

$2.58
1.06
0.13

Total
M arket Value

Shares
O utstanding
X
X
X

200,000
200,000
200,000

=
=
=

$516,000
212,000
26,000

Table 3

M arket Price of Radionics
Using M asters’ Price-Earnings Ratio
Year

Earnings

Price-Earnings
Ratio

P rice/S hare

1962
1961
1960

$0.086
0.043
0.006

25 x
23
16

$2.15
0.99
0.10

Shares
O utstanding

x
x
x

200,000
200,000
200,000

Total
M arket Value
=
=
=

$430,000
198,000
20,000
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for his $50,000. In terms of the number of shares, at a 10%
yield for example, he would get 40,000 and would own one-sixth
of the 240,000 shares that would then be outstanding.
Here is a summary of my different valuation calculations ( see
below).
In my opinion, the book value figures don’t really mean much;
after all, Windsor is not interested in buying a collection of
assets. He is interested in your management of those assets.
That’s why you should look at this problem in terms of earning
power. I included book value in my analysis for purposes of
comparison with Hightone and Masters to show that you are
not out of line on that score.
The other five values in the table all reflect earning power in

Table 4

Ownership Percentage A ttributable to a $50,000 Investm ent
at Various H ypothetical “D ividend Yields”
“D ividend
Yield”

D ividends Required
on $50,000

8%
10%
12%

Total “Dividends P aid”
(Profits Available in 1965)

$4,000
5,000
6,000

Ownership
Percentage *
for $50,000
13.3%
16.7
20.0

$30,000
30,000
30,000

* Total “dividends paid” divided into dividends required.

H all’s Valuation Calculations
Valuation m ethod
Book value:
All assets
Tangible assets
only
Price-earnings ratio:
25 times earnings
30 times earnings
Dividend yield:
8% yield
10% yield
12% yield
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Percentage Ownership
For $50,000 Investm ent

N um ber of Shares
for $50,000

Price Per
Share

61,097

$ .82

33.3

100,000

.50

10.4
8.8

23,256
19,380

2.15
2.58

13.3

30,769
40,000
50,000

1.63

23.4%

16.7
20.0

1.25
1.00
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some way. I really feel that I would prefer the price-earnings
ratio approach because it reflects an appraisal of companies
similar to Radionics by the impersonal market place.
If I read the market place correctly, I think the value of Radi
onics lies somewhere between the market value of Masters and
Hightone. In my opinion, the market place is willing to pay a
premium for the stock of a company that can double its earnings
in a year, as demonstrated in the case of Hightone. Thus, I
would place the value of Radionics at between $2.15 and $2.58
per share.
Stack: Why would you reject the values derived from the method em
ploying dividend yield?
Hall: I do not feel that these values reflect the supply and demand
forces at work in the market place. This is an important factor
since the demand for stocks of companies such as Radionics far
exceeds the supply. What the dividend approach really tells us
is that investors in companies such as these have very high ex
pectations that earnings will continue to grow in the future.
Windsor—or any investor for that matter—probably wouldn’t
pay more than $1.25 per share for a small, young company such
as this unless he thinks that earnings will continue to grow.
Stack: Well, now that we have a range of possible values between
$2.15 and $2.58, which one do I pick?
Hall: Well, even though I said that I thought your market value would
be in that range, the fact is your stock is not traded at all. This
means that you will probably have to allow some discount to
your first outside investor. My feeling is that you can expect
offers of about $2.00 per share, or about 15% less than what
your market value would normally be. At that price an investor
can, even if earnings level off at $30,000 per year, get a dividend
yield of better than 6½ %. That should be an incentive in this
kind of a situation.
Stack: Well, if I settle on $2.00 that means that Jack Windsor, for
example, would buy 25,000 shares and would own a little better
than 10% of the company. Boy, that’s a long way from his
original offer!
Hall: Windsor will probably present some reasons why his offer is a
reasonable one, but I feel that you should not take it until you
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have had an opportunity to look around. If I’m right about the
market being a seller’s market, you should get better offers.
Stack: W hat reasons do you think Windsor might give to support his
offer?
Hall: There could be many, but I can cite a few that he may give.
He could say the risk of investing in Radionics is very high,
so he should get a substantial discount for assuming the risk.
Here are two risks he might mention: first, the absence of a
good secondary market for the stock; and, second, his lack of
control over management. These risks exist, but they are his
problems—not yours.
He may say the market value approach is unreliable because
the market for stocks such as Hightone and Masters is “thin.”
I would agree the market for these stocks is “thin,” but in the
absence of better measures of values, who is to say the market
prices are unreliable? There are plenty of seasoned, blue-chip,
listed stocks that he could buy, but apparently he feels that
there is great potential in a small company like Radionics.
Another point he might make is that Radionics’ earnings are
overstated because of the deferral of research and development
costs during 1962. My audit opinion covered that, but you
might reiterate that the deferral was necessary to get a proper
matching of costs and revenues.
Following this meeting, Stack refused Windsor’s initial offer. Within
the next few weeks, the “gossip mill” among local investors spread the
word that Stack was looking for equity money and he received six
“firm” offers to purchase $50,000 worth of stock in his company. These
offers ranged from $1.00 to $1.80 per share, including an offer at $1.50
per share from Jack Windsor. Subsequently, Stack accepted the
highest of these six offers.
Peter Hall considered this project to be outside of Radionics day-today business; therefore this service was not covered by his retainer.
His separate bill to Radionics for these services included, in addition
to the analytical work, the time spent in contact with Stack during the
latter’s negotiations with the prospective investors. He normally billed
$30 per hour for this type of service. The adjusted bill as submitted to
Mr. Stack was in the amount of $500.
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Rack Service Corporation
In July 1965 William T. Booth, a partner in the Philadelphia CPA
firm of Skene, Home, Booth & Co., was studying the preliminary ma
terial he had collected in connection with the prospective acquisition
by a client, Rack Service Corporation, of a controlling interest in
Housewares Unlimited, Inc. He had been informed of the prospective
deal the previous week by Preston Lewis, president of Rack Service,
who had requested Booth’s assistance in the negotiations, particularly
with respect to the financial aspects of the transaction. Preston Lewis
considered himself to be uninformed and without any particular skills
in the financial area. His specialty was in merchandising. Lewis’
brother-in-law, Charles Richards, was the chief financial officer, but
day-to-day duties kept him so fully occupied that he welcomed Booth’s
assistance whenever a major non-routine project arose.
Rack Service Corporation had been an audit and tax client of Skene,
Horne & Booth since its formation by Preston Lewis and some family
associates, including Mr. Richards, in 1958. In its seven years of exist
ence, the corporate group of which Rack Service was the central mem
ber had grown rapidly, in part as the result of some significant acqui
sitions either by Rack Service Corporation or directly by Preston Lewis
and his associates. During this time Lewis had come to value Mr.
Booth’s advice highly, and readily sought his counsel on many of the
major financial transactions that he was considering. Booth considered
such advice as being part of the total package of services his firm pro
vided for their clients. He normally billed separately for time spent on
this type of activity only when there was a specific engagement or a
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clearly defined project or problem such as an acquisition; failing this,
his regular bill would simply include the cost of whatever time was
spent in this way, without separate itemization. Over the years Mr.
Booth found an increasing number of clients (many similar to Rack
Service in size or management organization) requesting financial ad
vice. He felt that the ability to assist them was an important extension
of the traditional audit-and-tax relationship, and filled a real need. His
wide experience with the problems of different companies gave him a
useful perspective whenever he was called upon for advice on financial
questions.

Rack Service Corporation

In 1965 Rack Service Corporation was the center of a group of inter
related companies conducting various types of rack-jobbing in the tricity region of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Wilmington, Delaware; and
Trenton, New Jersey, and surrounding areas. (See Exhibit 1, page 143
for corporate organization chart.)
The geographic and business specializations of the various com
panies were as follows:
Rack Service Corporation Supermarket rack-jobbers in health and
beauty aids, toiletries, shaving supplies
(Philadelphia &
and toothpaste, etc. Also, centralized
local area) :
services to entire group, including pur
chasing, warehousing, accounting, ad
ministration, etc.
Merchandise Service Corpo Discount store rack-jobbers (conces
ration (Philadelphia, Tren sionaires ), same lines as Rack Service,
plus cosmetics.
ton and local areas):
Dela-Wares, Inc. (Wilming
ton and surrounding areas):

Small free-standing stores devoted ex
clusively to health and beauty aids,
etc. (more complete lines, and dis
count pricing if compared to Rack
Service in supermarkets).

Rack Service had been started by Preston Lewis in 1958, with
financial backing from the members of his family, including Charles
Richards, who joined the company as chief financial officer. The con142
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cept of supermarkets carrying non-food items was relatively new and
untried at that time. Preston Lewis, who had held a variety of mer
chandising and managerial posts with large retail chains in the East,
felt that the growth of convenience shopping made it a logical develop
ment for supermarkets to carry a limited range of non-food items. He
knew that some supermarket chains which had tested this idea had
found severe difficulties in putting it into practice, primarily because of
their unfamiliarity with the merchandising of non-food items. Also,
their physical facilities and personnel were geared solely to the
handling of food items. While non-foods seemed to represent an un
tapped market, the potential in individual supermarkets seemed to be
small, thus making separate attention by in-store personnel pro
hibitively expensive.
The solution that many of the supermarket chains were turning to
was to “subcontract” the non-food operation by having independent
contractors responsible for it in all of its phases, similar to leased de
partments in department stores, with the exception that the mer
chandise was paid for by the customer in the normal way, together
with his or her food purchases at the checkout counter. An identifying
key would often be used on the cash registers to enable the stores to
accumulate sales volume figures for non-foods, but any such figure
would not affect the non-food subcontractor’s revenue. The subcon
tractor was paid for all merchandise he placed in the store at retail
price less an agreed markup for the supermarket. These subcontractors
became known as “rack-jobbers” because in many cases the merchan
dise items that they serviced were placed on racks in various locations
throughout the supermarkets. The name persisted even when their
operation grew beyond the concept of servicing “racks.”
Preston Lewis felt that rack-jobbing in supermarkets offered a sub
stantial business opportunity, particularly because his background in
retailing provided an element of “know-how” that the supermarket
operators lacked. Acting on this premise, Rack Service Corporation
was founded in 1958 in Philadelphia, with Lewis and various members
of his family as sole owners.
By 1960, after two years of expected difficulties, the corporation was
operating quite successfully, and expanding rapidly. In reviewing the
initial operating results, Lewis decided that the key to continued suc
cess and profit growth in the rack-jobbing business was through in
creased volume. This was because great economies were available
through centralized administration, purchasing, warehousing, distribu
tion, accounting and billing. A central “core” of these services was an
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integral part of any rack-jobbing operation. However, once such a
properly managed core was in existence, it could cope with substantial
increases in volume at very little additional cost, because the costs as
sociated with greater volume were, in Lewis’ opinion, for the most
part fixed. For example, warehousing and order-picking required a
fairly major investment in facilities and materials handling equipment.
Subject only to the physical limits of the warehouse and equipment,
an increase in the volume of goods warehoused and in the number of
orders filled resulted only in minor additional expenses for labor, in
surance and power. In other words, the increased use of such facilities
resulted in a substantial increase in the productivity of these facilities.
Also, increased volume made the costs of more sophisticated overhead
services justifiable, e.g., computer installations for inventory control
and billing.
Preston Lewis felt that in time the natural growth of the company
would permit it to take advantage of the cost savings just mentioned.
He also felt, however, that substantial additional profit could be made
by filling up the spare capacity sooner than normal growth would pro
vide by adding large increments of existing volume to Rack Service
Corporation’s operations. Accordingly, with the help of their local
commercial bankers and occasionally drawing on investment bankers
in Philadelphia and New York, Rack Service began exploring the possi
bilities of acquiring other companies already in the rack-jobbing busi
ness. An essential criterion for any acquisition candidate was that its
operations could be consolidated into the corporation’s facilities.
Acquisition of Beauty Products Distributors, Inc.

The first acquisition, made in late 1960, proved to be doubly fortu
nate from Rack Service Corporation’s point of view. The company
acquired was Beauty Products Distributors, Inc. of Trenton, New
Jersey, also a supermarket rack-jobber and carrying substantially the
same lines of merchandise as Rack Service. Beauty Products Distribu
tors was owned and managed by Mr. N. A. Brandon, whom Preston
Lewis recognized as an individual with a rare merchandising sense,
and who, although successful on the small scale which his limited
resources permitted, was clearly capable of assuming wider responsi
bilities. As part of the transaction, therefore, Mr. Brandon became
sales manager of Rack Service, while continuing to act in the same
capacity for Beauty Products Distributors.
Mr. Brandon was most sympathetic with Rack Service’s desire to
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achieve greater economies through its service facilities because he had
felt somewhat irked by the increasing administrative problems of his
company as it had grown. At the same time, however, Mr. Brandon
felt a strong sense of personal identification with his company, and had
considerable faith in its future under his direction. Therefore, during
the course of the negotiations with Lewis, he suggested that he retain
a substantial minority stock interest in Beauty Products Distributors.
On the other hand, Lewis wanted to create a strong tie between
Brandon and Rack Service Corporation, because he believed that as
sales manager, Brandon could make a considerable contribution to
Rack Service’s future growth.
These objectives were finally satisfied when the investment banker
who had introduced Brandon to Lewis suggested that the two ex
change stock in each other’s companies. This proposal, which seemed
attractive to the parties, required some negotiating before an appropri
ate exchange ratio was found. It was finally decided that Lewis and
his associates would acquire 60 per cent of the stock of Beauty Products
Distributors in exchange for 40 per cent of their Rack Service stock,
thus leaving them with majority ownership of both companies, and
leaving Brandon with a substantial minority position in both com
panies. (When Mr. Booth heard of this arrangement he asked why
Rack Service Corporation had not simply acquired Beauty Products
Distributors in exchange for new stock equivalent to 66⅔ per cent of
the stock already outstanding [100:66% = 60:40]. Lewis’ answer was
that Brandon wanted to maintain the separate identity of his company
—an answer which Mr. Booth did not find completely illuminating.)
Booth was apprised of the terms of the Lewis-Brandon deal when
the two men called on him for assistance in devising a formula by
which Rack Service’s charges to Beauty Products for service functions
were to be computed. This was regarded as an important issue by
both men, even though they each had an unchanging interest in every
dollar of profit, regardless of the company to which it was attributed.
In the end, a fairly simple formula was worked out whereby Rack
Service Corporation’s costs applicable to shared services would be
prorated between the two companies based on a number of factors, in
cluding sales volume, number of transactions and average transaction
size. The result of the formula was that Rack Service in effect shared
some of its fixed costs of providing centralized services, while Beauty
Products, in addition to being relieved of its administrative problems,
also obtained these services at a lower cost than before the joint ar
rangement was established.
146

RACK SERVICE CORPORATION

Acquisition of Dela-Wares, Inc.

The next addition to the group came in April 1962, when Preston
Lewis and associates acquired 60 per cent of the stock of Dela-Wares,
Inc. of Wilmington, Delaware, a corporation operating a chain of small
free-standing stores selling only health and beauty aids, toiletries, and
similar items. The Dela-Wares stores maintained a broader line of
merchandise than did Rack Service Corporation and Beauty Products
Distributors, but there was substantial overlap. Further, the operation
was run in substantially the same manner as the other two companies.
Dela-Wares, Inc. had been very successful, building its volume on the
basis of convenience; a wide variety of fairly standardized merchan
dise; and in “discount” prices which were below the manufacturers’
suggested prices and usually below the prices charged by other stores
in the immediate neighborhood. There was also some overlap in
trading area between existing Dela-Wares units and Rack Service and
Beauty Products customers. Customers usually entered a Dela-Wares
store to purchase a specific item (e.g., toothpaste, vitamins, aspirin,
etc.) and then bought not only that item, but also numerous other
items that were displayed in the store. Preston Lewis believed that
there was substantial room for expansion by Dela-Wares, Inc., both in
its own general area (Wilmington, Delaware) and in the areas in
which Rack Service and Beauty Products served their customers.
Dela-Wares, Inc. had been brought to Preston Lewis’ attention
through the offices of his commercial bank, a correspondent of DelaWares’ bank in Wilmington. Dela-Wares, Inc. was looking for an
opportunity of combining operations with a larger firm in roughly the
same line of business within easy distance of their existing operations.
It fitted very well into Rack Service’s merchandising and distribution
pattern, and also gave the group the nucleus for an expansion effort
in a new field. Dela-Wares’ management, headed by L. S. Jurgens,
remained with the company. Mr. Jurgens and his associates retained a
40 per cent interest in Dela-Wares, Inc., a fact which Preston Lewis
felt would supply them with the sense of financial involvement that
would continue to motivate them in continuing to increase Dela-Wares’
growth and profitability. The Jurgens group had no difficulty in reach
ing an agreement with Rack Service Corporation for the provision by
the latter of centralized services, on a basis identical to that of the Rack
Service-Beauty Products arrangement. Both parties expected to realize
economies from this arrangement; Dela-Wares because it was obtain
ing the advantage of spreading overhead cost over a sales volume sev
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eral times larger than its own, and Rack Service Corporation because
the additional volume meant better utilization of its service capacity.
Despite a slight increase in Rack Service’s total operating costs, “unit”
costs were reduced because the proportionate increase in volume ex
ceeded the proportionate increase in costs.
Acquisition of Merchandise Service Corporation

About a year after the Dela-Wares deal, Mr. Jurgens, the president,
approached Preston Lewis with the suggestion that they jointly acquire
a discount-store rack-jobbing company headquartered in Philadelphia,
the Merchandise Service Corporation. This company’s activities were
described by the owners as the operation of department store con
cessions rather than “rack-jobbing,” but Jurgens felt that essentially
their business was in rack-jobbing, and as such, was compatible with
the rest of the Rack Service Corporation group. The departments
operated by Merchandise Service Corporation in numerous discount
stores in the Philadelphia area carried approximately the same lines as
Rack Service, plus a wide selection of cosmetics.
The proposed acquisition seemed to fit in with Lewis’ plans for ex
pansion of the Rack Service group for a number of reasons. As he saw
it, the new company:
1. Would expand the group’s coverage in the Philadelphia area as
presently served, but would not compete with the existing installations
in supermarkets
2. Depended on the same type of inventory as existing operations
except for cosmetics, and required similar merchandising and logistical
skills
3. Provided a nucleus for further expansion in its own particular
line of endeavor
4. Provided a further opportunity for cost-sharing and saving on
centralized administrative functions.
Preston Lewis thought that Merchandise Service Corporation would
make a valuable addition to the Rack Service group, but found himself
in the middle of a controversy when he agreed to negotiate with the
prospective sellers. Jurgens, the president of Dela-Wares, who had
brought the company to Lewis’ attention, claimed that he and his asso
ciates were “entitled” to acquire a share in the new company, not only
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by virtue of their role as finders but also because they wished to par
ticipate in its management and were veiling to back this desire with a
personal investment in the company. Because it had always been
Lewis’ desire to integrate “divisional” executives into the broader man
agement of the whole group, and to give them the widest possible
scope for the exercise of their talents, and because he had a high regard
for Jurgens’ capabilities (demonstrated by the success of Dela-Wares),
Lewis felt that he had no option but to accede to Jurgens’ request for
an interest in Merchandise Service Corporation. On the other hand,
Lewis was also under pressure from N. A. Brandon, sales manager of
Rack Service Corporation and minority stockholder in both Beauty
Products Distributors and Rack Service Corporation, for an interest to
be made available to him as well.
The solution that finally evolved to meet the clamor from all sides for
“a piece of the action,” was for the stock of Merchandise Service to be
purchased 60 per cent by Rack Service and 40 per cent by the Jurgens
group, Brandon’s claim for an interest being satisfied via his 40 per cent
interest in Rack Service Corporation. The 40 per cent interest allocated
to the Jurgens group was influenced partly by the fact that their hold
ings in Dela-Wares, Inc. also amounted to 40 per cent thus providing
some sort of uniformity and partly by the fact that an “outside invest
ment of this size would provide a substantial part of the capital re
quired while still leaving Rack Service Corporation ( and thus Preston
Lewis) with voting control.”
After the acquisition negotiations were completed, and Merchandise
Service Corporation had taken its place as a member of the Rack Serv
ice Corporation group, however, Preston Lewis remarked to his certi
fied public accountant, Mr. Booth, that the organizational structure of
the group seemed to be getting “unnecessarily” complicated. Oper
ationally all the executives in the group worked well together and
coordinated their activities quite harmoniously. None of them dis
puted the methods used to allocate joint costs to the various operating
units. It was only when it came to actual ownership that there seemed
to be forces pulling in opposite directions. Preston Lewis remarked to
Booth that sooner or later it might be necessary to simplify the owner
ship problem by combining the various companies in the group, per
haps by merging all the others into Rack Service. He had no set views
on what exactly should be done, or when, but he did feel that in due
course some action along those lines would be necessary. “I can’t have
a wrangle like this with the boys every time we want to add a company
to the group,” he said to Booth, “and you can be sure that we’re still on
149

the lookout for acquisitions, so sooner or later this thing will have to
come to a head. I’ll call you when we decide to do something.”
Lewis’ promised call to Booth never came, however. Instead, the
matter was next raised, indirectly, when Preston Lewis called Booth
in July, 1965 to request his assistance on yet another acquisition, this
time a company known as Housewares Unlimited. Booth suggested
that Lewis come into his office to discuss it later that same day.
Housewares Unlim ited, Inc.

Preston Lewis began his discussion with Booth by recounting the
now familiar and well-tried philosophy of the advantage of expanding
the Rack Service Corporation group by acquisition, in addition to the
normal processes of internal growth. He added that in reviewing the
make-up of the group, as he and his fellow executives had done re
cently, he had come to the conclusion that there were very few ap
proaches to the rack-jobbing of health-and-beauty aids in which the
group was not represented as a result of the series of acquisitions made
through the years. Thus, apart from normal internal growth, future
expansion could only come from acquisitions of:
1. Competing companies in geographic areas presently served
2. Companies engaged in other forms of rack-jobbing within geo
graphic areas presently served
3. Companies operating outside the areas presently served, in either
health-and-beauty aids or other lines of rack-jobbing.
Lewis said that alternative (1) seemed the “safest” to him, while
(2) seemed to be “the most interesting.” Alternative (3) was not too
attractive until all opportunities available under (1) and (2) were
exhausted, because (3) would involve logistic strains or the operation
of a separate organization, neither of which seemed to fit logically
with the successful pattern of development on which the group’s
growth had been based so far. Lewis went on to say that after further
consideration he had found considerable merit in the acquisition of
companies engaged in other forms of rack-jobbing within Rack Service
Corporation’s geographic area. The primary reason for this was that
such acquisitions would enable the Rack Service Corporation group to
offer a more complete service to their existing customers and thus pro
vide the means for even further utilization of its centralized facilities.
According to Lewis, the obvious answer to the question, “W hat else
is rack-jobbed in supermarkets?” was housewares. Housewares con
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sisted of items such as kitchen utensils, brooms and other cleaning
equipment, pots and pans, plastic household articles, low-priced glass
ware, and many others. Housewares were rack-jobbed for the same
reasons as health-and-beauty aids, but there had been very little ac
tivity in this field until the early 1960’s when the success of the rack
jobbing concept in health-and-beauty aids had given the spur to the
rack-jobbing of other articles. This need had been met by specialist
firms, rather than by existing rack-jobbers, primarily because the basic
concept of rack-jobbing was that success depended on specific mer
chandising skills in specific lines of merchandise. Logistics were also
important, and on this score the existing rack-jobbers had an advantage
even though it would have meant handling other lines of merchandise,
but logistics skills were secondary to the need for merchandising skills
which the existing firms handling other lines did not have. Lewis had
concluded, therefore, that the Rack Service Corporation group should
only acquire a houseware rack-jobber if it acquired skilled management
as well. The contribution which Rack Service would bring to the
marriage would be its logistic services, entree to its existing customers,
its low cost overhead service, and, of course, its capital resources.
Preston Lewis said that the last benefit seemed to be quite im
portant, because his investigations had indicated that the typical housewares rack-jobber was small and undercapitalized, much the same as
Rack Service Corporation had been in its early years. He went on to
say that in the course of his investigation of housewares rack-jobbers,
he had come across a company that seemed to be an excellent acquisi
tion prospect, namely Housewares Unlimited, Inc., of Philadelphia.
The president of Housewares was Mr. Charles Fulford, who owned
100 per cent of the stock of the company. Mr. Fulford was only 31
years old, and had founded his company late in 1963 after having
worked for some years for a Philadelphia five-and-ten-cent chain.
Lewis told Booth that he had approached Fulford to sound him out
on a possible deal, and had received a positive response. Fulford’s
company had been quite successful in its year and a half of existence,
but it was in need of capital for further growth. Furthermore, Fulford
was quite intrigued with the possibilities for expansion which associa
tion with the Rack Service group could provide.
Lewis told Booth that he wanted to acquire 80 per cent of the stock
of Housewares Unlimited, Inc., leaving 20 per cent in the hands of Ful
ford in order to provide him with an incentive, because Fulford would
continue to play a major role in Housewares Unlimited’s management.
Lewis said that he was not sure, however, whether he and his asso
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ciates ought to acquire the 80 per cent directly, or through one of the
companies in the group, perhaps Rack Service Corporation. He said
that this was one point on which he would like to have Booth’s opinion.
Booth had been trying to break into the conversation for some
time, and at this point he interrupted Lewis. “Preston, in your eager
ness to buy this company, I think you’re making the same old mistake
all over again—or, at least, you’re heading that way. When you ac
quired Merchandise Service Corporation you said something to me
about the increasingly complicated corporate structure of the Rack
Service Corporation group, with ‘outside’ interests owning a piece of
everything and an organization chart that’s beginning to look like a
labyrinth. In fact, at the time, you said that you thought something
ought to be done about simplifying the structure, but you didn’t want
me to come up with anything specific, and you never came up with
anything yourself that I know of. Now you’re getting ready to add
another head to this monster. Do you really think it’s wise to let Ful
ford keep 20 per cent of his company? I am certain that there are
alternative ways of achieving the incentive you want for him. Isn’t it
time you did something about tidying up the group’s organizational
structure?”
“Hmm, you may have a point there,” Lewis replied. “In the excite
ment I guess I had forgotten about that conversation we had. But
Bill, I can’t wait to acquire Fulford until we sort the rest of the group
out. That could take years, and obviously I still don’t know, exactly,
what form the tidying-up should take. I’ve got the feeling that it will
take a tremendous selling job to get the rest of the boys to give up
anything they now have regardless of what we offer in exchange. Yet
it’s got to be done. In the back of my mind I’ve had the idea of going
public some time in the future, and we’d obviously have to have the
group in shape long before that happens. But that of itself is not the
immediate problem. I’ve got this fellow Fulford ready to come in with
my group, and I’ve got to come up with something within a week or
two. I’d like to make him an offer that’s good enough for him to accept,
because I’m quite keen on having him join us. This could be a major
breakthrough for our organization, to be able to provide a combination
that no one else in the business has. I don’t want to gum up the corpo
rate works with another little company floating in mid-air, and I don’t
want to lose this one either. W hat do I do?”
“Don’t get me wrong, Preston. I’m not suggesting that you not enter
into this deal, and I know that consolidation of the group will be a
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lengthy process. But being aware of the problem is an advantage by
itself. At least maybe you can try to consummate this acquisition in
such a way that it doesn’t make the eventual consolidation any more
difficult than it already is.”
“What do you mean?”
"I’m not quite sure in terms of specifics, at this point. But I think
the principle is important enough that you might want to consider the
possibility of a future consolidation into the structure of this acquisi
tion. I can offer to do some thinking on this matter and see if I can
come up with an idea or two.”
“Excellent. But please get those ideas fast, because I’ve got to get
back to Fulford pretty soon.”
“Is there anything else I can do for you?”
“Well, if we get to the agreement stage, of course I’ll want you to do
a balance sheet audit of Housewares Unlimited so that we know what
we re getting. I don’t think I need you to audit the financial statements
for his first year; they were certified by Fulford’s auditor, and in any
event the assets involved are so small that the financial statements are
almost irrelevant. However, you might take a look at them and let me
know if you see anything that looks unusual. Also, if you can get a
handle on a fair price to pay Fulford, that will be useful—although,
frankly, as I said before, I doubt if the financial statements will help
you on this. My discussions with Fulford so far have skirted around
the price issue; I think it’s going to be a matter of horse-trading when
we get down to it. Here are the financial statements that Fulford gave
me; why don’t you give me a call as soon as you’ve come to any
conclusions.”
The financial statements for Housewares Unlimited, Inc. that Lewis
left with Booth are summarized in Exhibits 2 and 3, pages 155 and 156.

Questions

1. Suggest an approach that Preston Lewis might follow in his
negotiations with Charles Fulford, and indicate how it conforms to the
need of eventually combining all the companies in the Rack Service
Corporation Group. Do you think that this “need” is a valid objective
for Lewis to be following at this point? ( State your reasons, whether
pro or con.)
2. Suggest a price range for Housewares Unlimited, Inc. If addi153

tional data is required, state what, where and how you would obtain it.
3. Are there any important factors or considerations relevant to the
proposed acquisition that apparently have not been considered by
Lewis?
4. If Lewis were to request you to develop plans for the eventual
consolidation of the Rack Service Corporation group into one company,
what steps would you suggest?
Booth’s Analysis

As William Booth began his analysis of the Housewares Unlimited
acquisition problem, he recognized that he didn’t have very much data
to go on. His files, of course, contained the Rack Service Corporation
group’s financial statements since its beginning, but he didn’t believe
that the statements prior to the 1964 fiscal year (the latest; see Ex
hibits 4, 5, and 6, pages 158, 161, and 162, respectively) would tell him
anything more useful than the 1964 statements themselves. However,
he naturally was familiar with the group’s background and history.
Further, while Booth also had Housewares Unlimited’s financial state
ments for almost the whole period of its existence (Exhibits 2 and 3),
he didn’t think that these told him very much that was useful either.
Booth decided to look first at the question of acquisition per se,
since this was the most urgent and also the most tangible part of his
assignment. He decided to treat the questions of relating Housewares
Unlimited to the Rack Service group and of the ultimate structure
toward which the group might begin to move as secondary matters
because the “answers” here, if any, were very much a matter of con
jecture and the personal preference of the parties involved.
Booth began his study of the acquisition problem by carefully
analyzing Housewares’ financial statements. He noted the following
main points of interest:
• Tangible net worth approximately $30,000.
• Sales approximately $250,000. (Note: need to get comparative data,
if available, for four months to May 31, 1964 to determine possible
growth rate.)
• Gross margin 21-22%. (Note: Rack Service Corporation’s gross
margin is about 20% .)
• Profit before taxes $14,000—$22,000. (The latter number is de
pendent on a seasonal factor, if any, and after paying Fulford a
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Exhibit 2

HOUSEW ARES U N L IM IT E D , INC.—BALANCE SHEETS
Statem ents of Financial Position
January 31, 1965 and May 31, 1965
ASSETS
May 31,1965
C urrent assets:
Cash
Accounts receivable
Loans receivable
Inventory
Total current assets
Fixed assets:
L and & buildings .......................
Automobiles & trucks
Fixtures & fittings
Total fixed assets
Less: Accum ulated depreciation
Fixed assets, book value
O ther assets:
Deposits
Prepaym ents

$ 6,300
23,300
4,400
25,400

$12,000
14,800
3,800
14,400
$ 59,400

$45,000

28,400
9,500
4,200

28,400
9,500
4,000

42,100
5,100

41,900
4,100
37,000

3,200
2,200

Total other assets
Total assets ...............................

Long term liabilities:
Notes payable-bank (over 1 yr.)
Notes payable-officers
First m ortgage
Total long term liabilities

3,200
4,500
19,500

Stockholders’ equity:
Common stock
R etained earnings
Total stockholders’ equity

13,400
19,200

37,800
3,200
2,500

5,400

5,700

$101,800

$88,500

LIA BILITIES and EQUITY
C urrent liabilities:
Accounts payable
$28,000
Notes payable-bank
10,600
Taxes payable
3,400
Total current liabilities
$ 42,000

Total liabilities & equity

January 3 1 , 1965

$27,500
5,000
5,100
$37,600
3,800
—
20,000

27,200

23,800
13,400
13,700

32,600

27,100

$101,800

$88,500
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Exhibit 3

HOUSEW ARES U N L IM IT E D , INC.
Statem ents of Income
For the Year Ended January 31, 1965 and
The Four Month Period Ending
May 31, 1965
F our M onths E nded
May 3 1 , 1965
Sales
Cost of sales:
Inventory—beginning
Purchases
W ages
Inventory— ending
Cost of sales
Gross profit
General & adm inistrative
expenses:
Accounting & legal
Auto & truck expense
Blue Cross
City taxes
Depreciation
Electricity
Executive salaries
Fuel
Insurance
Interest
Licenses
M aintenance
Payroll taxes
Postage
Property expense &
depreciation
Stationery & printing
Telephone .................................
Travel ........................................
T rade gifts
Casual labor
Miscellaneous
Total
Profit before taxes
Federal and state income taxes
N et income
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Year E nded
January 3 1 , 1965

$90,100
$ 14,400
73,500
8,800
(25,400)

$233,700
$ 10,900
162,900
22,600
(14,400)

71,300

182,000

18,800

51,700

100
1,000
300
—
400
400
5,100
200
500
400
100
100
800
100

700
2,600
600
300
2,200
500
16,300
400
2,300
2,000
200
1,100
1,900
300

700
100
400
500
—
—
100

2,600
400
900
700
300
700
400
11,300

37,400

7,500
2,000

14,300
3,600

$ 5,500

$ 10,700

RACK SERVICE CORPORATION

$16,000 salary. (Note: Rack Service’s 1964 fiscal year profit $26,000
before taxes.)
• On Housewares’ existing business, the most likely cost savings after
amalgamation into the Rack Service group are the following
expenses:
1/31/65 Total
Wages
Blue Cross and payroll tax
Electricity and fuel
Insurance and maintenance
Property expense

$22,600
2,500
900
3,400
2,600
$32,000

In that it is unlikely that all of the amounts above can be saved; an
assumption of 50% or $16,000 is made.
Booth also noted the following additional factors which he felt were
relevant:
• Housewares was probably at the same critical stage where further
expansion would add substantially to overhead, as had happened
when Rack Service grew (pre-tax profit margin for the 1964 fiscal
year is 6% and annualized it is 1% for fiscal 1965).
• Housewares’ past success and profitability is undoubtedly attribu
table for the most part to Fulford’s own personal efforts. The same
will undoubtedly hold for the future.
• For Rack Service Corporation, the real attraction in Housewares is
the potential profit from substantially increasing Housewares’ vol
ume by introducing its products to other Rack Service customers
(this profit includes the overhead and administrative cost “saving”
from adding the Housewares operation to Rack Service’s). This
really represents a leverage on Fulford’s abilities, which presumably
are being under-utilized at present. Question: should Rack Service
Corporation pay Fulford anything for this leverage, i.e., should this
be a factor in setting the price? Isn’t much of this potential brought
to the deal by Rack Service?
• Housewares’ own, independent natural growth could require addi
tional financing, which Rack Service could obtain much more easily
than could Fulford.
• From Fulford’s point of view it is probably appropriate to view
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Total assets

O ther assets

Total fixed assets

Racks
Trucks ........................................................
E quipm ent and fixtures
$277,000

$148,000
61,000
68,000
$191,000

$128,000
28,000
35,000

Allowance for
D epreciation

$20,000
33,000
33,000

Net

$1,252,000

12,000

$86,00086,000

153,000

Investm ent in affiliates
Cost

251,000

Due from affiliates (net) ............................................................................................................................

Fixed assets:

$ 750,000

$ 2,000
309,000
431,000
8,000

C urrent assets:
Cash ............................................................................................................................................................
Accounts receivable ................................................................................................................................
Inventory (including $17,000 in transit)
Prepaym ents ...............................................................................................................................................
Total current assets ............................................................................................................................

ASSETS

Balance Sheet
January 31, 1965

RACK SERVICE CORPORATION

Exhibit 4

and

STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY

302,000
$1,252,000

Total liabilities and equity

$240,000
62,000

Stockholders’ equity:
Common stock
R etained earnings
Total stockholders’ equity

$ 950,000

Total liabilities

$ 902,000
48,000

$501,000
361,000
19,000
21,000

Long term liabilities:
Notes payable

C urrent liabilities:
Accounts payable
Notes payable-bank (secured) .............................................................................................................
Loans payable
Taxes payable ..........................................................................................................................................
T otal current liabilities ....................................................................................................................

LIA B ILITIES
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Housewares as a salary-and-profit producer. Thus, salary may be a
bargaining point, or one way of conveying to Fulford the total
package of values he desires.
Mr. Booth then drew the following conclusions, which he clearly
labeled as being subjective since he felt that objectivity as such would
give him no guide to the required answers.
• Housewares is probably worth something in excess of book value
(book value = 2 to 1½ X pre-tax income).
• Maintaining Fulford’s interest and participation in the company is
critical.
• Housewares is in a poor bargaining position because continued inde
pendence offers little prospect of a substantial growth in income.
• Fulford’s salary is probably about right. An increase would repre
sent a premium over his personal market value.
Mr. Booth then calculated a range of possible purchase prices for
Housewares, as follows:
Pre-tax earnings base (subject
to verification of current year
increase from $14,000 to
$22,000)
Valuation of company at stated
multiple
80% of above ...........................
Valuation of company if earn
ings were $5,000 less (i.e., if
Fulford’s salary increased by
$5,000)
80% of above

$18,000 Average
2½ X

3X

4X

5X

$45,000
36,000

$54,000
43,200

$72,000
57,600

$90,000
72,000

32,500
26,000

39,000
31,200

52,000
41,600

65,000

52,000

Mr. Booth believed that it was in Rack Service Corporation’s interest
to keep the purchase price for Housewares as close to tangible book
value as possible. He reasoned that this would protect his client in the
event, however unlikely, that Housewares were ever liquidated. He
reasoned that this was important where a business was so highly de
pendent on the efforts of one man. It followed from this approach that
any goodwill or premium over book value required by the seller should
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be recognized by increasing his annual income. This had two ad
vantages:
• Such payments were annually contingent upon the continued exist
ence of the company being acquired and upon the critical indi
vidual’s employment.
• Such payments were 100% tax-deductible whereas the amortization
of goodwill would not be. (The tangible assets of Housewares
seemed to offer little opportunity for revaluation.)
The disadvantage of this type of payment was that the salary might
well continue long enough to exceed the cash value that the seller
would accept including goodwill, if the company acquired remained
successful. Mr. Booth felt that this was not a significant factor, and
that the “insurance” was worth the possible future cost. He would
point this out to Lewis at their meeting.
Booth recalled that Lewis had suggested leaving Fulford with a 20
Exhibit 5

RACK SERVICE CORPORATION
Income Statem ent
For the Year Ended January 31, 1965
Sales ...............................................................................
Less cost of goods sold:
Inventory—beginning
Purchases ..................................................................
Inventory—ending
Cost of goods sold
Gross profit
Less expenses (detail per Exhibit 6):
W arehouse ..............................................................
Selling & delivery
Adm inistrative and general

$1,878,000
$ 444,000
1,464,000
(414,000)
1,494,000
$ 384,000
$ 208,000
129,000
210,000
$ 547,000

L e ss: Expenses apportioned to other group
companies
N et expenses
Net profit from operations

189,000
358,000
$

Federal and state income taxes
N et income ...................................................................

26,000
9,000

$

17,000
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Exhibit 6

RACK SERVICE CORPORATION
Schedule of O perating Expenses
For the Year Ended January 31, 1965
W arehouse expenses:
Payroll
Rent .................................................................................
Heat, light and pow er
W arehouse supplies
Insurance
D epreciation ................................................................
Miscellaneous
Total warehouse expenses

Delivery and selling expenses:
Payroll .............................................................................
Automobile and truck expenses
Depreciation
Travel and selling expenses
Taxes (vehicles)
Insurance .......................................................................
Total delivery and selling expenses

Administration and general expenses:
Executive salaries
Payroll taxes
(including warehouse & salesmen)
D epreciation ................................................................
Professional services
Office salaries ..............................................................
Office supplies and expense
D ata processing rentals
Telephone
Bad D ebts
Interest ...........................................................................
Miscellaneous
Total adm inistrative & general expenses .........
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$135,000
36,000
7,000
13,000
10,000
4,000
3,000
$208,000

$ 60,000
8,000
34,000
17,000
3,000
7,000
$129,000

$ 50,000
18,000
3,000
5,000
55,000
9,000
22,000
7,000
5,000
35,000
1,000
$210,000
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per cent equity interest in Housewares. Subject to later review in con
nection with the consolidation question, he decided to accept this as
a working premise because it would achieve the important objective of
providing Fulford with a financial incentive geared to Housewares’
future success. It then occurred to Booth that permitting Fulford to
retain this interest need not necessarily “dilute” his client’s interest in
Housewares’ net assets in the event of liquidation. This could be
achieved by converting Housewares’ stock into two classes, “A” and
“B”, with “A” entitled to a preference on liquidation, but with both
classes sharing in profits on a share-for-share basis. The ratio of A to
B would be 80:20. The liquidation preference of the “A” class would
be set at a per share figure calculated by dividing the total book value
of the company on acquisition by the number of “A” shares. Booth
recognized that this feature might not be attractive to Fulford, but he
thought that if the purchase price of the “A” stock were set at the same
value as the liquidation preference then Fulford should not object be
cause he would have been paid the full book value of the company
when selling his stock. In effect, his “B” stock would represent a one
way option on 20 per cent of any increase in book value, and on 20 per
cent of Housewares’ earning power.
Reviewing the calculations he had made previously, Booth noted
that a multiple of slightly more than 3 X the adjusted average pre-tax
earnings would produce what might be considered a satisfactory price
(3 X $13,000 = $39,000; $39,000 X 80% = $31,200; $31,200 = ap
proximate book value [$32,600]). In other words, a purchase of 80
per cent of Housewares’ stock by Rack Service Corporation at 3 X
pre-tax earnings would not represent a cost in excess of 100 per cent of
tangible book value. Although he had in reality “backed into” this
figure, Mr. Booth felt that 3 X pre-tax earnings was quite an appropri
ate multiple for a company like Housewares. He therefore summarized
his thoughts about the terms of the possible acquisition into the follow
ing three steps:
1. Housewares would classify its common stock as “A”, capitalizing
its retained earnings by declaring a stock dividend in “A” and “B” shares
—“B” shares to amount to 20% of the total stock outstanding after
the stock dividend. The “A” shares would be given a liquidation pref
erence of 125% of par value (100% ÷ 80% = 125% ).
2. Fulford would be offered a price for the “A” shares equivalent to
total tangible net worth of the company. This price is equivalent to
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slightly over 3 X adjusted pre-tax earnings (adjusted as per item (3)
below). [Booth noted that he thought that Lewis could go up to 3½
X earnings, or a premium of approximately 10%, if he absolutely had
to. This could perhaps be countered by an increase in the liquidation
preference in the “A” stock.]
3. Fulford’s salary would be raised by $5,000 to $21,300 per year.
Having established a recommendation on the terms of the offer to be
made for Housewares, Booth turned next to consideration of the wider
question of the structure of the whole Rack Service Corporation group,
and Housewares’ relationship to it. As he did so, Booth wondered
whether he had perhaps prejudged the issue when he had placed this
major question second in order of attention. As he began to think about
the question, he realized that he was now trying to rationalize the
proposal on Housewares that he had already come up with, rather
than look at the structure question in an objective manner. Regardless
of the rights or wrongs of his approach, however, he realized that the
damage, if any, had already been done by tackling the price-and-terms
question first. (After the whole problem was resolved, Booth con
tinued to wonder how much his recommendation on the structure
question had been affected by the order in which he tackled the two
parts of his assignment for Lewis.)
Booth spent some time considering where in the group the 80 per
cent holding of Housewares’ stock should be located. He found no
easy solution, starting with the assumption that all of the stockholders
and companies in the group had the resources to make the purchase.
His first inclination was that the Housewares’ stock should be pur
chased by Rack Service Corporation as it was the central company in
the group. He realized, however, that this suggestion might not be
well received by the Jurgens group who had no investment in Rack
Service itself. Thus, the logical contender to make the investment
might be Merchandise Service Corporation, since all three investor
groups had some interest, direct or indirect, in that company. He
wasn’t sure, however, that the proportionate ownership of Merchandise
Service was what Preston Lewis wanted for the new investment. Per
haps Lewis in conjunction with his family associates should make the
investment, since this would avoid the problems represented by the
percentage ownerships of the other investor groups in the various com
panies within the group. But this would not provide interest for either
Mr. Brandon or the Jurgens group.
At this point Booth realized that his reasoning was going around in
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circles. There were advantages and disadvantages in putting the
Housewares investment in any of the group companies. Further, he
did not consider it desirable to divide the Housewares stock among two
or more companies within the group. He felt that a different approach
was needed and decided to take a fresh look at the question the follow
ing day.
When he returned to the problem, Booth’s first reaction was that he
had been focusing too narrowly on the issue in an attempt to solve the
specific problem of finding a “home” in the Rack Service group for
Housewares. He believed that a more fruitful approach would be to
first develop some ideas about the future consolidation of the group,
and then see where that left the Housewares problem.
Booth therefore listed the following reasons which he felt justified
consolidation of the group:
• Greater financial power of a larger company, particularly to raise
capital for expansion.
• Possibility of a public offering of stock, providing (a) enhanced
ability to acquire other companies, and (b) estate planning advan
tages for existing stockholders.
• Consolidation would emphasize the “group” nature of the Rack Serv
ice Corporation organization, in contrast to the present fragmented
structure. Executive-stockholders’ financial incentives would depend
more on the success of the group as a whole than on the success of
the individual companies within the group.
• Problem of citing new acquisitions, e.g., Housewares Unlimited, Inc.
would be obviated.
The problem of specifying which of the companies in the group
should become the eventual survivor in the consolidation process was
almost as complicated as the problem of where to put Housewares. It
occurred to him, however, that in consolidating the group it could be
quite feasible to set up a new company and merge all the existing com
panies into it. This, of course, would mean determining a value for
each company, in order to establish the terms for the mergers. Booth
reasoned that this was the key to the problem.
If a value could be assigned to each company in the group, Booth
reasoned that there would be no need (except for possible legal compli
cations) to set up a new company into which the existing companies
could be merged. Once values were set, the companies in the group
could be merged into any group company with the identical result in
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terms of ownership; selecting the surviving company would then be a
matter for the various founders to decide, recognizing the inevitable
desire that each might have to see his company survive. The analytical
problem, however, resolved itself into one of determining relative or
absolute values, after which consolidation could take place at will. If
a value could be established for Housewares Unlimited, Inc. on compa
rable terms, it too could become part of the consolidated group without
any difficulty.
Taking his reasoning a step further, Booth realized that if the various
investors in the Rack Service group agreed that the investment in
Housewares would be valued at cost for purposes of consolidation, this
would mean that any increase in Housewares’ value between acquisi
tion and the time the group was consolidated would accrue to the vari
ous investors in proportion to the values of their holdings in the entire
group at the time of consolidation. If it were assumed that these pro
portions would not change substantially from the present time, then it
would not matter which group company was chosen as the temporary
home for Housewares. That problem therefore was conditionally
solved; and Booth decided to recommend that the Housewares stock
be purchased by Lewis personally, or alternatively by Merchandise
Service Corporation, assuming in either case that Lewis was able to
satisfy the various owners that this reasoning was sound. In the event
that Brandon or the Jurgens group refused to contemplate Lewis’ ac
quiring the Housewares stock directly, Merchandise Service was the
only group company in which all the investor groups had an interest.
Therefore, Merchandise Service would be the alternative.
Booth noted that “cost”, or current value at time of acquisition would
not be the value to use if Fulford’s 20 per cent interest in Housewares
were taken over at the consolidation. This interest should be valued by
first placing a value on Housewares’ stock, using whatever method was
agreed upon by all concerned for use in valuing all group companies,
and then calculating the appropriate amount due Fulford for his shares.
Thus, Fulford would receive any appreciation in value of Housewares
between acquisition and consolidation. As he noted this point, Booth
realized that the approach he was developing would not require all the
group companies to be consolidated simultaneously. Each could be
brought in individually, at whatever time the parties deemed appropri
ate. For example, it might be considered preferable not to consolidate
Housewares until it had become a fully-fledged member of the group.
Fulford’s incentive might best be kept at the Housewares level until
such time as his activities had become so integrated with the group
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that it was desirable for his financial interest to become group-oriented
also. This was just an example, Booth thought, but the same idea might
be applicable to other existing group companies and, of course, to
future acquisitions as well. Further down the road, he realized, a fully
integrated company might operate more efficiently with a substantially
different organizational structure for top management; at this time,
however, he felt it premature to predict how the organization might
evolve in the future.
Booth decided that the terms of this engagement precluded his going
ahead and setting tentative values on individual companies in the
group. He did decide, however, that he would recommend that this
be undertaken as early as possible. He felt that the assistance of one or
more investment bankers would probably be required in this project,
because the most important and difficult part of the problem would be
to develop a theoretical basis, or formula, to use in deriving values. As
he thought about this, Booth made a mental note that he felt that Rack
Service Corporation’s value should include some kind of premium over
a formula value, to take into account the value of its name, its long
existence and reputation, and the administrative and service structure
it had built up for the benefit of the group. He had no idea how large
this premium should be, but he resolved to bring this point up for
discussion at the appropriate time.
Feeling that he had come up with answers to all the questions that
Lewis had raised, Booth telephoned him and hold him that he was
ready to talk specifics on a possible price for Housewares Unlimited,
Inc. and that he had formulated an approach that could ultimately be
used to consolidate the Rack Service Corporation group into one
company.
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